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Abstract
The academic discipline of Sociology has rarely broached the subject of war and its recursive
relationship with society. This paper addresses three major approaches in several disciplines that
can be deemed ‘economically deterministic’: Marxist, Liberal, and Realist. These approaches
can be useful for certain questions, but also leave out, or cloud other non-economic variables in
understanding war – notably culture and military variables themselves. By using Karl Polanyi’s
thesis regarding the “Myth of the Hundred Years’ Peace” (1815-1914) as a foil, the historical
case of war in the nineteenth century is used to highlight the nature of war in European
modernity and capitalism.

iv

Contents

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
1.

War, Modernity, and Capitalism ............................................................................................. 6

2.

Economistic Theories of War and Modernity ....................................................................... 11

3.

4.

2.1.

Marxist Perspectives ...................................................................................................... 12

2.2.

Realist Perspectives ........................................................................................................ 27

2.3.

Liberal Perspectives ....................................................................................................... 41

2.4.

A Synthetic Critique of Marxist, Liberal, and Realist Perspectives............................... 54

The Myth of the Hundred Years’ Peace: War in the Nineteenth Century ............................. 63
3.1.

Polanyi’s Hundred Years’ Peace .................................................................................... 66

3.2.

Measuring War and Peace in the Nineteenth Century ................................................... 74

Culture, Ideology, and War in the Nineteenth Century ....................................................... 126

Conclusion: “Capitalism” vs. “Civilization” .............................................................................. 166
References ................................................................................................................................... 173
Appendix A ................................................................................................................................. 192
Vita.............................................................................................................................................. 207

v

List of Tables
3.1

Wars Involving Great Powers

75

3.2

Great Power Wars According to Polanyi’s Criteria

77

3.3

Armies (in 000s)

90

3.4

Navies (In Number of Battleships)

93

A.1

Wars, Revolutions and the Bond Market, 1830-1914

192

A.2

Wars between “Western” Powers, 1815-1914

193

A.3

Wars by “Western” Powers against Lesser States, 1815-1914

194

A.4

Wars Involving “Western” States and Non-State Actors, 1815-1914

195

A.5

Wars and Issues, 1815-1914

196

A.6

Issues that Generated Wars, 1815-1914

199

A.7

Progress of Railway Building

200

A.8

Density of Railway Network, 1880

201

A.9

Wars, New Technology and Weapons, 1800-1914

202

A.10

Central State Expenditures in Current Prices, 1800-1910

205

A.11

Land of the British Isles Held in Estates of 1,000+ Acres, 1880

206

vi

List of Figures
3.1

Three Economically Deterministic Theories of War

63

3.2

Four Pillars of Nineteenth Century Civilization

66

3.3

Magnitudes of Great Power War by Century, 1500-1975

76

3.4

Wars by Western Powers, 1815-1914

79

3.5

Key Issues in War, 1715 – 1914

81

3.6

Military Expenditure by the Great Powers, 1880-1914

97

3.7

Relative Concentration of Capital and Coercion as Determinants of States’
Paths of Growth.

105

3.8

Increase in Territory per State, 1876-1915

115

3.9

Export of European Capital to 1914

118

4.1

Merits and Weaknesses of Theories in Relation to Nineteenth Century War

128

1

Introduction
The origins of this project stemmed from research I had begun in 2008 dedicated to
understanding the American military-industrial complex and the U.S. wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. During the course of this research I discovered a number of fascinating
sociological theories of war, including Baran and Sweezy’s Monopoly Capitalism and the worldsystems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein. 1 Though these perspectives provided insight into the
role of the economy and its relationship to war in the twentieth century, I soon realized these
frameworks had limits. For example, how does one explain the strange sense of obliviousness
within U.S. culture to the fact that we are at war? If the wars in Iraq were truly about oil, or
reactions to over-accumulated surplus capital, why did President Bush have to frame the
endeavor in terms of national security and spreading democracy? Why did the public buy and
support this agenda? Could these not legitimately be the reasons to go to war held by the
administration and the public, and not simply cover for ulterior economic motives?
As I tried to find other sociological theories of war, I discovered a number of
perspectives, such as that of Charles Tilly, which highlighted the role of war in generating the
nation state in early modern Europe. Max Weber, Stanislaw Andreski, Norbert Elias, and others
noted the role of military organization in bureaucracy and court society around the same period. 2
However, I found that between the end of the Napoleonic Wars in the early nineteenth century
and the beginning of total war in 1914, there was a considerable gap in terms of understanding

1

P Baran and P Sweezy, Monopoly Capital; an Essay on the American Economic and Social Order, Monthly
Review Press, New York, 1966; I Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2004.
2
S Andreski, Military Organization and Society 2nd edn., Routledge & K. Paul, London, 1968; N Elias et al., The
Civilizing Process : Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations Rev. edn., Blackwell Publishers, Oxford ;
Malden, Mass., 2000.
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these two trends. If surplus capital and hegemony were the driving forces for war in the
twentieth century, when did this trend begin? If war was the most important factor in the
generation of the modern state, how did this trend continue to develop over the course of the
nineteenth century? Precisely during the period we typically identify as the formative era of
modern society in Europe, the various theories begin to lose their explanatory power.
I soon connected this problem to what I consider an overemphasis on economic variables
in explaining war and peace. Relying especially on Michael Mann’s Sources of Social Power,
vol. II, both for historical material, as well as a theoretical framework that identified four sources
of social power - Ideological, Economic, Military, and Political (I.E.M.P) - without granting
primacy to any over the other, I realized that the questions related to war and society in the
nineteenth century could begin to be addressed. 3
Additionally, I found that, whereas in sociology, the subject of war is incredibly undertheorized and under-researched, in the discipline of history, since the mid-1970s a trend known
as “new military history” had been developing that was explicitly dedicated to the relationship
between ‘war’ and ‘society’. The historiography of the rise of the new military history was
described by Robert Citino in the American Historical Review. 4 Citino identified three schools
of military history: operational, social, and cultural military history. The first, operational
military history, is essentially a more rigorous and contextual version of Great Leader/Great
Battle history. Wars and battles are examined in tremendous detail to determine which
movement on the battlefield led to which outcome. Attention is given to arms technology and
the agency of officers, as well as the contingencies of weather, topography, and luck on the
3

M Mann, The Sources of Social Power Vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914, Cambridge
University Press, New York, 1993.
4
R Citino, 'Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction', The American Historical Review, vol. 112, issue 4,
2007.
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particular day a battle is fought. Though this operational history has lost favor within the
academic discipline of history, much of the historical materials consumed by popular audiences,
whether at Barnes and Noble or on the History Channel, are of this sort. The second school of
military history can be termed social or “sociological,” in as much as new military history is
interested explicitly in the connection between war and society. The connection between the two
is, rightly, assumed to be a recursive one, in which social structure impacts the way in which
wars are fought, while wars, in turn, affect society and change social configurations. The third
development in military history is cultural history of war, following a general trend in many
disciplines since the 1970s known as the “cultural turn.” Of the three trends in military histories
old and new - operational, sociological, and cultural - clearly the sociological is the least
developed. The promising project of new military history, directed toward understanding the
recursive connection between war and society, seems to rely on a relatively weak conception of
“society” as part of the equation. Particularly in terms of economy and social structure, society
remains under-theorized in much new military history literature.
This realization led me to try to reinsert the overly economic theories, which I had found
to be deficient, into the detailed, but under-theorized historical material that has been generated
by new military historians. This process forced me to identify specifically what socioeconomic
processes and mechanisms were relevant in establishing the link between war and society. In the
case of the nineteenth century, these theories helped me identify precisely those economic
structures that were missing or minimized within the new military history literature. At the same
time, particularly in reference to cultural history, I found that these economic variables could not
hold up as the solely determining influences in war and peace.

4

What follows is an attempt to retrace the experience of these discoveries and insights in a
slightly different chronological order. In section one, I define precisely the social phenomena I
am interested in exploring in relation to each other, namely ‘war,’ ‘modernity,’ and ‘capitalism.’
In section two, I retrace and critique three major theories from various social science disciplines
that have tried to deal with these questions: Marxist, Realist, and Liberal. In their traditional
forms, all suffer from an overly economic perspective, which prevents us from seeing noneconomic variables, such as autonomous military and cultural developments, that influence
decisions of war and peace.
In section three, I use Karl Polanyi’s notion of a “Hundred Years’ Peace” (1815-1914) as
a hypothesis against which I can test insights gained from the new military and cultural history
literature. 5 Using a number of quantitative as well as qualitative measures I deconstruct
Polanyi’s thesis to demonstrate how exactly a simply economic interpretation of war and peace
will not suffice.
The fourth section then introduces cultural material that has been neglected in materialist
analyses of war in the nineteenth century. Though it is difficult at this tentative stage to identify
precisely what elements of culture are most important at what time, I have suggested several
sociocultural and sociopsychological mechanisms that seem to be related to war in nineteenth
century Europe. I conclude by identifying what these cultural considerations suggest in terms of
future research and theoretical development.
Though I have not found the precise answers to my initial questions regarding our present
wars in the Middle East, during the course of my research on nineteenth century Europe, I have
found conspicuous similarities between our world and theirs - particularly during the late period
5

K Polanyi, The Great Transformation : The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Beacon Press, Boston,
MA, 2001.
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immediately preceding World War I. At the moment the modern world was becoming conscious
of itself, with the power of new technologies ready at hand – it was unclear whether theirs was a
civilization of peace or of a militant hegemon. On the one hand, in 1914 very few had
experienced war, at least within Continental Europe. The “Great War,” as the Napoleonic Wars
were called, had been fought by grandfathers and great grandfathers. International institutions
had prevented war for ages, and seemed ready to do so indefinitely. 6 On the other hand,
atrocities and failures witnessed by a new popular press, such as the Boer War and King
Leopold’s rubber plantations, began to shake the assumptions underlying imperialism: that
Europe was the center and pinnacle of human civilization; that European militaries were not out
for their own interests, or in support of naked greed. At the time, it must have been difficult to
understand the nature of modernity, war, and society, because one did not want to think of one’s
own society as warlike. Today, it seems just as hard to understand. Whether we like it or not,
this essay is an attempt to see war’s actual influence on our past, present, and future society.

6

Of course, this was only an impression of peace, since the nineteenth century was full of war as will be discussed
below.
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1. War, Modernity, and Capitalism
Understanding war requires an understanding of society as a whole, while, conversely,
society cannot be understood without accounting for war and violence. The latter side of this
argument, however, has not been sufficiently internalized within the discipline of sociology,
leaving war to political scientists and anthropologists to frame in terms of politics and culture. 7
When sociologists do approach war, it is often within the materialist framework of Marxist
theory, highlighting the causal role of the contradictions of capitalism. Indeed, what is modern
society if not capitalist? However, the key question in this regard is whether economics are the
determining factor needed to explain modern war. Are wars simply the games powerful classes
play with the lower classes as pawns? Are wars that are justified by participants as nationalistic,
racial, or liberal simply the cynical rationalization for material self-interests? Though material
interests are always present in any mobilization or execution of war, the idea that actors cannot
have any non-material motivation for engaging in war represents economic determinism – an
assertion I will suggest is refutable. I would suggest that the notion of economic primacy is a
reflection of “capitalist” modernity itself. 8 The task of the historical sociologist should be to
deconstruct this notion and identify the evolution of this trend towards valuing economic matters
in the execution of war and peace. For this reason, the case of war in the nineteenth century will

7

In 1999, Edward Tiryakian described war “as a societal and trans-societal phenomenon…the most understudied,
underanalyzed field of sociology”; E Tiryakian, 'War: The Covered Side of Modernity', International Sociology,
vol. 14,issue 4, Dec 1999, 473-89; Gregory Hooks and James Rice, reviewing three prominent sociological journals,
American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review, and Social Forces, found that out of 1575 articles
between 1990 and 1999, only 23 articles were related to war; G Hooks and J Rice, 'War, Militarism, and States: The
Insights and Blind Spots of Political Sociology', in R Janoski, A Hicks, and M Schwartz (ed.), The Handbook of
Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005.
8
An argument that is to follow will consider, and ultimately challenge, the semantic use of the term “capitalism” as
the definition of modernity. Since this argument will come considerably later in the paper, I will use the term
traditionally until the argument is made.
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be important to the theoretical argument of this essay, providing the historical material against
which the hypothesis of economic determinism can be assessed.
Before proceeding, adequate definitions of three terms - war, modernity, and capitalism will need to be outlined. War has been defined at various points for statistical purposes as
violent conflict between two or more political groups resulting in at least 1000 battle deaths. 9
While the adequacy of this definition for statistical use has been debated elsewhere in terms of
which wars are, or are not, included according to this criterion, it is relatively uncontroversial for
the purposes of this thesis. I would, however, add some characteristics that highlight the social
aspects of war in addition to the political characteristics listed above. 10 Wars are mass
mobilizations of (typically) men designed to murder, maim, or capture members of an opposing
group of warriors and/or civilians. As Lewis Mumford quite dramatically put it, “War is that
special form of conflict in which the aim is not to resolve the points of difference but to
annihilate physically the defenders of opposing points or reduce them by force to submission.” 11
While the above definitions are especially general, it will be the task of the rest of this paper to
deal with what particular motivational content has filled the generic form of war in the modern
era.
Defining modernity once and for all seems impossible if the ongoing debate between
postmodernists, modernists, traditionalists, and radical modernists provides any indication. 12
However, in terms of pure historical dating, a useful benchmark is Reinhart Koselleck’s
9

D Singer and M Small, The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook, Wiley, New York,, 1972; J Levy
and W Thompson, Causes of War, John Wiley & Sons, Malden, Mass, 2010.
10
Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” C Clausewitz and
A Rapoport, On War, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968.; cf. J Keegan, A History of Warfare, Alfred A. Knopf , New
York, 1993 for a critique of Clausewitz’ dictum.
11
L Mumford, Technics and Civilization, Harcourt, New York, 1963. p. 308
12
J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition : A Report on Knowledge, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis,
1984; A Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1990; J Habermas,
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity : Twelve Lectures, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987.
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suggestion that modernity began sometime in the mid to late eighteenth century Europe as
society became reflexively self-aware. 13 Koselleck suggested that the period from around 1750
to 1850 should be considered a Sattelzeit (saddle-time) between the early modern and the modern
period. Elsewhere, Mark Raeff described that “what emerged into the open in the eighteenth
century in most of Western and Central Europe - was society's conscious desire to maximize all
its resources and to use this new potential dynamically for the enlargement and improvement of
its way of life.” 14 In this sense, modernity can be read as a set of modern institutions – the
modern nation-state, the modern economy, modern technology, and so forth. Modernity can also
be characterized by particular forms of consciousness, such as one that distinguishes between
“Man” and “Nature.” 15 Modern society, therefore, maintains a “constitution” that distinguishes
it from previous epochs.
Included within the constitution of modernity is the social system defined as capitalism.
In political-economic terms capitalism requires a legal framework that provides adequate
protection and reproduction of private property, free labor, and (relatively) free markets. Capital
is a factor of production that is not consumed within the production process, and includes money,
fixed assets like machinery, and social assets such as network contacts and education. For
capital to accumulate it must remain in a state of movement, for it requires the commodity form
and money as both a means of exchange and as a commodity itself. 16 This movement and
accumulative tendency provides capitalism with its dynamic character. Because capital can
13

R Koselleck and T Presner, The Practice of Conceptual History : Timing History, Spacing Concepts, Stanford
University Press, Stanford, Calif., 2002. pp. 154-169
14
M Raeff, 'The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and EighteenthCentury Europe: An Attempt at a Comparative Approach', The American Historical Review, vol. 80,issue 5, 1975,
1221-43.
15
Leading Bruno Latour to conclude that “We have never been modern,” since this distinction was never real, and
that reality is always characterized by “hybrids” between human products and nature. B Latour, We Have Never
Been Modern, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1993.
16
K Marx, Capital: Oxford Abridged Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999. Pp 51-92, 93-100.
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never rest, neither can the social system of capitalism remain static. The social consequences of
this process were described by Marx in terms of the contradictions within the logic of the system
itself, particularly in terms of the class relations between owners of the means of production and
labor. 17 Further contradictions have been highlighted by Marxists such as David Harvey, who
demonstrated the tendency within capitalism to generate fiscal crises, 18 and Moishe Postone who
suggested that the fundamental contradiction relates to the modern notions of abstract value and
abstract time. 19 Postone argued that traditional Marxists, that is, the majority of academic and
political disciples of Marx, have misread the dialectic Marx tried to explain in Capital and The
Grundrisse. 20 The details of Postone’s argument will be discussed later, but for the purposes of
defining capitalism here, a necessary distinction needs to be made between capitalism as an
economic system and capitalism as a social system. In other words, is capitalism to be equated
with the “totality” of modern society, or is capitalism the particular structure of economic
relations and transactions? Providing a hard answer to this question at this point would be
premature and will occupy much of the considerations that follow.
The relationship between war, modernity, and capitalism is of primary importance for
establishing an adequate analysis of the question of whether war is immanently contained within
the constitution of modern society, or whether war is an atavism of previous epochs that has not
been removed or contained by modern international institutions. This issue is fundamentally a
sociological question, in the sense that sociology is interested in understanding modern society.
However, the discipline of sociology has rarely addressed this problem or incorporated the
17

op. cit. Marx 1999; K Marx and F Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Penguin Classics, New York, 1967.
D Harvey, The Limits to Capital, B. Blackwell, Oxford, 1982.
19
M Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination : A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge England ; New York, NY , USA, 1993.
20
op. cit. Marx 1999; K Marx, Grundrisse; Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), Allen
Lane, New Left Review, London,, 1973.
18
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question of war in its mainstream sociological theories, a legacy, perhaps, of the mindset of the
classical sociological theories of Spencer, Durkheim, and Parsons. 21 In other words, despite the
overwhelming obviousness that war is essential to understanding society, as evidenced by the
actuality of the occurrence of wars throughout the modern era, sociologists have, to this point,
implicitly or explicitly assumed the position that war is not an immanent feature of modernity.
Of course, there are exceptions to this generalization about the mainstream of sociology.
Several scholars, such as Charles Tilly, Michael Mann, Hans Joas, and others have demanded
that we confront the violence inherent in modern society, especially in the form of the modern
nation-state. The work of these sociologists will be of great importance to the theoretical project
outlined below. Furthermore, the work of Marxist scholars from Vladimir Lenin to Immanuel
Wallerstein has dealt with the issue of war by drawing on the implications of Marx’s analysis of
capitalism. In this sense, these scholars, more than any other, have confronted the very issue of
whether war is contained within the logic of modern society. However, this project will consist
of a specific critique of the economic determinism of these analyses – that is, the focus on
resources, markets, and distribution, toward the relative exclusion of cultural, political, and
social factors that, in orthodox Marxism, are accorded the position of the “superstructure.”

21

M Mann, States, War, and Capitalism : Studies in Political Sociology, B. Blackwell, Oxford [England] ; New
York, NY, USA, 1988; H Joas, War and Modernity, Blackwell Pub.,Malden, MA, 2003.
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2. Economistic Theories of War and Modernity
I will begin with an outline of four theories that have been developed to understand war
and modern society, all of which can be deemed economically deterministic: Marxist, Realist,
Liberal, and Communitarian. The relative popularity of these theories is by no means
proportional, and they exist across social scientific disciplines. Synopses of the assumptions of
the respective theories are as follows:

22

•

Marxist – The class contradictions of capitalist accumulation generate a condition
that necessitates that surplus capital which has been over-accumulated must be
exported, leading to economic and military imperialism. On a world-systemic
scale the global division of labor between core, semi-periphery, and periphery
leads to hegemonic cycles in which the core nation-states battle, often militarily,
for primacy.

•

Realist – States exist within an anarchic international state system that has no
over-arching regulatory control mechanism. The stability, or balance-of-power,
that exists is maintained by states acting in their objective state interest, which is
the accumulation of power. Power is defined in military and economic terms –
weapons, people, land, resources, money, and so forth. If states do not act
according to their objective state interests this can cause imbalances of power
which can lead to war.

•

Liberal – Industrial society and enlightened political economy provide the
conditions upon which cosmopolitan peace can exist. Free markets, democracy,
and international law provide the framework through which true enlightened
modernity can become actualized. War is considered atavistic, feudal, or
uncivilized. Markets and industrial production are considered politically neutral
in this reading, and, in fact, are beneficial in stimulating transnational
relationships. War is considered irrational and needs to be overcome through
liberal projects such as free markets, education, and, ironically, interventionist
war.

•

Communitarian – This position, like communitarianism in general, is not
explicitly codified in any one place. Yet, I use the term to describe the specific
argument made by Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation regarding the
Hundred Years’ Peace. 22 This position can be defined by what it is not: namely,

K Polanyi, The Great Transformation : The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Beacon Press, Boston,
MA, 2001.
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Marxist, Liberal, or Realist. Yet it is compatible with some elements of the
Marxist and Liberal readings. The economic argument is essentially that of the
Liberal, which suggests that free markets and international economic integration
led to peace in the nineteenth century. However, another side of Polanyi’s
argument suggests that this Liberal economic system was superficial and based on
a false understanding of human society.
My analytic position will draw from a combination of all four of these readings, finding none
entirely adequate on their own. In order to see the merits and inadequacies of the respective
theories they will need to be outlined in greater detail.
2.1. Marxist Perspectives

Three of the above theories can be defined, to a certain extent, by their utopian
elements. 23 This is especially important to understanding the Marxist perspective. Because war
and other social problems are, in the final analysis, related to the contradictions of capitalism,
removing or overcoming these contradictions will lead to a more just society and the removal of
the causes of war. Whether this overcoming is through communism, socialism, or another form
of political economic organization is less important than the critique of capitalism as it is
currently constituted. In fact, a positive aspect of capitalism is that it allows the possibility of
overcoming itself. Capitalist society’s form is not determined by ethical social relations, as was
the case in traditional or “primitive,” societies. Rather modern capitalist society is solely
determined by the economic relations of the exchange and production of commodities. Only
through concerted analytical effort and political revolution, the deeply rooted motor of capitalist
accumulation and class conflict could be eliminated. War and the military will exist as long as
class-antagonist state societies exist and will finally be overcome only when the state ceases.

23

The exception, of course, is Realism, which is more or less defined by its rejection of idealism, instead claiming to
look at the “reality” of human nature.
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Before returning to the Marxist critique of the current socio-economic situation, I need to
digress on a consideration of violence in the overcoming of capitalism itself (i.e. revolution), for
it will lead to an important assumption regarding the state in the Marxian framework. Marxist
perspectives related to violence are not universally held by all Marxian activists and scholars.
However, one reading of Engels, via Lenin, indicated that a classless society is only possible
following a certain amount of war. Though Marx did not clearly explicate a consistent and
thorough theory of the state, Lenin combed through Marx and Engels’ writings in search of a
definitive perspective. 24 Citing Engels’ Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, 25
Lenin asserted,
Here we have…the basic idea of Marxism on the question of the historical role
and meaning of the state. The state is the product and the manifestation of the
irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises when, where, and to the
extent that the class antagonisms cannot be objectively reconciled. And,
conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are
irreconcilable. 26
This led Lenin to reassert Engels’ declaration that the state should be abolished in the classless
society. He continued,
If the state is the product of the irreconcilable character of class antagonisms, if it
is a force standing above society and “increasingly separating itself from it,” then
it is clear that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without
a violent revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state
power.” 27
Any revolution that shatters the state apparatus finds itself in conflict with the former
dispossessed ruling class who will attempt to regain control of this armed body and the state.

24

V I Lenin, 'The State and Revolution', in A. Giddens and D. Held (ed.), Classes, Power, and Conflict: Classical
and Contemporary Debates,Macmillan Press,London, 1982.
25
F Engels, Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State, Resistance Books, Newtown, AUS, 2004.
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This revolution is protected by “special bodies of armed men” that protects the new state from
the old. 28
The concept of a revolutionary power, whether interim or permanent, led critics to
suggest that the revolution was merely cloaked opportunism, allowing one group of dissidents in
society to replace the current ruling class for another in the form of a revolutionary vanguard. 29
However, Lenin asserted a five-fold argument against the claim of opportunism and the validity
of the ‘withering away’ argument. Firstly, the state, as defined as the container for class
antagonism, would cease to be “a state” as traditionally defined. Secondly, the state’s “special
repressive force” would convert from a bourgeois force oppressing the proletariat to its opposite:
a proletarian force oppressing the bourgeoisie. Thirdly, the state would wither away as the
communist government became pure democracy. Fourthly, the revolutionary state must exist in
order to prevent anarchy. Finally, the logic of dialectics makes it imperative that the state be
replaced by violent revolution, which is essentially a development of an anti-state - the
proletarian state. This violent revolution would then wither away.
Lenin draws our attention to the role of violence and lethal force in revolution. All this is
achieved through Lenin and Engels’ redefinition of the state as both outside society and
composed of violent bodies. This claim, however, does not hold up to scrutiny. Excepting
anarchy, there cannot be a removal of the state, if the state is defined as the monopoly of
coercive force. 30 Any state, even one ostensibly representing the masses, must establish a
system of justice which needs to be backed up by armed force. As Foucault argued in his
28
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discussion with the Maoists, this force or legal system can never be truly neutral for it will
always represent a certain ideology and structure of power. 31 For this reason, the Soviet Union
did not transcend or overcome the antagonist class relations of the bourgeois state and resulted,
instead, in something like what Frederick Pollock described as “state capitalism.” 32 Legitimate
arguments can be made that Leninism, Maoism, or other violent forms of Marxism are somehow
misunderstandings of Marx’s true mission, or that Marx’s scientific program should be separated
from his political program. 33 However, I would argue that Lenin’s interpretation and the
consequences in the Soviet Union do in fact stem from Marx and Engels’ understanding of the
state as something that exists outside society – as something that can be seized. 34
Other Marxists, including Nicos Poulantzas, Claus Offe and Volker Ronge, and Maurice
Zeitlin have suggested that the state can be defined only in relation to specific modes of
production. 35 For example, Poulantzas wrote that the state has “the particular function of
constituting the factor of cohesion between the levels of a social formation.” 36 That is, states
perform a functional role for reproducing classes and the conditions for economic production.
The state functions “require” expansion of the “repressive and ideological state apparatuses” –
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police, welfare, education, mass media, etc. 37 This functional analysis is not exclusive to the
state alone, but is also related to the concept of social reproduction as Giddens pointed out in
Central Problems in Social Theory. In many readings of Marx,
Capitalism has its own ‘needs’, which the system functions to fulfill. Since the
system needs a reserve army, one comes into being. The argument is sometimes
stated in reverse. Since the operation of capitalism leads to the formation of a
reserve army, this must be because it needs one. 38
Functionalist conceptions of social systems suggest that the system, or totality, has ‘needs’ or
‘reasons’ of its own. This proposition cannot be easily defended, for it is the actors and
institutions that compose the system that have needs or reasons, not the system itself. Any social
reproduction of economic modes of production are due to the actions of actors or the unintended
consequences of action, which is not to say that unintended consequences are the same as latent
functions. 39
Functionalism is also present in the post-Marxist world-systems analysis of Immanuel
Wallerstein. In describing the peripheralization of Poland and the Baltic States in the fifteenth
century, Wallerstein stated: “Either eastern Europe would become the ‘breadbasket’ of western
Europe or vice versa. Either solution would have served the ‘needs of the situation’ in the
conjuncture.” 40 Like Giddens’ example of the reserve army above, the argument can be framed
in two ways: either the capitalist world-system needed some region to become a periphery and
made it so, or, in reverse, because Eastern Europe became peripheralized it must be because the
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capitalist world-system needed it to be so. This functionalist logic is problematic in terms of war
when the world-systems concept of hegemony enters the picture. Wallerstein wrote,
The longer hegemonic cycles involve a struggle between two major states to
become the successor to the previous hegemonic power by becoming the primary
locus of the accumulation of capital. This is a long process, which eventually
involves having the military strength to win a “thirty years’ war” Once a new
hegemony is instituted, its maintenance requires heavy financing which
eventually and inevitably leads to a relative decline of the current hegemonic
power and struggle for a successor. 41
While Wallerstein’s analysis leads to interesting conclusions regarding the transition from Dutch
hegemony to British hegemony to American hegemony, the world-systems perspective seems to
indicate a “law” of hegemonic cycles, in which over-extension of militaries “inevitably” leads to
relative decline. 42 William H. Sewell Jr. suggested that this represents a kind of teleology due to
Wallerstein’s misapplied cosmology analogy. Rather than explaining social phenomena in terms
of the principles governing its smallest entities (human individuals, local communities, states,
etc.), Wallerstein indicates that “the fates of local communities are determined not by local
causes but by the operation of global, system-level causes.” 43 Furthermore, Wallerstein argued a
posteriori back from the current state of the capitalist world-system to its prior state, establishing
a “big bang” event (the discovery of the New World) that foreordained all subsequent
development. In fact, all of the history he recounted was incredibly contingent, from the politics
of Portugal in the late 1400s to the ascension of William III to the throne of England in 1689.
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While there are means by which the system, or rather the totality, can impact the social
reproduction of the actors who constitute the system through socialization, psychological
repression, and class solidarity, 44 this does not seem to be the angle from which these Marxian
analyses are coming from. Rather, the structure of the arguments of Poulantzas and others that
characterize the state as functional to capitalism turns the state into a “place,” as Michael Mann
has pointed out. “The state is not an actor, but a place where classes and class ‘fractions’ or
‘segments’ organize.” 45 While Mann would argue this is wrong because the state is neither an
“actor” nor a “place,” but rather is an “active place,” the Marxian notion of the state as a place
leads right back to Lenin and Engels’ analysis concerning the seizure of the state. If the state is a
neutral place that is perverse only because it is the “committee for managing the common affairs
of the whole bourgeoisie,” 46 it follows that seizure of the state by the proletariat is a reasonable
expectation. One imagines a series of buildings with teletype machines that need only be
reprogrammed before being turned off, or withering away. In fact, the state consists of the
institutions that provide legacies of time and space, as well as the actors that compose and
operate the centralized “state machinery,” as well as the population and territory that exists
within borders.
This excursus into the Marxian conception of the state is relevant in relation to
imperialism and hegemony, two subjects that are central to the Marxist analysis of war and
modernity. Lenin, adapting J.A. Hobson’s analysis of surplus capital, 47 suggested that, in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, imperialist growth had become a necessity generated
44
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by capitalism. As he said in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, “under capitalism the
home market is inevitably bound up with the foreign market.” 48 The inevitability of this
relationship with foreign markets stems from the need within the capitalist mode of production to
expand. As Marx said, “The tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept
of capital itself. Every limit appears as a barrier to be overcome.” 49 The accumulation of
surplus value from the laborer to the capitalist generates the need to reinvest (in overseas
investment) and distribute (in the form of market exchange) that surplus to the non-capitalist
world. The process requires the integration of the non-capitalist outside into the capitalist inside
in a perpetual process of extraction and expansion. 50
The significance of this process as related to war was best expressed by the Resolution
adopted at the Seventh International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart in 1907 constructed by
Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. It was agreed that,
Wars between capitalist states are, as a rule, the outcome of their competition on
the world market, for each state seeks not only to secure its existing markets, but
also to conquer new ones. In this, the subjugation of foreign peoples and countries
plays a prominent role. These wars result furthermore from the incessant race for
armaments by militarism, one of the chief instruments of bourgeois class rule and
of the economic and political subjugation of the working class. 51
The statement above highlights the destruction wrought by capitalism upon the peoples of what
would later be termed the Third World or the Global South. The Statement furthermore insisted,
simply, that “wars…are part of the very nature of capitalism.” 52 Wars also distract the masses,
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through ideological and nationalist sentiments, from recognizing their positions as alienated
producers in conflict with capital - a phenomenon known as “social imperialism.” Because wars
are fought by soldiers who are largely drawn from the proletariat, wars in the interest of the
capitalist ruling class should be avoided at all costs. But should a war arise, it was the
responsibility of the International Socialist community to “intervene in favor of its speedy
termination and with all their powers to utilize the economic and political crisis created by the
war to rouse the masses and thereby to hasten the downfall of capitalist class rule.” 53 This was
precisely what Lenin managed to achieve in Russia, and what Luxemburg attempted in Germany
– the exploitation of the sufferings of war to highlight the horrors of the capitalist system in order
to encourage the proletarian masses and soldiers to overthrow the system. Lenin’s analysis of
the capitalist mode of production in the imperialist stage suggested that the destruction wrought
by the rapid expansion across the global landscape reflected the violence inherent in capitalism
most visibly. Imperialism was capitalism laid bare. Eventually, Lenin thought that this division
of the world between capitalist associations in conjunction with the division of the world
between the great powers would inevitably lead to a conflict between the great powers, i.e.
World War I.
Before comparing Lenin’s economically deterministic theory of imperialism to that of the
other theories listed above and outlined below, I will demonstrate that this Marxist-Leninist
interpretation is not fundamentally dissimilar from other Marx-inspired analyses of imperialism
and surplus capital. The concept of Military Keynesianism, for example, dominated midtwentieth century considerations of the military, inspired by the Vietnam War and the American
military-industrial-complex. To a large extent, this analysis of militaries within modern
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capitalist society has not been superseded. Marxist scholars Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy argued
in Monopoly Capital that giant firms dominated the U.S. economy in the mid-twentieth century
against the interests of society. Large corporations rigged the rules of the game so that surpluses
would travel through the economy to a select group of firms organized in monopolized or
oligopolized configurations. Among the means by which these firms were able to do this was by
taking advantage of Military Keynesianism, or government defense expenditures. As Baran and
Sweezy said: “Here at last monopoly capitalism had seemingly found the answer to the ‘on what’
question: On what could the government spend enough to keep the system from sinking into the
mire of stagnation? On arms, more arms, and ever more arms.” 54 Military spending is capable of
absorbing surplus because
1. It is fungible and can be easily diverted into different military products
2. It generates a virtually continuous demand because of the destruction and
obsolescence of military weaponry
3. Military strength assures U.S. global hegemony enhancing the profitability of
U.S. firms
4. The fiscal conservatism that restrains other forms of government spending is
blunted by the anti-communist ideologies of the Cold War
5. Military spending does not threaten private profitability and ostensibly, it does
not have the redistributive consequences of alternative forms of government
spending. 55
Baran and Sweezy did place a limit on the level to which this Military Keynesianism can be
effective, related to technological development. As the military focuses more and more on
science, technology, and research and development, less and less people are employed by the
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Military Industrial Complex limiting the overall stimulus to the labor economy. Beyond this
level, investment in the military (i.e. in military technology) results in stagnation and does not
further absorb the economic surplus.
The application of military spending is also covered in James O’Connor’s work, The
Fiscal Crisis of the State, which dealt with Vietnam era social and military expenditures of the
U.S. government, also with a Marxist lens. Again, the military provided a relief valve for
surplus accumulation. O’Connor considered the imperial growth of American hegemony to be
economically motivated, in tandem with an industrial arms cartel that received most of the
military contracts outside the realm of a “free market”. These government expenditures were
factored into his four categories of state expenditures (all of which primarily benefit
monopolies):
1. Social capital – expenditures required for profitable accumulation
2. Social investment – projects and services that increase labor productivity
3. Social consumption – projects and services that lower reproduction costs of
labor
4. Social expenses – projects and services required to establish the legitimacy of
the state. 56
Military expenditures typically stimulate or contribute to several of these categories at once
which is why they are so often employed. For example, the military’s Interstate Highway
System (IHS) was developed for increased mobility of troops, and was therefore a “legitimate”
social expense. However, as the highway system allowed workers to move to and from work it
was also a form of social consumption. As a means of commercial freight transport, the IHS was
also a form of social investment.
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For O’Connor, the military was a relatively popular choice for which the state could
expend monies because it fulfilled so many roles at once and remained relatively outside the
purview of ideological and political considerations through which other expenditures were
typically scrutinized. The “legitimized” state - that is, the state that publicly operates according
to its professed values - is therefore a welfare-warfare state, while the actual state proceedings
have intended and unintended effects that primarily benefit the monopoly sectors of the
economy.
While Baran and Sweezy’s and O’Connor’s analyses have been empirically demonstrable
in many ways, 57 and continue to stimulate considerable debate and research, there are two
identifiable problems that would prevent an application of their approach more generally, even
within a sociological theory of modern society. First, the analyses are historically specific in that
they seem to exist only within the framework of welfare-state capitalism, monopoly capitalism,
and the Cold War. 58 This is not necessarily a bad thing, in the sense that good contemporary
research and conclusions have been drawn from the perspective. However, the second problem
is that the military and war remain functional in the analysis. The military exists for surplus
capital to be laundered. The cache of excess armaments lying around seems to stimulate
imperial ambition, which serves another function in establishing safe markets for U.S. exports.
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Again, the problem with functionalism is that the system does not ‘need’ to export
surplus capital – particular members of society need to invest capital, and choose military
armament firms. In this sense, Baran and Sweezy’s description of the specific reasons these
investments would be attractive ventures are on the mark; as is O’Connor’s analysis that
military expenditures are not as politically suspect as other government spending. However, the
idea that the system also ‘needs’ to imperialize to establish safe markets abroad does not seem
adequate. Certain firms, which have developed due to historically contingent circumstances,
may lobby to invade Vietnam or Nicaragua or Iraq for economic reasons, but so might exile
groups from Tibet or Sudan lobby to deal with a humanitarian crisis. The state responds to the
interests of those who have access to power. Typically, economic power (e.g. Boeing) trumps
deliberative power (e.g. the Dalai Lama), but these transactions are mediated through specific
interactions between actors and institutions with particular goals and means. The actions are not
directly derived from the system’s functional requirements.
In the context of postwar, postliberal society and the U.S. military, a more adequate
analysis from a “Marxist” perspective comes from C. Wright Mills’ Power Elite. 59 Mills
outlined the realms of power within mid-century American society indentifying groups or classes
of people who occupied those positions of power. The military represented one of three major
groups (military, political, business) which acted upon the country and, due to the geopolitical
position of the United States, thereby acted upon the world and “made” history.” 60 Military men
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came from the upper middle class, and yet, within the overall class structure of the country, their
status role fell somewhere between politician and manager. Because, for the most part, military
officials did not begin life in the highest classes, a sublimation of politics and ideology was
needed to proceed through up to 25 years of gradual mobility leading military officials to orient
themselves to their immediate superiors and inferiors in expected directions relative to rank.
Indeed, as Morris Janowitz explained in Sociology and the Military Establishment, a vast system
of authoritative and communicative controls are in place within the military organization such
that, more so than perhaps in any other realm of society, a role within the military hierarchy can
be considered static and independent of the individual personality of the officer. 61 For similar
reasons, the Prussian military was one of the inspirations for Max Weber’s ideal type of
bureaucracy. 62
Critics of Mills might suggest that the military exists in a subservient status relative to
civilian authority, and, by that measure, remains subservient to capital as well. This position,
however, would miss on several points. For one, the civil-military relations of the postwar era
are especially historically contingent. It has not been the norm for militaries to be answerable to
the state, and the evolution of this civil-military relation took place largely in the nineteenth
century, as will be discussed below. Additionally, the military has at its disposal advanced
technological means to deliver lethal violence. As Michael Mann pointed out in his I.E.M.P
model, military power must be considered as analytically separate from political power. 63 For
example, the fact that a military coup can happen demonstrates that the military is distinct from
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the state if it can overthrow the state. Beyond lethal power, the military has developed politically
instrumental techniques such as “systems analysis.” Though systems analysis, developed by Ed
Paxson at the RAND Corporation, was not used for its intended purpose (determining nuclear
bombing strategies), the Air Force did use the mathematical techniques to manipulate
Congressional funding approval for defense projects.64 All of this is to suggest that the military
does have autonomous power even within the relatively constrained civil-military relationship
that existed in the 1950s.
The final, and most important reason Mills’ analysis is relevant for considering the
military’s power in modern society is that he points to the specific class relations that are
reproduced through the recruitment of upper middle class officers. While the military goes to
great lengths to depoliticize soldiers in terms of Democratic or Republican party leanings, this
process is never fully complete. Evidence of this can be seen in the appointment of ex-military
officials in ambassadorships, congressional posts, and even the presidency. 65 Ultimately, it is
through the class relationship shared among members of the power elite, that the “system” gets
its necessary actors to reproduce the particular configurations of power needed to maintain the
modern political-military-economic framework. The analysis of class, particularly the class
character of General Staffs and diplomats, remains an essential feature of any discussion of war
and modernity. In principle, if not always in the particular form of the U.S. military-industrialcomplex analyzed in The Power Elite, Mills’ attention to the specific actors who hold positions
of power, and their relation to those class structures they draw power from and reproduce, seems
applicable to many times and places in the modern era.
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Ultimately, it must be said that Marxists have paid attention to the role of war in the
constitution of modern society. However, as has been demonstrated above, this can be
problematic when phenomena are treated in a functionalist manner. This can be seen in Lenin’s
theory of imperialism, Baran and Sweezy’s conception of Military Keynesianism, and
Wallerstein’s law of hegemonic cycles. To be sure, the events these analysts described
happened, and in many instances the Marxist lens that was utilized uncovered material left
obscured by other perspectives. However, in attributing causal significance to economic factors
stemming from contradictions in the distribution of surplus value (i.e. class antagonism),
Marxists run the risk of excluding other ‘non-economic’ factors, including nationalism,
humanitarianism, or aggressive impulses to dominate for its own sake. Orthodox Marxists could
conclude that even these categories are superstructural and determined by the economic base in
the final analysis, but this is not a position I am willing to accept as scientific. Still, many of the
Marxist, neo-Marxist, and post-Marxist assumptions cannot be denied. For example, capitalism
was, and is, an important feature of modern society, if not the most important feature. To reject
an over-emphasis on economic and material concerns should not suggest a rejection of the
validity of these concerns. This would represent what I call the “see-saw effect” typical of social
theory debates in which stating “it’s not all economics” is taken to mean “it’s all culture.” Of
course it is both. Indentifying the particular influence of capitalism and the economic sphere in
relation to other, non-economic factors will be the ultimate goal of this essay. The Marxist
perspective will remain an important foil against which the other economistic theories and the
broader historical analysis of the nineteenth century will have to be assessed.
2.2. Realist Perspectives
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The Realist International Relations (IR) perspective, often associated with conservative
political persuasions, is not typically considered next to Marxism in terms of their similarities.
However, I would argue that both maintain similar emphases on the materialist motivations of
money and power, while also reverting to systemic causal explanations. Additionally, in certain
versions of the theories, modern society is considered ahistorically, or, rather, transhistorically,
projecting the present condition of society backward in time.
However, as mentioned above, the utopian sentiments of a better future society or an
ideal natural past, which are keys to understanding the other theories of war, are not inherent in
the Realist perspective. Realism, in fact, is considered by its proponents to be emphatically not
idealistic or utopian. 66 The Realist tradition, which harkens back to classical and early modern
philosophers like Thucydides and Niccolo Machiavelli, can be considered derivative of Thomas
Hobbes’ influential work, Leviathan. 67 Essential to the model of international and domestic
politics is the idea of homo lupus – man as wolf. Man’s natural condition is to be in the state of
war. Hobbes wrote in 1651, “During the time men live without a common Power to keep them
all in awe, they are in that condition with is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man,
against every man.” 68 War is like weather – it comes and goes in spurts and is not necessarily
ever-present. It is, however, inevitable and, ultimately, natural, in the sense that men following
their human nature are prone to fight and engage in violent conflict. Only through the
development of the strong national state can men escape this “poore, nasty, brutish, and short”
life. 69 Scholars have noted that the particular life history of Thomas Hobbes, who lived through
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the brutal English Civil War of the 1640s as well as the devastating Thirty Years War in which
up to a third of the population of the Holy Roman Empire was destroyed, 70 left an imprint on the
author that indicated that war was, indeed, the normal condition of human society.
While Hobbes advocated the construction of a strong centralized state to impose order by
force based on his assessment of seventeenth century warfare, Realist scholars see the period
following the Thirty Years War as significant for establishing the modern international state
system in Europe. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 ended the wars of religion that plagued
Europe since the Protestant Reformation, and secularized the causes of conflict. The
consequences of this stalemate between religions were at least two-fold in terms of international
relations. First, the treaty, as an agreement to disagree on matters of faith, institutionalized what
IR scholars call the “anarchic” international state-system. Second, the secularization of conflict
drew states’ focus away from theological debates and towards the increase of power itself. Each
of these conclusions has consequences for Realist and Neorealist IR theory, as will be dealt with
below.
The first issue is international anarchy. Because there is no authority above the state, the
international state system is said to be in a state of anarchy. 71 Whatever stability does exist is
said to be maintained by multi-state balance-of-power, bipolarity, or hegemony. Balance-ofpower theories are based on the assumption that states act reasonably rationally to maximize
their security. 72 Though balance-of-power theory was consequential to the extent that statesmen
internalized and acted upon the international system based on the idea of it, the explanatory value
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in the context of IR is suspect when it is turned into a law of history. Paul Schroeder described
the defective concept of balance-of-power well:
Balance-of-power arguments generally, explain any outcome equally well. War
or peace can be accounted for either by a balance or by an imbalance of power.
Wars arise because conflicts end too indecisively, like the War of the Austrian
Succession (1740-8), or because they end too decisively, like the Seven Years
War, because one side gains a dangerous superiority, like Britain on the high seas,
or because neither has the upper hand, like Austria and Prussia in Germany. Thus
the balance-of-power argument fails really to explain anything and begs the
question. Worse, it conceals the main fact: balance-of-power rules and practices
were not a solution to war…but a major part of the problem. 73
Furthermore, one of the assumptions behind balance-of-power is that states will act to prevent
conditions of hegemony or bi-polarity as existed (simultaneously?) during the Cold War.
However, as the Cold War example demonstrates, the international system can be stabilized or
unstable in these other conditions. Why are these objective state interests (maintaining balanceof-power) something that leads to objectively similar conditions as lack of these state interests
(hegemony)?
This is the case because peace and survival are not the only state interest, as indicated in
the second consequence of Westphalia mentioned above – the secularization of power. Rather,
attainment and increase of power can, and likely will be in the state’s interest, often trumping
maintenance of peace as a goal. Initial Realist perspectives on power were defined in the 1940s
by Martin Wight in his book Power Politics, and Hans Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations. 74
Power politics (Machtpolitik) is a state of international relations in which sovereigns protect their
own interests by threatening one another with military, economic, or political aggression.
Machtpolitik, and its related concept raison d’etat, imply a separation of morality from the
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objective interest of state, which should be the increase of more power. As Wight explained,
“Every dominant power aspires, by giving unification to the whole of international society, to
become a universal empire.” 75 Thus obtaining hegemony is the goal of every state, and
according to the principles of competition, every other power is duty bound to prevent another
state from attaining this position of dominance. Interestingly, as can be seen in Morgenthau’s
quotation, “The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power
among other powers,” the semantic use of the word “power,” meaning “state,” and “power”
meaning “resources” establishes a kind of cannibalistic notion in which powers gobble other
powers using power to gain more power. 76
And yet, power is rarely defined explicitly in Realist and Neorealist texts. Kenneth
Waltz, for example, tried to clarify that power can be considered either as a “means to an end” or
an “end in itself.” 77 Yet, this does not define what power actually is. From a sociological and
philosophical perspective, leaving power undefined seems inadequate, and assumes that
everyone knows what power means based on common sense. 78 Steven Lukes, for example,
defined three dimensions of power in his work, Power – A Radical View. 79 The first dimension
of power corresponds with Max Weber’s definition of power as “the possibility of imposing
one’s own will upon the behavior of other person,” or in terms of A‘s authoritative power of
command (domination) over B. 80 The second dimension relates to the power of decision making
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and non-decision making. 81 The third dimension relates to ideological power, or the power to
“manipulate consensus by definitional fiat” - in other words, having the power to make others
accept the existing order of things because they can see no alternative to it, or because they see it
as natural and unchangeable. 82 Furthermore, Weber’s, Barach and Baratz’, and Lukes’
definitions of power concern only distributive power, to say nothing of collective power, as
described by Talcott Parsons in his critique of C. Wright Mills’ Power Elite.
Power is a generalized facility or resource in the society. It has to be divided or
allocated, but it also has to be produced and it has collective as well as distributive
functions. It is the capacity to mobilize the resources of the society for the
attainment of goals for which a general ‘public’ commitment has been made, or
may be made. It is mobilization, above all, of the actions of persons and groups,
which is binding on them by virtue of their position in the society. 83
Indeed, Mills’ statement that “Politics is a struggle for power,” 84 implies that power is a zerosum game between “ins” and “outs” – an image of power that seems compatible with other
materialist conceptions of power, like the Realists’.
Within the Realist framework, implicitly, power seems to be material interests – wealth,
military arms, or territorial control, all of which function as means and ends for distributive
power, or domination. Furthermore, because Realists consider morality to be removed from
considerations of pure raison d’etat, ideological and (domestic) political concerns are conceived
of as disguises for actual material interests, in other words, as means to an end. This eliminates
two of the four sources of social power identified by Michael Mann in his I.E.M.P. model,
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Ideological, Economic, Military, and Political power. 85 In the case of ideology, Mann does
indicate that ideology can be configured as “immanent morale,” intensifying the power of an
already-established social group, which would correspond with the idea that ideology can be
simply justification for material state action. 86 However, ideology can also be “sociospatially
transcendent,” when emergent properties of social life “transcend the organizational reach of
secular authorities.” 87 In other words, ideology can have autonomous power of its own, as in the
case of Christianity during Medieval European history, which transcended national borders and
material interests.
Without even bringing in the complex issues of power brought up by Nietzsche and
Foucault at this time, 88 the point can be clearly made that classical Realism and Neorealism did
not adequately incorporate the many faceted debates concerning the philosophy and sociology of
power. 89 By not examining the particular nature and configurations of power at the abstract
level, Realism contended itself to identifying the objective interests of state in terms of brute
power, hegemony, or security, but not in terms of human rights, true religion, or even
cooperation for its own sake. This is further complicated by the fact that throughout the
twentieth century Realist scholars like Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and George
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Kennan have actually made the policy decisions that are supposed to be hypothesized by the
theory, proving the case by making the case exist. 90
This has led to what John Hobson has called “tempocentrism” and “chronofetishism.” 91
Chronofetishism is the assumption that the present can only be explained by examining the
present and ignoring the past. This leads to reification of the present which makes the modern
international system appear static and self-constituting. This illusion, in turn, leads to a sense of
the naturalness of the system, as opposed to having been historically constituted in a particular
time and place: the modern era in Europe. Finally, this leads to an illusion of immutability as the
structure of the system becomes eternalized. The perspective does even more epistemological
damage when the condition of the present (which is reified and misunderstood) is extrapolated
backwards throughout all of history. This is what Hobson means by tempocentrism. History
done as such would have Imperial Rome operating off of balance-of-power imperatives identical
to the Duke of Burgundy in 1477. A famous (and inane) example of tempocentrism can be
found in the comparison between the “bipolar” worlds of competing Sparta and Athens and the
Cold War United States and the Soviet Union.
Chronofetishism and tempocentrism cause Realism to suffer from the same teleological
and functionalist problems characteristic of some of the Marxist readings of war and modernity
described earlier. Like Wallerstein’s big bang concept of capitalism, tempocentrist projections
of the present state of things back in history forces events into the analysis to fit the theory.
90
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Events can be explained equally well by states engaging in their pure material state interests, or
by acting on ideological or psychological grounds, which are considered as cover for actual state
interests. This causes cherry-picking and a misreading of history, for example, by explaining the
European Crusades of the Levant as the result of demographic growth or the desire for access to
the riches of the wealthier Near East. The religious motivations actually felt by Pope Alexander
II or Bernard of Clairveaux are considered “irrational” and are assumed to be either false
consciousness of their true material interests, or secondarily important.
I do not mean that material interests are irrelevant; for the productive capacities of states’
economies and the states’ ability to extract resources from the economy are important variables
that can determine the outcome of geopolitical rivalries and wars. 92 A brief review of Paul
Kennedy’s encyclopedic history of European politics from 1500 to 1986, The Rise and Fall of
the Great Powers, will demonstrate the merits of this type of analysis, while also showing the
way teleological laws of history develop which are similar to Realist IR theory in many ways. 93
He summarily states:
The triumph of any one Great Power in this period, or the collapse of another, has
usually been the consequence of lengthy fighting by its armed forces; but it has
also been the consequence of the more or less efficient utilization of the state’s
productive economic resources in wartime, and, further in the background, of the
way in which that state’s economy had been rising and falling, relative to the
other leading nations in the decades preceding the actual conflict. 94
Kennedy’s analysis begins with the first major contender for European dominance, Hapsburg
Spain during the reign of Phillip II (1554-1598). Early access to New World gold provided the
Spanish throne with unusually large resources with which it could challenge the other European
states. However, excessive debts that eventually led to multiple bankruptcies, rising inflation,
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and the inability to transform the agricultural economic base toward a more commercial one, led
to the steady decline of the Hapsburg Empire in Spain, Flanders, and Austria. 95 As an early
prototype for the typical trajectory of many aspirants of European hegemony, the Hapsburg
Empire prequels the rise and decline of modern European states, including Holland, France,
Britain, Russia, and Germany. Similarities can be immediately drawn between Kennedy’s
historical theory and the cycles of hegemony witnessed by world-system theorists, Immanuel
Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi. 96
However, as Niall Ferguson argued in The Cash Nexus, Kennedy’s law-like analysis is
tautological and represents history incorrectly. 97 Ferguson suggested that, in particular, the case
of the British Empire does not seem to correspond to the military over-stretch argument. 98
Though Great Britain in the late nineteenth century controlled 13 million sq. miles of the Earth’s
surface and up to 25% of the world’s population, the imperial administration was comparably
minimal. The British defense budget prior to 1914 was only 3.2% of GNP, much less than that
of Russia, France, Italy, and Germany. Kennedy’s argument resembles nineteenth century critics
and modern counter-factual economic historians who have suggested that Britain could have
relinquished her territories in the late nineteenth century to receive a “decolonization dividend”
in the form of a 25% tax cut. 99 Ferguson debunked this claim by pointing out: the idea that the
imperial colonies would have maintained the same level of trade and investment without military
support assumes that international free trade was a naturally occurring condition in which Britain
could reap the same rewards in a global free market without direct administration. He suggested
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that Kennedy’s argument in the British case is contradictory and tautological, “It is not clear
from this what Kennedy thinks Britain should have done: while some governments are damned if
they spend too much on defense, others are damned for spending too little.” 100 Even on
materialist grounds, the argument that military overstretch causes unsustainable deficits that lead
to decline is too narrow a view, and seems to reflect the contemporary concerns related to the
United States’ giant deficit of 1.4 trillion dollars in the late 1980s. 101
Indeed, the projection of very historically specific conditions in the immediate postwar
period back in time made the geopolitical configuration of the Cold War seem natural. 102 The
problem of chronofetishism, however, is not exclusive to Realist IR theory, and has been a
charge leveled at the functionalist sociology of Talcott Parsons that was also hegemonic in the
postwar period. 103 In fact, functionalist logic was characteristic of Neorealism, as it was in
Marxism. Ostensibly, Neorealism tried to remove the causal power of Hobbesian human nature.
However, in attempting to establish social scientific foundations for empirical research, Kenneth
Waltz suggested that balance-of-power is the norm in international state systems, which seems
similar to economic theories of supply and demand equilibrium. 104 In Man, the State, and War,
Waltz identified three levels of analysis: the individual, the nation-state, and the international
state-system, through which the “polarity” of international relations can be examined. 105 While
the heuristic value of the three levels is useful in many regards, ultimately, the assumption that
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the “normal state” of international relations is balance-of-power gives primacy to the system
level. Again, as Levy and Thompson pointed out, “systems do not have goals. Only actors
(individuals, organizations, states) have goals.” 106
However, one can even question whether states, within the second level of analysis, have
goals. Suggesting that states have rational goals implies a rational mind, either internally (in the
sense that “Poland” decides to do this or that) or as deemed by an observer (as in “Poland’s”
actions were rational.) This runs a substantial risk of reifying states into characters. So France
goes to war with Britain, then changes her mind and signs a treaty with Britain against Germany.
In certain instances, descriptions of this sort are useful. 107 However, there is a risk that this
essentializing of states obscures complexity in the realm of domestic politics (was all of France’s
population happy about this change of diplomatic relations?) and in history (what are the
continuities vs. the differences between the France of the 1890s and the France of the Hundred
Years’ War (1337 to 1453?).
For this reason, the analytic level of the individual actors that make state decisions are,
indeed, important. Who decides that France joins the Triple Entente? Questions of this sort
have led to an emphasis on “great leaders” – kings, diplomats, and generals who make the
decisions of state. For example, in the historical work of Henry Kissinger, Metternich,
Bismarck, Stalin, or Clemenceau either act according to the objectively “correct” raison d’etat,
or fail by disrupting the balance-of-power. 108 However, this can also lead to tautological
analyses. In Kissinger’s view, Metternich established the best possible scenario of balance-ofpower through the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe established at the Treaty of Vienna
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in 1815. However, Bismarck disturbed this balance-of-power by unifying Germany under the
Prussian banner in 1871. Though Bismarck acted as a master statesman in regard to Prussia it
left the continental geopolitical order unstable which was inherited by lesser statesmen before
World War I. This analysis begs the question: if Metternich’s balance-of-power system was so
great, why did it fall apart in 56 years? How can Bismarck be considered a great statesman, who
made all the best calculations of state interest, while simultaneously making the decisions that
led to Germany’s ruin 43 years later?
Beyond tautology, this approach emphasizing Aussenpolitik over Innenpolitik generates
an elitist model of the state itself. The state corresponds with the individual actors who represent
the mind and will of the state. Michael Mann called this analysis “true elitism.” Though elite
theories of state are right to emphasize the autonomous power of politics, their model is based on
distributive power of state elites over society which radiates outward from, not inward to, the
state. 109 Mann made the suggestion that “true elitism” should be distinguished from
“institutional statism.” While there is some room for the autonomous power of elites, there are
also autonomous effects exerted by state institutions on the political actors themselves. Laws
and constitutions developed at one time can have tremendous effects across time and space constraining actors through social contracts limiting declarations of war, or through
institutionalized elements of popular sovereignty. In the Realist framework, however, states are
active rather than passive. Here, then, we have a major difference between the Marxist
conception of the state as a “place,” as opposed to being an “actor.” Again, Mann pointed out
that neither view is correct: the state is actually an “active place.”
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While the epistemological assumptions that underlie Realist theories of war lead to
problematic ontological conclusions that overemphasize materialist concerns and accord primacy
to the international system, the theory cannot be wholly discarded. One of the important insights
of Realist IR theory is that attention should be paid to the international system. States exist
within a network of other states. It is a realm and a context for action - specifically war. As
Anthony Giddens pointed out in The Nation-State and Violence, states exist based on the
legitimacy accorded by its territorial subjects, but also based on the reflexive recognition of other
states.
The conception of the ‘sovereign state’ has so often been discussed as a purely
internal affair that it is worth stressing that it necessarily has external implications
for the state in the context of others. The state is to have exclusive authority
within its own domain, all other rights being conferred by the sovereign and
revocable by him. By its very nature, this formula draws a clear-cut distinction
between the authority of different states, and gives a new significance to the
territorial demarcations between. 110
Another sociologist, Michael Mann, recognized the utility of the geopolitical realm of analysis
which has been neglected in the wider discourse of sociological theory. His description of
geopolitics seems to draw from the Realist perspective on the anarchic state-system, though the
system is a context, not a functionally determining system. 111

Diplomacy is far less regulated, routinized and predictable than are major
domestic politics. Diplomacy involves a number of autonomous states among
whom there are few normative ties, yet continuous re-calculation of the main
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chance. The actions of one set up ripple reactions among others, amounting to an
unpredictable whole. 112

Indeed, one of the problems with sociology more generally is its lack of attention for the
geopolitical realm, which is where wars occur. Hence the influence of geopolitics and war on
social order is often underrated or missed. In this regard, the insights of IR theory can be useful
correctives for the pacific social theories discussed below, provided they are not assumed
uncritically. 113
2.3. Liberal Perspectives

The characterization of liberal theories of war as economically deterministic may seem
peculiar. Indeed, within this tradition, war is not explained by economic activity and material
interests, as was the case in Marxist and Realist theories of the causes of war. Rather, the very
opposite: peace can be explained by the interdependence and cosmopolitanism generated by
economic markets and liberal democracy. In other words, truly enlightened modernity would
amount to peace, if we only let it develop. Before addressing the specifics of this economic
argument, however, I should clarify Enlightenment concepts of the human individual, which are
essential to understanding the way in which the economic argument ‘works’.
As in Marxist theory, underlying the Liberal position is a utopian element - in this case,
derived from a sense of the human individual in nature – ‘the noble savage.’ In a primordial,
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prehistoric state, aboriginal humans lived peacefully in nature, and only with the advent of
agriculture, private property, and class and state coercion did wars develop. Some credit
Rousseau with the concept of the noble savage, though this origin is misapplied, 114 for in
Discourse on the Origins of Inequality Rousseau suggested that man in a state of nature was an
animal and could only be made “good” through social organization.’ 115 However, Rousseau did
make the point that the imprint of civilization on “man” is problematic and that many of the evils
that afflict humanity, such as war, are learned behaviors that are not inherent to the human
species in Nature. This notion, whether developed by Rousseau or his contemporaries, held
significant sway for much of the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and
impacted the social sciences of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, notably economics,
anthropology, and sociology. What emerges from this philosophical assumption - that “man” is
naturally good and is only corrupted by society - is the idea that war is not inevitable, but rather a
reflection of irrational social organization. However, because the Enlightenment project leads
toward a rational society, the phenomenon of war is either not explained at all, because it has no
place in the object of inquiry (modern society), or war is explained as an atavistic remnant of
traditional, feudal, or otherwise archaic society.
The Liberal worldview is characterized by attention paid toward law, which may be
emphasized in terms of morality and ethics, or in terms of natural law. Often modern
considerations of these emphases can lead to debates concerning “negative rights” (what cannot
be done to you by others) vs. “positive rights” (what you owe to others and is owed to you). 116
The specifics of this debate are well outside the scope of this essay, but can be briefly
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demonstrated by looking at the political philosophy of John Locke. Contrary to Hobbes, Locke
did not see the natural state of humanity as being characterized by permanent war. Rather,
Nature follows the ‘Law of Reason.’ 117 Stemming from this natural law, humans are free to do
as they wish, provided they do not infringe upon others’ rights for preserving “Life, health,
Liberty, or Possessions.” However, at a certain point, it becomes reasonable for individuals to
act in coordination with each other to preserve these rights, and via contracts the individuals
establish a government. The significance of Locke’s position is twofold: Firstly, individuals
precede the state. Secondly, the state is based upon a social contract. As in Rousseau, the
natural human individual enters into the state, society, and civilization as a relatively neutral
being in terms of good and evil. In Rousseau’s conception, this neutral being can be corrupted
by the civilizing process if the society, state, and civilization are not arranged to maximize the
positive qualities of nature – liberty, equality, etc.
Locke’s philosophy was derived from the Christian bible. However, even without
theological underpinnings, modern social science has not entirely shoved off the assumption that
civilization and, by extension, war are cultural constructions. In Margaret Mead’s anthropology,
clearly coming down on the side of the noble savage argument, “warfare is only an invention –
not a biological necessity.” 118 The Seville Statement adopted by the American Anthropological
Association (AAA) in 1986 similarly declared that “it is scientifically incorrect” to believe that
we have inherited war from our animal ancestors, or that war is genetically programmed into our
human nature. Also scientifically incorrect: that natural selection favors aggressive behavior
over other kinds of behavior, that humans have a “violent brain,” or that war is caused by
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“instinct” or any other single motivation. 119 Military historian John Keegan described the Seville
Statement critically:
There is much to be admired…since it seeks to liberate the human race from the
deadening conviction that war is its natural lot. Unfortunately, there is little that
is scientific about it. Science has thus far quite failed to substantiate any of its
five articles, some of which are not scientific propositions at all. 120
Other critics, including contemporary anthropologists themselves, as well as evolutionary
psychologists, biologists, and historians have drawn attention to so many factors that can lead to
war other culture – geography, genetics, psychology (or psychopathology), demographic and
material crises, etc., that the position of Mead and the AAA seems based on wishful thinking
along the lines of Rousseau and Locke. 121
Margaret Mead and the AAA were reacting to evolutionary biological perspectives that
highlight underlying animal survival instincts or selfish genes in explaining the causes of war. 122
And yet, the Lockian view of human nature corresponds with the sociology of the arch-Social
Darwinist, Herbert Spencer, who coined the phrase, “survival of the fittest.” Spencer, too,
assumed an original humanity of individuals who had become aggregated into society. However,
unlike Locke’s model of voluntary cooperation through contract, Spencer saw the origins of the
state and society as having occurred because of war. War necessitated centralized control and
led to a “militarist” state governed by “compulsory cooperation.” 123 This led to hierarchical and
stratified societies that limited individual freedom in favor of a minority of elites. Due to
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population pressure, agricultural productivity, and commerce, a new type of society emerged in
the modern era: “industrial” society, which was evolutionary, in the sense that it replaced the
static society of military hierarchy and coercion with a compounding and fluid society based on
the division of labor. This new society upended the relationship between state and civil society
(the economy, civic associations, free press, etc.), replacing the former with the latter in terms of
primacy. Though Spencer’s evolutionary perspective is today considered the ultimate master
narrative of Western progress, it is often forgotten that Spencer made no guarantee of the moral
direction of evolution as a process. Spencer saw greater complexity and differentiation
transpiring within industrial society, which was good in so far as it held the promise of greater
human freedom. However, toward the end of his life, Spencer saw all around him - in the Boer
War, the naval and armament races of the Great Powers, and even the Salvation Army - a
reversion toward a militarist society. When accused of advocating for the application of the law
of the survival of the fittest on human society, Spencer responded, “Aggression of every kind is
hateful to me.” 124
Talcott Parsons famously challenged in 1937, “Who now reads Spencer?. . . Spencer is
dead.” 125 And, as students in introductory sociology seminars all know, Émile Durkheim fixed
Spencer’s problems. However, as Robert Carneiro pointed out,
The idea of a comparative sociology, an interest in typologies of human society,
concern with the division of labor, discussions of structure, function, aggregation,
and integration, all of which are found in Durkheim, occurred earlier in works by
Spencer with which Durkheim was thoroughly familiar. Even when Durkheim
found himself at odds with Spencer, the latter’s views often served him as a
springboard to launch his own new interpretation. 126
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Perhaps, because of the influence of Spencer’s utilitarianism and/or the positivism of Auguste
Comte, 127 Durkheim could not escape from an evolutionary perspective of modern society that
suggested a move from mechanical solidarity (à la militarist society) to organic solidarity (à la
industrial society).
However, the important correction Durkheim made was precisely at the level of the
individual in the state of nature. Durkheim wrote in The Division of Labor in Society,
Far from being able to date the effacement of the individual from the institution of
some despotic power, we ought on the contrary to see in it the first step taken
along the road to individualism. In fact, the chiefs are the first individual
personalities who have risen from the mass of society. . . Dominating society,
they are no longer constrained to follow its every movement. 128
In Durkheim’s framework, “primitive” societies exist within a state of mechanical solidarity, in
which social functions are regulated by a relatively simple system of norms via the conscience
collective. 129 Only as the size and scale of society increases does a division of labor become
functionally necessary to maintain organic solidarity, which is more fluid due to the separation of
social tasks assigned according to merit and choice. At this point, the idea of individualism
develops, though it never a fully realized actuality due to the influence and coercion of social
facts upon social actors. 130 This consciousness of an individual psychology comes from modern
social organization. Durkheim said,
Most of our states of consciousness would not have occurred among men isolated
from one another and would have occurred completely differently among people
grouped together in a different way. Thus they derive not from the psychological
nature of man generally, but from the way in which men, once they associate
together, exert a reciprocal effect upon one another, according to their number and
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proximity . . . Society does not find ready-made in individual consciousnesses the
bases on which it rests; it makes them for itself. 131
So why, then, does Durkheim not provide the theoretical bases upon which war and
modernity can be assessed, as has been argued by Michael Mann, Hans Joas, Edward Tiryakian
and others? 132 If society and individual consciousnesses exist within a reciprocal relationship,
why do societies and individuals engage in war? In the context of modernity, Durkheim
indicated that the evolutionary development of the state in the context of organic solidarity
causes individuals to realize their interest in avoiding war. The increased social population and
the more complex division of labor in modern society require a larger state performing more
functions. 133 Again, this is the opposite of Spencer’s view. Among the important functions of
the state, in this context, is to preserve the sphere of individual liberty. As the individual
personality emerges from the social mass “he” realizes that,
War fetters his activity, diminishes his stature and so becomes the supreme evil.
Because it inflicts undeserved suffering on him, he sees in it more and more the
supreme form of moral offence. In these conditions it is quite contradictory to
expect him to submit to the same subordination as before. 134
In this view, the individual is no longer as compelled to submit to the whim of the despot who
would send him or her to war, because Reason allows them to distinguish the contradictions that
underlie the activity of military participation. Of course, Durkheim was writing this before the
most irrational of wars, the Great War, in which 70 million soldiers precisely did submit
willingly to subordination. Yet, in his pamphlet, “Germany Above All,” published during the
war, Durkheim suggested that Germany was responsible for having lost its Enlightenment ideals
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by glorifying war and denouncing international law. 135 That Durkheim harkened to morality
amidst the irrationality of war, confirms Edward Tiryakian’s suggestion that the roots of the
Liberal assumption of pacifist modernity pervading classical social theory do, in fact, lie in the
moral principles of the Enlightenment itself. 136
In “Perpetual Peace,” Kant suggested that the moral foundations of all national
constitutions imply that wars should be eliminated. 137 Through Republican government,
voluntary international congresses, and economic interdependence, sovereign nation states in
cooperation could establish the legal framework for this peace to be engendered. The
cosmopolitan point of view is also the natural outcome of the Universal Historic trend toward
Reason and Freedom. 138 Nature provides the conditions through which individuals come to
realize themselves through conflict between one another and with Nature herself which
establishes the motivation for hard work and positive action. For individuals themselves, this
may not represent a trend towards Reason. Only for the species as a whole can a Universal
History be conceived of that leads toward the final culmination of the trend towards moral
freedom – the end of war. 139 This does require concerted human effort, however, as the idea of
cosmopolitan law “can only serve as a guiding thread for presenting as a system . . . what would
otherwise be a planless conglomeration of human actions.” 140
Kant’s argument for a perpetual peace has been influential in contemporary political
philosophy and political science. In 1983, Michael Doyle wrote two essays in Philosophy and
Public Affairs inspired by Kant that led to an outpouring of historical and empirical research on
135
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“Democratic Peace Theory.” 141 The argument is simple: ‘democracies almost never go to war
with each other.’ This is presumably because rational citizens of a democratic state would not
vote to go to war against other democratic peoples. Indeed, there exists “extraordinarily strong
empirical” evidence demonstrating the plausibility of this theory, as Levy and Thompson have
pointed out. 142 However, critics of the theory have challenged the definitions of “democracy”
used by the Democratic Peace analysts. 143 For example, in the War of 1812 (or the Napoleonic
Wars for that matter), Britain is not characterized as a democracy because the monarchy still
handled foreign policy. Similarly, in the U.S. Civil War, the Confederacy did not meet the
criteria of being a democracy for over three years. Numerous exceptional cases have been
raised, often by Realist IR scholars, and defended by liberal peace theorists. However, one
reason Democratic Peace theory fails at explaining the problem of war, and modernity in general,
is that it employs a dyadic model of war and peace, in that the cases are single democratic states
vs. single democratic states. Indeed, these states rarely go to war with each other. But,
democratic states do go to war with states they deem authoritarian quite often. Furthermore,
democratic states are often inclined toward alliances and treaties that organize them into blocks,
like the Triple Entente, or NATO. These alliances are based on shared normative values of
democracy, but also on security concerns that would make attack against an ally fundamentally
irrational since it would isolate the aggressor from the collective defensive pact. The power and
security afforded by these democratic blocs may actually encourage the aggressive actions of
democracies against autocracies outside their normative international community; for example,
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in the NATO bombings in the Balkans, covert engagements in Latin America, or Operation Iraqi
Freedom. In any event, wars have not been eliminated by liberal democracy.
However, of the three principles that guarantee Kant’s perpetual peace, the third points to
the heart of the Liberal economic determinism I have promised to address. 144 Kant wrote,
Just as nature wisely separates nations…the spirit of commerce, which is
incompatible with war, sooner or later gains the upper hand in every state. As the
power of money is perhaps the most dependable of all the powers (means)
included under the state power, states see themselves forced, without any moral
urge, to promote honorable peace and by mediation to prevent war wherever it
threatens to break out. They do so exactly as if they stood in perpetual alliances,
for great offensive alliances are in the nature of the case rare and even less often
successful. In this manner nature guarantees perpetual peace by the mechanism
of human passions. Certainly she does not do so with sufficient certainty for us to
predict the future in any theoretical sense, but adequately from a practical point of
view, making it our duty to work toward this end, which is not just a chimerical
one. 145
There are a couple of elements of this argument that are worth highlighting. First, “the spirit of
commerce” is incompatible with war. By this, Kant means that war disrupts economic activity,
and that commercial states and firms, acting in their own self-interest, will soon prevent wars
from transpiring. Second, the material interest of states will force them to prevent war, “without
any moral urge.” Because citizens and states following their economic self-interest inevitably
create the conditions desired by morality, one does not, in fact, have to rest upon those moral
foundations, since peace will happen ‘naturally.’ Hence, our faith in cosmopolitan peace is
rested assured “by the mechanism of human passions.”
As is well known, Adam Smith’s “Invisible Hand” was supposed to achieve similarly
positive results by having merchants, industrialists, and consumers involved in market exchange
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regulated by the “law” of supply and demand. Before globalization, Smith assumed that capital
would naturally prefer to invest in their home market. Smith said,
By preferring the support of domestick (sic) to that of foreign industry, he intends
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was
no part of his intention. . . By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes
that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. 146
Though Smith did provide that one of the state’s necessary duties was to secure the territory of
the nation with militaries and war deficits, 147 ultimately, Smith trusted that states engaged in free
trade across borders would find that they could increase the wealth of their nation more
effectively through commercial activity than through pillaging and aggressive war. Smith,
therefore, relegated war to the political realm, where it would remain exogenous to the free
market economy.
Hans Joas suggested that Kant and Smith reflect two sides of the same coin. Kant
represents the republican tradition, while Smith demonstrates the utilitarian perspective. 148
While Joas noted that there is “productive tension” between these two optimistic positions, when
combined into the liberal utilitarian position (as in Spencer), the idealism of the perspectives
became dangerous when used to justify imperialism and colonialism. 149 Though Joas did not
think imperialism happened due to a Leninist model of capital exportation, Jürgen Habermas, in
his essay, “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred Years’ Historical Remove,” showed
his Marxist stripes by saying,
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Kant did not foresee that the social tensions that initially intensify in the course of
accelerating capitalist industrialization would both encumber domestic politics
with class struggles and direct foreign policy into the channels of violent
imperialism.” 150
Habermas was correct in pointing out that Kant could not have known in 1795 that, for example,
nationalism would turn active citizens into willing subordinates to the state, or that philosophy
could be taken up by anti-Enlightenment thinkers who justified aggression and war. On the point
of the economy, Kant’s inattention to the class conflict inherent in capitalism, to say nothing of
the anomie generated by industrialism and the division of labor, led him to conclude that the selfinterested economic activity of individuals would lead to morally beneficial outcomes in the
realm of international peace.
The symbiosis between the liberal and utilitarian positions is still evident in the current
discourse surrounding Democratic Peace Theory and free markets neoliberalism. In “The Nexus
of Market Society, Liberal Preferences, and Democratic Peace,” Michael Mousseau found
evidence to support his theory that “market democracies,” in particular, were especially prone to
peace. 151 Mousseau considered this trend as endogenously contained with market society, since
free markets directly contribute to the generation of a liberal political culture. Internationally,
Richard Rosecrance suggested, in The Rise of the Trading State, that as markets connected states
together in a competitive, but also mutually reliant system, the rational need to go to war would
be effectively removed. 152 The advent of the Information Age and globalization further increased
this interdependence, as computer, satellite, and transportation technologies led to an even more
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peaceful Rise of the Virtual State. 153 In 1999, perhaps it seemed reasonable to assert that “the
world is making steady progress toward peace and economic security.” 154 But Rosecrance was
far more prescient when he wrote: “The factor of land might stage a resurgence and territory
become more significant…where land and its products still remain the vital factor of production.
[In] the oil of the Caspian or the Middle-East – territory will continue to exert a delusive
influence.” 155 Indeed, the resurgence of war since 2001, involving democracies engaged in preemptive war in defiance of international law, has (or should have) challenged the liberal
assumptions behind peace and modernity. In 1989, Francis Fukuyama had declared the victory
of two forces, democracy and free market capitalism, which amounted to The End of History. 156
20 years later, it seems history still moves on.
How is the continuation of war to be explained? If, for example, we assume Mousseau’s
claim that markets generate democracy which generates peace – in other words, that peace is
endogenous to market society - then war must be an exogenous or atavistic variable to the
economy – as Adam Smith and Richard Rosecrance have suggested.157 While peace can be
explained by markets, wars persist in the modern era for reasons other than trade. Joseph
Schumpeter, for example, suggested in “The Sociology of Imperialism,” that war “falls in the
great group of those things that live on from earlier epochs, things which play so great a role in
every concrete situation and which are to be explained not from the conditions of the present but
from the conditions of the past.” 158 The fact that war still exists is a reflection of the continued
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existence of war-minded nobles and not due to the logic of capitalist production itself. This view
was shared by other classical economists, including Thorstein Veblen and A.C. Pigou, and has
been reformulated throughout the twentieth century in an economic theory debate that Coulomb
and Fontanel described as ““Markets-as-Peace” vs. “Capitalism-as-War.” 159 The battle lines of
this debate match up according to whether an economist is a Marxist 160 or a Liberal, 161
indicating that one’s position comes down to whether war is considered inherent in capitalism, or
not.

2.4. A Synthetic Critique of Marxist, Liberal, and Realist Perspectives

None of the three economically deterministic theories of war and peace are satisfactory
on their own. I should note, before proceeding, however, that the positions outlined above are
not necessarily the sum of Marxist, Liberal, or Realist schools of thought, or even the specific
theorists. Rather they should be considered as particular points of view that have been associated
with these traditions. In fact, the correctives to deal with the economic determinism within these
perspectives can be found immanently contained within the assumptions of the theories
themselves.
To start with the Liberal position - that market integration leads to peace and that war is
an atavism of pre-modern social systems - we should recall Rousseau’s emphasis on the
civilizing process in corrupting “man” away from the positive conditions of Nature. If this is the
case, then the continued persistence of war is a demonstration of the fact that modern social
159
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organization is still not correct. Rather than conceiving of an ideal world, as Kant did in
“Perpetual Peace,” in order to direct natural human activity toward morally desirable outcomes,
we should heed Voltaire’s ironic perspective to see that ‘this is not the best of all possible
worlds.’ 162 Modern war is not only a continuation of feudal militancy running counter to
evolution, but has itself evolved throughout the modern era in terms of technology, strategy, and
military participation. Rather than calling for a return to a natural state of noble savagery, or
resort to throwing our hands up by declaring war is simply a cultural construction, we should
direct our attention directly at the reality of war and society to determine which factors within
social organization are the causes of war.
The undermining use of an ideal, utopian future is also an issue for the Marxist
perspective. Indeed, Michael Mann, Hans Joas, and Edward Tiryakian have lumped the two
perspectives together as the “Liberal/Marxian” tradition, since both consider war to be
prehistoric and removable in a, yet unrealized, future society. Yet, the Marxist analysis of
capitalism does attend to question of what precisely is the element of modern society that causes
this corruption, concluding that the economic relations of capitalism generate class antagonism
and stimulate imperialist wars. Orthodox Marxists would suggest that it is exclusively the
material economic base that causes these problems. But this type of thinking leads to exclusively
economic prescriptions, such as the revolution of property relations attempted by Lenin, which
could only come about through coercive violence and war.
Another side of Marxian thought relates to the consciousness that is required for class
revolution to take place. In an objective sense, class relations are determined by economic
factors, such as income and wealth. But there is no guarantee that these class actors will become
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aware of their conditions and unite. For this, a subjective awareness of being a “class for itself”
is necessary. As Michael Mann pointed out, this indicates that the social consequences of class
are related to both economic power and ideological power.163 Mann outlined Marx’s own
position on class consciousness in terms of four positions:164
1. Identity. The definition of self as working class, as playing a distinctive role
in common with other workers in the economy. This self-conception need not
be associated with class conflict.
2. Opposition. The perception that capitalists and their managers constitute the
workers’ enduring opponent. Identity plus opposition will generate conflict,
but this may not be extensive.
3. Totality. The acceptance of the first two elements as the defining
characteristics of (1) the workers’ total social situation and (2) the whole
society.
4. Alternative. Conceiving of an alternative form of power relations to existing
capitalism. This will reinforce extensive and political class conflict and
legitimate revolutionary struggle. 165
Some combination of all four components should be present for a proletarian revolution or class
action to take place. This is why Marxist activists direct so much attention toward explaining the
non-self-evident features of the capitalist system to workers who are used to conceiving of issues
in terms of local, particularistic ways. While Marx’s polemics against idealism led his followers
to over-emphasize the material conditions that generate economic class structures, his position
above demonstrates that conscious awareness actually determines the outcome of overcoming
current conditions. Furthermore, contemporary research along Marxist lines, such as David
Harvey’s examination of neoliberalism, demonstrates that a conscious effort has been made by
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the capitalist class to institute conditions that benefit their international economic interest.166 In
this sense, the ideological awareness of all classes is relevant, not just in clouding the material
conditions of the present, but in determining the conditions of the present. With that in mind,
addressing the persistence of war should not come solely from theories that highlight the
economic structures that lead to war, but also the ideological factors that stimulate those actions.
The same position is also implied within the conception of power that is the basis of
Realism’s Machtpolitik perspective. As I suggested, the Realist definition of power is hard to
find, but seems to suggest material interests as determining the ever-present cycles of war that
take place at the international systemic level. However, there are two reasons power should not
be conceived solely in economic or material terms according to the model’s assumptions. First,
there is an underlying idea that humans and states are motivated to increase their power by
default, according to a kind of Nietszchian ‘Will to Power.’ This implies that power actually
transcends material desires and represents an end in itself. Wealth and territory could be simply
evidence of achievement of the real object of interest: power itself.
This leads to a second important conclusion. Because, at the individual level of analysis,
Realism represents a “true elitist” perspective of the state, one must look at the individual
statesmen who act within the state system. In this view, the statesmen who drive the state toward
its objective state interest do so, based on particular perceived opportunities or threats, but also
based on an instinctual or psychological desire to increase their power. This is the inevitable
conclusion of Hobbes’ homo lupus view of man. If one rejects the Hobbesian instinct as
unscientific, as Kenneth Waltz and the Neorealists do, then the instinct to increase state power
should be replaced with psychological motivations to increase their power. These psychological
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traits, which might be egotism, dominating personalities, or sociopathy, could be just
characteristic of individuals who rise to the positions of power in foreign policy, and do not
necessarily have to be universally held by all humankind. These personalities might also be
absent in statesmen who fail to operate in their states’ objective interests. These psychological
features may come from the biology of the human brain, but they also come from society
through socialization and interaction. Here the question becomes, what are the features of
modern society that cause these actors to have this psychological ‘Will to Power’?
All of the issues above point to a misrecognition of the autonomous power of culture and
ideology on the part of the economistic theories of war. This is a reflection of the universalistic
assumptions underlying the theories, which largely stem from the Enlightenment. As Clifford
Geertz noted,
The trouble with this kind of view… is that the image of a constant human nature
independent of time, place, and circumstance…may be an illusion, that what man
is may be so entangled with where he is, who he is, and what he believes that it is
inseparable from them. It is precisely the consideration of such a possibility that
led to the rise of the concept of culture and the decline of the uniformitarian view
of man. Whatever else modern anthropology asserts… it is firm in the conviction
that men unmodified by the customs of particular places do not in fact exist, have
never existed, and most important, could not in the very nature of the case
exist. 167

Indeed, how can we speak of war in the modern era without speaking about the specific cases of
France during the Third Republic or Germans during the Nazi period? How can we understand
the motivations of imperialists during European colonialism without understanding the bourgeois
sensibilities of Bildungsbürghertum or Social Darwinism? Though not in whole - in part, the
economic theories of war tend to neglect these features as either unimportant or irrational. Even
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the best sociological attempts to critique the monolithic power of capital in structural analysis,
for example, Michael Mann’s Sources of Social Power, vol. II, or Charles Tilly’s Coercion,
Capital, and European States, 990-1990, do so by emphasizing the additional role of the military
in constituting society. 168 Rarely do they emphasize the symbolic power of national identity, the
social psychological pathologies that developed in the modern era, changes in gender and
masculinity norms, the colonial importation and export of culture, or the novelty of bourgeois
individualism itself. These were not simply surface manifestations of modern society, but were,
rather the medium and glue that held together and constituted Western society in the midst of
dramatic social change. That these “non-economic” factors could, and did, lead to wars in many
instances should not be ignored due to theoretical narrowness.
Of course, anthropology already deals with war through the lens of culture. 169 If we are
in search of a compatible sociological theory, we cannot let the “see-saw” fall on the proposition
that “It’s all culture.” Structures are important. And with all due respect to the achievements of
Saussure, Lévi-Strauss, Sapir and Whorf and others, language, semiotics, and mythology cannot
explain social structure entirely. 170 Material and economic relations do have important roles to
play in determining the channels and possibilities of social action, as do political organizations
and status hierarchies. This structure need not be functionally understood according to
biologistic or cybernetic analogies. Rather, systems exist due to the reproduction of social
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structure by actors and institutions that linger across space and time. 171 Neither should structure
imply a universal model that is applicable transhistorically irrespective of difference. So how
then, do we reach an understanding of modern society, which is not transhistorical, but, rather,
was particularly structured between 1750 and the present, with origins in Western Europe? As
Wallerstein and world-systems theorists have clearly shown, a particular economic structure did
expand from the territory of Europe to encompass the globe during this period – namely
industrial capitalism. What are the impacts of (and preconditions for) this economic system
which seem so important to the constitution of modern society?
This question should not be posed simply in terms of a global division of labor or class
relations, but also in terms of cultural exchange, Orientalist racism, and even religion. In fact, an
ontologically and epistemologically correct understanding of modern society, modern capitalism,
and modern war, would require that there be no distinction between culture and economics made
at all. 172 Rather, culture and material interests are always involved in a dialectical relationship.
The work of Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, Bourdieu, and others have demonstrated that social
structure and individual consciousness are not actually distinct from one another. The societal
totality (however defined) does not functionally reproduce individual actors, but rather, totality
and agents reciprocally reproduce each other. 173 A conception of social structure conceived
dialectically makes it difficult to assign primacy to a particular sphere of social life - for
example, the economy, because economic relations cannot exist without other forms of social
interaction, like religion, political ideology, or family traditions. Furthermore, by removing the
causal power of structural-functional needs, phenomena must be explained in terms of the
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relatively conscious action of individuals, who are no longer in the position of “cultural dupes,”
to use Anthony Giddens’ phrase. 174 This becomes especially apparent if we take seriously the
Realists’ elite theory of the state. These powerful individuals are acutely aware of their own
power and the dynamics of power at work in international society.
On another level, however, individuals can be considered as cultural products - though
not in terms of “false consciousness” which can only be subjectively attributed by the analyst.
Rather, through a dialectical framework, we can see the manner in which existing society
imprints the cultural traditions, behaviors, and a sense of self on the individual. This establishes
highly specific cases of cultural difference at the level of the individual, but also explains why
societies take on a recognizable form at the aggregate level.
When one considers that asymmetrical generational differences persist through all eras,
while the cultural dynamic generated by immigration, transnational relationships, and the media
stimulate further changeable grounds upon which society rests – one can see that the dynamic
structure of capitalism exists within, while also causing, a chaotic social totality moving through
time. Wars are similarly situated within the modern era, causing, as well as being caused by, the
greater modern society.
To penetrate the logic of this dialectic at work, we will need to examine particular
historical cases. With that in mind, I have decided to look at wars in the nineteenth century –
1815-1914. This period has often been overlooked in terms of military development, because it
is generally considered peaceful, as I will critically discuss below. Returning to this period is
important for understanding modernity and war, for, in many ways, the modern world was born
in the nineteenth century. Because social theorists living during the period could not bear
174
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witness to the climaxes of modern warfare, World Wars I, II, and the Cold War, their theories do
not seem to have left specific road maps to understanding war in their time. Meanwhile,
twentieth century and contemporary scholars seem to forget that wars even happened in the
nineteenth century. In many ways, the nineteenth century can be read as the best comparative
case for the twentieth century, and though the space of this essay leaves little room for this
comparison, the historical analysis below should be read in terms of the essential similarities and
differences between our modern world and our world in the recent past.
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3. The Myth of the Hundred Years’ Peace: War in the Nineteenth Century
The previous section identified three theories that have been used to understand the
relationship between war, capitalism, and modernity – Liberal, Marxist, and Realist. However, I
have argued that, in their traditional forms, each places too great an emphasis on economic
determinates leading to an undervaluation of ideological and cultural factors. While I have
identified several problems with the assumptions that underlie the theories, I have also noted that
the theories do not necessarily preclude the influence of ideology. Rather, all have immanently
contained within their respective frameworks positions in which non-material influences have
considerable importance. In Figure 3.1 below, I have outlined the core assumptions, the negative
consequences of these assumptions, and the openings for ideological analysis in each of the
theories.
Figure 3.1 - Three Economically Deterministic Theories of War

Theory

Assumption

Consequent Error

Ideology?

Marxist

Mode of production
causes war.

System causes events.
States and actors are
treated functionally.

Class consciousness
can be determining.

States and elites want
to survive and
increase their power.

Systemic and
tautological analyses.
Elites are equated
with the state.

“Power” can be an
end in itself for actors,
which we may be able
to explain through
psychology.

War is atavistic.
Market integration
and democracy lead to
peace between
nations.

Does not recognize
war’s particular
character in
modernity, or the
persistence of war
despite the institution
of liberal democracy.

Individuals are
constructed by culture
and civilization.

Realist

Liberal
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The most significant dichotomy exists between the Marxist and the Liberal perspectives, which
is reflected in the debate between “Markets-as-Peace” and “Capitalism-as-War.” The fact that
each perspective has a more-or-less completely opposite view of the pacific nature of modern
market capitalism demonstrates how important one’s point of view is in determining the analysis
of the same series of events.
Luckily, between these theories lies a fourth perspective I identified earlier as the
“Communitarian” position. This position is not widely held, though there are consonances
within the communitarian philosophy of scholars, like Michael Walzer, and his influential
perspective on war. 175 In this case, I use the term to distinguish the particular position assumed
by Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time,
written in 1944. 176 The book’s primary purpose was not to develop a theory of war, and his
hypothesis regarding the “Hundred Years’ Peace” (1815-1914) occupied only the first two of
thirty-five chapters. However, Polanyi’s argument figures especially well within the context of
the three theories discussed above. In terms of his economic perspective, Polanyi is aligned
closely with the Marxists, who would suggest that the growth of the capitalist market has led to
alienation and social disintegration. His political economic ideology could just as easily be
termed “socialist,” but this would run the risk of associating Polanyi with the Marxists all
together. For Polanyi also ceded to Liberals that transnational capitalism did appear to have led
to peace in the nineteenth century. He challenged Lenin specifically for suggesting that finance
capital was responsible for wars, when, in fact, it appeared as though they had averted a major
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conflagration until 1914. 177 Finally, less explicitly, there is some indication that Polanyi
regarded the Realists’ ‘Will to Power’ as a condition that would have taken place in the
nineteenth century had there not been a countervailing trend (transnational capitalism). In other
words, Polanyi still feels as though peace needs to be explained.
Because Polanyi made an explicit argument regarding war in a specific historical period,
I will use his argument regarding the “Hundred Years’ Peace” as a hypothesis reflective of the
economic determinism generally found in all of the theories. 178 In disproving the absolute
validity of this hypothesis I hope to show the merits and inadequacies of looking at war,
modernity, and capitalism in this overly economic way.
The first part of the critique will consist of a historical challenge to Polanyi’s claims on
materialist grounds themselves – that is, by highlighting alternative historical evidence within the
framework of power as traditionally conceived. The second part of the critique will examine
cultural and ideological factors that are not considered important by Polanyi or other materialist
scholars. Though I have argued in the previous section that the separation between economy and
culture is not an accurate representation of reality, it will serve here as a necessary heuristic
device. This approach reflects the dramatic cleft within the discipline of history between “social
history” and “cultural history.” Since I will not be engaging in primary research at this time, I
will need to follow the division as it exists within the secondary historical literature. After
addressing nineteenth century war and society in this way, I will return to the dialectical
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theoretical framework to indicate where future research should be directed according to initial
findings.
3.1. Polanyi’s Hundred Years’ Peace

Between the Napoleonic Wars and World War I there lies “a phenomenon unheard of in
the annals of Western civilization, namely a hundred years’ peace – 1815-1914.” 179 So stated
Karl Polanyi in 1944 amidst the ruins of that very civilization. Nineteenth century civilization,
he said, rested on four institutional pillars – the balance-of-power system, the international gold
standard, the self-regulating market, and the liberal state. Two of these institutions were political,
two were economic. In another configuration, two were domestic and the other two were
international, as can be seen in Fig. 3.2.

Figure 3.2 - Four Pillars of Nineteenth Century Civilization
National

International

Political

Liberal State

Balance of Power

Economic

Self-Regulating Market

International Gold Standard

Source: Polanyi, p. 3
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The Hundred Years’ Peace was maintained by the international balance-of-power political
system and the international economy maintained through the gold standard. Though the
breakdown of the international gold standard was the proximate cause of World War I, Polanyi
considered the domestic political-economic configuration of the self-regulating market to be the
underlying root cause of the seemingly stable, but ultimately superficial nineteenth century
civilization. Polanyi explained,
The fount and matrix of the system was the self-regulating market. It was this
innovation which gave rise to a specific civilization. The gold standard was
merely an attempt to extend the domestic market system to the international field;
the balance-of-power system was a superstructure erected upon and, partly,
worked through the gold standard; the liberal state was itself a creation of the selfregulating market. The key to the institutional system of the nineteenth century
lay in the laws governing market economy. 180
Note that the other institutional pillars are either created by or are a superstructure upon the selfregulating economy. The primacy of the economy in Polanyi’s analysis is most apparent here,
where the echo of Marx’s base/superstructure model is clearly evident. Nineteenth century
civilization, or at least its “specificity,” was itself derived from the capitalist market economy,
indicating that social relations were determined by the relations of economic exchange.
Polanyi’s communitarian position was that the idea of a self-adjusting market is “a stark
utopia” that could not exist without destroying the human and natural substance of society. 181
Here Polanyi has made a normative judgment about what is “natural,” which he clarified later in
the book. In Nature, society is just, egalitarian, and symmetrical based on patterns of reciprocity
and redistribution, as was the case in the Trobriand Islanders of Western Malanesia. 182 Modern
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society, therefore, is “unnatural.” It had to be created by capitalists in their image. The majority
of The Great Transformation is a remarkable examination of how this creation was developed in
England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed, an enduring legacy of
Polanyi’s work is his identification of a natural “double-movement” in which civil society reacts
against the transgressions of capital in an attempt to restore social reciprocity, redistribution, and
social order – for example, during the American New Deal. By restraining unchecked greed, the
double movement prevents capital from completely “disembedding” the economy from society.
Removing social constraints to allow greater economic freedom is always in the capitalist class’s
interests; however, the process is never complete since the economy will always be “embedded”
within society. On the one hand, capital itself needs the political apparatus of the state and
society to maintain its legal and cartel privileges. On the other hand, society never lets itself
become fully reduced to economic cogs, but rather fights back against the deadening life of
economic exploitation by reembedding the economy under social control. Polanyi’s perspective
has been criticized as “primitivism,” by Murray Rothbard, in that he implied our advanced
market society should return to its “primitive” roots in egalitarianism. 183 This positions Polanyi
differently than Marx, who would overcome capitalism through industrialism, taking advantage
of modern technological achievements. However, Polanyi’s communitarian ideal of a collective
society that has been distorted by the stark utopia of the self-regulating market is not entirely
essential to his analysis of war. Rather his attempt to connect the horrors of World War I and II
to the international gold standard served to provide brutal evidence of the consequences of an
unquestioned liberal state protecting an unregulated free market.
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Polanyi’s observed that peace was not the normal state of international relations in
previous and subsequent centuries. In order to identify the cause of the peace, one must identify
the novel variable that could explain the difference within the new era. Polanyi acknowledged
new diplomatic relations that institutionalized balance-of-power, notably the Congress system,
but suggested that these held a loose confederation that convened rarely and were not aligned.
There needed to be something that bound these powers together. He said, “We must seek some
undisclosed powerful social instrumentality at work in the new setting, which could make the
peace interest effective. This anonymous factor, we submit was haute finance.” 184 Haute
finance was an institution peculiar to the last third of the nineteenth century and the first third of
the twentieth (at the time of Polanyi’s writing).
Polanyi argued that transnational capital functioned as the main link between the political
and economic organization of the world, representing a permanent independent agency dedicated
to peace between Great Powers. According to Polanyi, “There was intimate contact between
finance and diplomacy… neither would consider any long range plan, whether peaceful or
warlike, without making sure of the other’s goodwill.” 185 The members of the elite class of
bondholders, embodied in the Rothschilds and J.P. Morgan, would have to float the loans
required to pay for wars. They held the reins of states, and yet were independent of national
organizations. Because international banking was not restricted to financing governments, and
included foreign investment in industry, public utilities and banks, as well as long-term loans to
public and private corporations abroad, any risk of war that would jeopardize these investments
would be emphatically discouraged. Trade had become linked with peace through an
international monetary system which could not function in a general war. Any holders of
184
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government securities were bound to lose if currencies were affected, and to the extent that
governments relied on these financiers in multiple directions, they listened. Polanyi asserted,
“Consequently, there was never a time when the peace interest was unrepresented in the councils
of the Concert of Europe.” 186 Their motivation was purely for economic gain. Peace was, in
fact, an unintended consequence.
The logic behind this assessment is similar to that of the Liberal market peace theory. It
is natural that businesses will lobby for peace because it is in their rational self-interest to leave
the international economy undisturbed. Polanyi, however, offered a list of specific mechanisms
that provided capital with the necessary power to ensure this peace in the nineteenth century.
The gold standard limited fluctuations in budgets since loans and the renewal of loans hinged on
good credit behavior. Finance had substantial power over smaller sovereign states because of
loans and credit, allowing the City of London to make “its voice heard” in these smaller
countries with a “timely pull of a thread in the international monetary network”. 187 Finance also
provided de facto administration of semi-colonial regions in the Near East, North Africa, etc.
Capital intensive projects such as railroads across the Balkans, Anatolia, Syria, Persia, Egypt,
Morocco, and China, were long-term enough that states considered the risks to their investments
in time of crisis. Soon enemies’ banks were investing in each others’ markets. While it might be
controversial to invest directly in a potential enemy’s domestic market, this was less of an issue
in colonies, as evidenced, for example, in the case of Germany’s investments in Algeria and
Morocco late in the century while assuming a hostile posture with the French. During this period
legal frameworks were set up to safeguard loans and business during wartime. The Napoleonic
wars were the last major examples of confiscation of private property in belligerent territory
186
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(until the twentieth century), and, during the Crimean war, enemy merchants could come and go
at port, maintaining international trade. Slowly, but surely, throughout the century the influence
of transnational capital grew, making it the only other international organization with sufficient
power to motivate nations toward maintaining the balance-of-power and peace. As Polanyi said,
“Budgets and armaments, foreign trade and raw material supplies, national independence and
sovereignty were now the function of currency and credit.” 188
Polanyi did cede that haute finance were anything but pacifists, noting that “they had
made their fortune in the financing of wars; they were impervious to moral consideration; they
had no objection to any number of minor, short, or localized wars.” 189 As we shall see below,
there were plenty of these to be found. Industrial and agricultural capital interests also worked
against international finance by encouraging aggressive action that would lead to increased
armaments spending or mercantilist customs regulations. The road toward financially-instituted
peace between Great Powers was not inevitable or easily won, but eventually became the
invisible causal link that contained war within Continental Europe, in Polanyi’s view.
There are several historical points on which Polanyi’s analysis can be criticized, as will
be discussed below. Yet, there is merit in his attention toward the novel factor of transnational
capital and the international gold standard as an influence in decisions of war and peace in the
nineteenth century. Indeed, on the bond market especially, where states gathered the loans
necessary to fund wars, one can see the relationship that existed between political and economic
events. Historian Niall Ferguson identified four political assumptions, based on the experience
of the French Revolution of 1789-1815, felt by nineteenth century financiers themselves. 2 - 4
relate to war:
188
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1. That a political move to the left, ranging from outright revolution to a change
of ministry due to elections, would tend to loosen fiscal and monetary policy;
2. That a new and radical government would be more likely to pursue an
aggressive foreign policy which might, in turn, lead to war;
3. That any war would disrupt trade and hence lower tax revenues for all
governments;
4. That direct involvement in war would increase a state’s expenditure as well as
reducing its tax revenues, leading to substantial new borrowings. 190
These fears led to market crises during, for example, the Revolutions of 1848 and the outbreak of
the Crimean War, demonstrating that investors priced bonds in response to political news as
often as fiscal or monetary indicators (see Appendix A, Table A.1). Indeed, this was the
perspective of particular financiers, like the members of the Rothschild family. During the threat
of revolution in France in 1830, James de Rothschild said, “We have a holding of 900,000
rentes; if peace is preserved they will be worth 75 percent, while in case of war they will drop to
45 percent…I am convinced that if peace is maintained rentes will improve on three month by at
least 10 percent.” 191 And to be sure, the Rothschilds and other major bond holders did have
some access to the ears of state. The personal influence of these lenders, with the impersonal
pressure of the bond market, certainly affected decisions of war and peace during the nineteenth
century.
But, to what extent? After all, Polanyi’s argument was that transnational finance was the
primary cause of peace between Great Powers in this period. For his argument to work, two
hypotheses would need to be verified. First, the influence of bond holders would need to be
substantially different than previous eras. Since at least the fiscal crises that beset Habsburg
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Spain during the sixteenth and seventeenth century following multiple defaults and bankruptcies,
states have taken note of their bond holders. 192 Throughout the eighteenth century, the modern
international bond and stock markets themselves originated because of the need to finance and
pay back war debts. 193 However - even if we concede that the bond market took on a newer,
more robust form in the nineteenth century as modern banks, trusts, and economists put their lot
into the fluctuations of growing and more complex international markets – the necessary proof of
Polanyi’s primacy argument must come by excluding other explanations for war and peace. This
second hypothesis will be the focus of the discussion below.
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3.2. Measuring War and Peace in the Nineteenth Century

Polanyi was not alone in seeing the nineteenth century as oddly peaceful. Especially in
the years following World War I, the idea of a “Hundred Years’ Peace” was in the air. After all,
those who could remember the belle époque of international peace that existed between 1870 and
1914 seemed justified in wanting a return to that way of life. Polanyi, however, provided very
specific vectors that defined this period as a Hundred Years’ Peace, which we can use to assess
the historical veracity of such an impression.
According to Polanyi, “apart from the Crimean War – a more or less colonial event England, France, Prussia, Austria, Italy, and Russia were engaged in war among each other for
altogether only eighteen months,” compared to an average of sixty to seventy years of major
wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 194 Indeed, in terms of average battle durations,
battle deaths per year, and a host of other statistical criteria, nineteenth century Europe does not
rate with either the eighteenth or the twentieth century versions of itself. Though Polanyi does
not provide his data sources, the proportions of his facts seem to bear out according to his
criteria. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Great Powers were involved in war
94% and 78% of the time, respectively, compared to 40% of the time in the nineteenth century
(including the Napoleonic Wars of 1800-1815). 195 Table 3.1 below demonstrates these changes
in proportion, while Figure 3.3 shows these proportions in three dimensions.
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If we focus on wars between Polanyi’s ‘Great Powers’ - the Austro-Sardinian War, the
Roman Republic War, The War of Italian Unification, The Seven Weeks War, and the FrancoPrussian War amounted to a total of 17.7 months, as seen in Table 3.2 below.

Table 3.1 - Wars Involving Great Powers

a

Century

Number of wars

16th
17th
18th
19th
20tha

34
29
17
20
15

through 1975
Source: Tilly 1990, p. 72

Average duration
of wars
(years)

1.6
1.7
1.0
0.4
0.4

Proportion of
years war
underway (%)

95
94
78
40
53
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Figure 3.3 – Magnitudes of Great Power War by Century, 1500-1975

Source: Tilly 1990, p. 73
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Table 3.2 - Great Power Wars According to Polanyi’s Criteria

War

Great Powers
Involved

Years

Duration
(months)

Austro-Sardinian
War

Austria v. Italy

1848-49

4.7

Roman Republic
War

France v. Austria

1849

1.8

War of Italian
Unification

France, Italy v.
Austria

1859

2.5

Seven Weeks War

Prussia, Italy v.
Austria

1866

1.4

Franco-Prussian
War

Prussia v. France

1870-71

7.3

Totala

a

Total with Crimean War (+28.3 months) is 46.0.

Source: Singer and Small 1972

17.7
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However, before accepting Polanyi’s claim outright, his calculation needs to be examined
further. For one, there is no reason why the Crimean War should be left out – it was not “a
colonial event,” as Polanyi suggested, but was rather one of the century’s most significant wars,
involving Britain, France, and Turkey against Russia. The war dramatically shifted the balanceof-power as Austria-Hungary became isolated from the Holy Alliance; 196 Russia stalled its
persistent incursion through the Caucasus and Black Sea in the hopes of seizing
Constantinople; 197 while Britain preserved the Ottoman Empire and its communications network
to India. As Winfried Baumgart suggested, “if the fighting had carried on during 1856, the First
World War would then have taken place 60 years earlier.” 198 Adding this conflict’s 28.3 months
back into the calculation brings the ‘Great Power’ total to 46.0 months – nearly 4 years. This is
still a long shot from previous centuries’ 60 to 70 years of major wars.
But, Polanyi’s six powers (England, France, Prussia, Austria, Italy, and Russia), while the
greatest, were not the only European, or “Western” powers during this period as states declined
out of, or entered into the core inter-state system. One could add the Ottoman Empire (Turkey),
Holland, Spain, the United States, Japan, and China by the end of the period. Wars between these
twelve powers would yield an additional 88.4 months of war between “Western” powers (See
Table A.2). If one adds all of the wars that were not between these powers, but involved one or
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more of the powers against weaker states, like the newly independent Latin American 199 or
Balkan states 200 an additional 125.5 ‘nation-months’ of war can be accounted for (see Table
A.3). Adding colonial wars by these powers against non-state actors yields an astonishing
additional 784.1 months (see Table A.4). All of these figures combined amounts to
approximately 87 years of war in which major powers were involved, as seen in Figure 3.4
below.

Figure 3.4 – Wars by Western Powers, 1815-1914
Total Duration in Nation-Months

46.0

Between Great Powers
88.4

Between 'Western' Powers
By Western Powers against
Lesser States

784.1

125.5

By Western Powers against
Non-State Actors

Total : 1044 months (87 years)
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In this light, it is difficult to characterize states as peaceful during this period of time. They were
involved in nearly constant preparation for, and execution of war at home or abroad. Even
within Continental Europe, Kalevi Holsti determined that during the ninety-nine years after the
Congress of Vienna there was only a 13% lower occurrence rate of war than the previous period
- one war every 3.3 years compared to one every 2.8 years (see Table A.5). 201
Furthermore, Holsti’s comparative data reflects the causes of war in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, providing us with a window into the relative proportion of economic
motivations in the execution of war (see Tables A.5 and A.6). According to Holsti’s calculation,
the most frequent war-generating issues in the nineteenth century were:
1. Maintaining integrity of state/empire – 55% of wars
2. Territory – 42% of wars
3. National liberation/state creation – 29% of wars
4. National unification/consolidation – 26% of wars
5. Protecting ethnic confreres – 16% of wars 202
Several of these motivations were novel, either as agenda items at all, or in terms of relative
significance. For example, ‘national liberation/state creation’, and ‘maintaining the integrity of a
state/empire’ each went from being a part of 8% of all wars from 1715-1814, to being a part of
29% to 55% respectively. National unification and ethnic protection were not issues listed at all
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in the preceding period. At the same time, the issues of the past became less important.
‘Territory’, for example, while still accounting for 42% of all wars had dropped from being a
part of 67% of wars in the preceding period. The other two most important issues from 17151814 were ‘commerce/navigation’ and ‘dynastic succession claims.’ The comparative difference
between these selected issues in each period can be seen in Figure 3.5 below.

% of Wars

Figure 3.5 – Key Issues in War, 1715 – 1914
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In Table A.6, I have attempted to reduce the complexity of Holsti’s list of war causes using
Michael Mann’s I.E.M.P. model, which identifies Ideological, Economic, Military, and Political
sources of power. 203 While all of these sources overlap, making it difficult to isolate a single
primary cause in most of the 31wars Holsti examined, the issues themselves could be defined in
terms of their emphasis on economic, ideological or military power. 204 For example, support for
ethnic confréres would be more ideologically driven (I) than wars to secure strategic territory,
which would be more important militarily (M).
As Fig. 3.5 demonstrates, the economically motivated (E) wars about commerce and
navigation declined from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. This could be the indication
of two possible scenarios in relation to Polanyi’s and the Liberal market peace theses. The first
confirms, while the second contradicts the thesis.
1. The increase in the scale and scope of the free market decreased the use of war as a
means to resolve competition for resources and commerce, or
2. The major commerce and navigation issues were resolved in the eighteenth century,
with Britain as the dominant naval power controlling sea lanes.
Indeed, there are many indications that the second proposition could have been the case. Holsti
noted that, although the occurrence of war decreased by only 13%, “except for the three brief
wars of German nation-building and Russia’s armed interventions into Hungary and Poland at
mid-century, the center of Europe running from London, through Paris, Berlin, and Vienna
constituted a significant zone of peace.” 205 At sea, and in the core of the Western European state
system, the unresolved territorial, dynastic, and navigational issues that plagued Europe through
the eighteenth century seemed to have been settled by 1815, following the breakdown of
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France’s claim to hegemony. 206 The largest remaining questions of this sort were in Central
Europe, and were resolved by war as will be discussed below. Simply observing that peace
existed does not tell us whether the peace that transpired in Central and Western Europe was due
to market integration, or whether international trade was a byproduct that was allowed to take
place due to the territorial security established by Continental balance-of-power and naval
hegemony.
Paul Kennedy suggested that there were, in fact, three materialist causes for this
pacification of the core. First was the growth of the integrated economy, as was explained by
Polanyi and others. Second was the fact that Europeans focused their energy abroad against less
developed peoples, as shown in Figure 3.4 above. Third, technology derived from the Industrial
Revolution led to uncertainty and changes in the nature of power and war, itself. According to
Kennedy, “Although it is difficult to generalize, the shifts in the Great Power balances caused by
the uneven pattern of industrial and technological change probably affected the outcome of midnineteenth-century wars more than did finance and credit.” 207
Consider, for example, the expansion of railways and telegraph lines. On the one hand,
railways were economically motivated, linking territories by land that were previously
commercially isolated from one another. Railroads and telegraphs, however, increasingly
assumed military significance throughout the century, as the case of the Franco-Prussian War
and the U.S. Civil War showed especially. As early as 1859, the French were able to move
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50,000 men to Italy by rail during the War of Italian Unification to gain the upper hand against
60,000 Sardinians. 208 By 1871, Prussian General Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke had
developed a carefully planned strategy of rail movements, in which uniform length trains were
run at uniform speed, linked and responsive to telegraph instructions. 209 When Napoleon III
rashly declared war with Prussia over an issue of Spanish succession, beginning on July 15,
1870, over 1,500 trains travelled to their destination in Alsace, turned around and went back for
another load, until nineteen days later the field force of over 380,000 men and supplies was
gathered while the French were still ferrying reservists from Algeria. Even during peacetime,
Prussia used their railways as a military threat. As Michael Mann noted,
Railways resembled spiderwebs, each spun over a state’s territories, with only a
few threads connecting the national webs. This was deliberate. A Prussian line
ran inside almost the whole length of the Saxon border, with many connections
back into Prussia and only one into Saxony. Military and national economic
considerations combined …in war the Prussian army could flood over the Saxon
border, as it did in 1866. 210
Additionally, the Prussia monarchy nationalized the railways, providing the state with 44 percent
of its revenue, which was used to fund wars with autonomous discretion from the
inconsequential Reichstag. Railroads led to three consequences in relation to war.
1. Railroads served dual purposes – providing economic and military advantages.
2. As the density of railway networks increased within the core of continental Europe, a
type of check-mate scenario evolved due to the dramatic increase in the numbers of
troops and armaments that could be mobilized for wars.
3. The few wars that were actually fought became relatively short.
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All three of these consequences are worth examining further. First, the dual military and
economic benefit was not exclusive to railroads alone, but rather demonstrates the dramatic
power generated by the Industrial Revolution for all realms of society. Steamships and
telegraphs connected Britain to her 9.5 million square mile Empire. By 1880, there were 97,568
miles of telegraph cable across the oceans, allowing 900 British civil servants and 70,000 British
soldiers to govern over 250 million Indians with direct contact with mainland Britain. 211 This
contact would prove decisive, for example, during the Sepoy War of 1857-59. 212 Because
Britain could quickly mobilize troops from its scattered regions in South Africa, Australia, India,
and elsewhere, while also being able to wire money, they could be anywhere they wanted or
needed to be in ‘all good speed.’ 213 This amounted to a massive “compression of time and
space,” to borrow David Harvey’s expression used to describe the postmodern condition of the
late 1980s. 214 Whereas, in the late eighteenth century it took nine days to travel from Frankfurt
to Berlin (302 miles), by 1872, Phileas Fogg could realistically travel the entire world (23,739
miles) in eighty days – nearly a nine-fold increase – to say nothing of how quickly he could send
a telegram. 215 The massive increase in the speed of travel and communications made the world a
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smaller place. 216 The territorial ambitions of states were no longer limited by the distance a
soldier could march in a day with necessary supplies (approx. 10-15 miles). 217 European
colonial powers began fighting upon the far flung continents of Asia, Africa, and Australia,
perhaps, because of “the need of the world-economy to expand its boundaries,” as Immanuel
Wallerstien has suggested. 218 However, as crises like the Fashoda Incident of 1898 in the middle
of desert Africa highlights, the Great Powers fought in previously inaccessible parts of the world
because they could. 219
However, Wallerstein was right to point out the internal pressures of the capitalist system
that stimulated the expansion and extension of that system abroad. These pressures, such as
unprecedented demographic growth, urbanization, and proletarianization developed as the
Industrial Revolution changed the European landscape. 220 This relates to the second point listed
above concerning railroads’ impact of military considerations. The density of the railway
network within Europe itself changed the military potentials of war, particularly in regard to the
size and speed of mobilization. Great Powers like France and Austria could no longer count on
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the numerous buffer states of the German Confederation or the Northern Italian region providing
breathing space should conflict arise. With the exception of Russia beyond her Polish territories
and Britain secured behind her wall of ships, states with connected railroad networks became
neighbors. With this in mind, Eric Hobsbawm’s figures related to railroad building take on
remarkable significance (See Tables A.7 and A.8). Where railroads became densely situated in
the core of the European system, the size of armies necessary to compete was substantially
increased. Whereas in the Napoleonic Wars, there was only one battle (Leipzig [1813]) in which
more than 300,000 men were involved, by 1860, these numbers were par for the course (as in the
battles at Sadowa [1866], Gravelotte[1870], and Sedan [1870]). 221 Though the French Republic
accomplished the historically unprecedented achievement of a standing army of over one million
men through the Levée en masse begun in 1793, only forty years later saw 2.5 million men
mobilized in the U.S. Civil War out of a population of 33 million, and 1.7 million in the FrancoPrussian war of 1870. 222 The introduction of machine guns, breech-loading rifles, artillery and
trenches further increased the number of infantry required to pitch battle. In the battle of
Mukden in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, 624,000 men engaged before each side lost nearly a
third of their forces to machine gun fire. 223 The persistent progress of technology throughout the
century led to the evolution of mass warfare that characterized the twentieth century. This form
did not emerge autopoetically in the First World War, but was, rather, tentatively engaged in
during the various wars that did happen over the course of the Hundred Years’ Peace.
The industrialization of war that occurred throughout the nineteenth century led to
relatively short conflicts that were resolved quickly and decisively, as indicated in the third
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consequence attributed to railroads above. The Wars of German Unification (The Second
Schleswig War [1864], The Austro-Prussian War [1866], and the Franco-Prussian War [1870])
stand as the best examples of this trend. 224 On the one hand, wars in the mid-century were still
based upon the principles of eighteenth century diplomacy. They were about specific issues that
were intended to be settled decisively on the battlefield without involving civilians or risking the
stability of the domestic societies of belligerents. This was apparent in the Austrian Habsburg’s
decision to end the war in 1866 as soon as it was clear that the Prussian’s substantially greater
mobilized force would win, providing the war with the moniker the “Seven Weeks War.” The
significance of this chess move, however, cannot be adequately summed up in the duration of the
conflict. The terms of the treaty ended the hopes of the numerous other German states who lined
up behind the Austrians (Hanover, Bavaria, Baden, Saxony, Würtemberg, Hesse Electoral, Hesse
Grand Ducal, and Mecklenburg-Schwerin) for a Grossdeutsch solution to the German question.
Instead, Catholic Austria was eliminated from Bismarck’s plan to extend the Zollverein customs
union to political unification of the German Empire under a Prussian banner. All that was
needed was to unite the independent German militaries according to the terms of the pact against
a non-German foe. Napoleon III’s declaration of war provided this opportunity, and in 1871 at a
conquered Versailles, Bismarck established the unified German Reich. 225 The goal of a unified
German state in Central Europe had evaded statesmen since at least Ferdinand II’s last attempt to
consolidate the Holy Roman Empire during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). 226 To suggest
that these wars amounted to peace simply because, in sum, they only took a few months clouds
the overwhelming importance of the motivations behind the wars and the consequences of their
224
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resolution. Not only did the Wars of German Unification resolve the German question, but they
allowed the maneuverability necessary for Mazzini to unify Italy under King Victor Emmanuel
II of Piedmont. That these wars would have taken several months in the eighteenth century
should not be the conditions by which we measure nineteenth century war and peace. Equating
wars with duration or even battle deaths minimizes these wars’ impact of geopolitics and society.
Additionally, suggesting that these short industrial wars amounted to a period of peace
shifts our attention away from the profound ways warmaking still impacted society. Consider,
for example, the dramatic increase in arms, battleships, and armies during the long peace.
Conscription, which had begun in Revolutionary France, was instituted in Prussia, Austria, and
Russia early in the century. Though conscription was initially very unpopular, by the end of the
century, serving two or three years in active service followed by reserve duty became a taken for
granted experience in many young men’s lives. 227 Ute Frevert described the manner in which
Prussian enlisted men in either the Landwehr (militia army), or the regular army, were
conditioned by the army as a “total institution.” 228 Individual identities were broken down in
order to become incorporated into life in the barracks, through a process of trimming,
programming, stripping, and leveling. 229 By 1910, as much as 20 percent of adult males in most
countries had been disciplined in this manner. 230 The gray uniformed soldiers of World War I
had truly become a mass army through conscription and “provided the human fodder for total
war,” as Anthony Giddens has said. 231 Recall that Napoleon’s army of 1.3 million men was
historically unprecedented, with the hypothetical exception of the Chinese military during the
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Ming Dynasty. 232 The large battles that followed this precedent in the nineteenth century were
made possible due to the amount of enlisted populations ready to go to war, as seen in Table 3.3
below. Even accounting for substantial population growth, the percentage of active military
personnel in these societies were high. In 1900, Austria’s army represented 6.9%, France’s
8.8%, Britain’s, 6.6%, and Germany’s 6.3% of the male population aged 20-44 years. 233 These
mass armies, developed and trained during peacetime, provided statesmen with tremendous
diplomatic bargaining power with which the stalemate of Europe was precariously maintained.

Table 3.3 – Armies (in 000s)

1879

1913
Peacetime
Mobilized

Peacetime

Mobilized

Great Britain
(India)

136
200

600
-

160
249

700

Austria-Hungary

267

772

800

3,000

France

503

1,000

1,200

3,500

Germany

419

1,300

2,200

3,800

Russia

766

1,213

1,400

4,400

Source: Hobsbawm 1987, p. 351
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Advances in arms technologies further increased the capabilities of states to execute
lethal violence. This can be seen by considering the hegemony maintained by Britain, who had
one of the lower numbers of soldiers above, but was the dominant naval power throughout the
century. Though Britain had succeeded at eliminating her French rival at sea during the Battle of
Trafalgar in 1805, 234 her lead in the Industrial Revolution was the true key to commanding the
seas during the nineteenth century. Navies depended on sophisticated infrastructures of bases
and supply systems. Britain’s advantage lay in its capacity to build and maintain more ships of
different kinds due to technological leads in metallurgy and hydrodynamics. 235 These
advantages, and indeed Britain’s industrial capacity generally, were themselves products of the
Napoleonic wars. During the wars, the government provided massive capital expenditures in
ironworks, establishing the foundry base upon which the nineteenth century railroad and factory
networks were built. As William McNeill said, “The men who built the new coke-fired blast
furnaces in previously desolate regions of Wales and Scotland would probably not have
undertaken such risky and expensive investments without an assured market for cannon. At any
rate, their initial markets were largely military.” 236
By keeping alive the image of British sea power through the occasional execution of
“gunboat” diplomacy in Algeria in 1824 or Navarino Bay in 1827, the British were able to
establish a convoy system that increased their share of the world mercantile shipping. The Royal
Navy, in turn, was able to draw upon the trained manpower of substantial merchant marine. This
allowed the image of Pax Britannica to thrive even as its actual naval capabilities declined until
France restarted fleet construction in the late 1820s rekindling a competitive incentive.
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Steamships gradually replaced sail ships throughout the period, but both were used together until
the 1890s when wooden ships were finally considered obsolete. As steam developed, so did long
range artillery and armor plate on board. Inventions, like exploding shells instead of solid shot,
were useful in naval bombardment and were soon incorporated on land in breech-loading
artillery. The mid-century witnessed a brief age of “ironclads,” beginning in the American Civil
War and climaxing at Lissa in 1866 during the Austro-Prussian war where seven Austrian
ironclads went up against twelve Italian steamships. During the Ironclad race between Britain
and France during 1859-65, the innovations of gun turrets and self-propelled torpedoes were
introduced. Torpedo boats and fast moving cruisers soon became the lot in which the so-called
jeune école of French naval theorists cast their hopes of revanche. 237 In 1881 the French
Chamber of Deputies ordered seventy torpedo ships and cancelled armored warship construction.
Five years later, they ordered fourteen cruisers and an additional one hundred torpedo boats.
This action stimulated the British to move away from their Nelsonian strategy of big guns on big
boats firing from far away toward dreadnaught battleships and destroyers. Eventually, the
British dropped their convoy system altogether and focused instead on being able to deliver
overwhelming force anywhere in the world on short notice. Around the same period, German
industrialists pressured the Kaiser to begin what would be termed the Great Naval Race between
Britain and Germany on the North Sea. 238 By the end of the century, most of the Great Powers
were focusing their energy on building bigger, better ships, as quickly as possible, as can be seen
in the dramatic jump between 1900 and 1914 (see Table 3.4 below).
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Table 3.4 - Navies (In Number of Battleships)

1900

1914

Great Britain

49

64

Germany

14

40

France

23

28

Austria-Hungary

6

16

Russia

16

23

Source: Hobsbawm 1987, p. 351

Though the nineteenth century could be considered a “naval” century, similar advances
occurred in land-based military technology as well. In logistics, we have already drawn attention
to railroads and telegraphs mid-century, but these had their origins in Napoleon’s use of
semaphore and the flexible use of divisional corps to deliver overwhelming and coordinated
force before his opponents could congregate. 239 The semaphore system allowed messages to
travel 150 miles per hour in clear weather, and Napoleon’s mobile cartographic unit, the Bureau
Topographique, was the first general staff in history. 240 Military academies, including with the
École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr in 1802, were established to expand the technical
239
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capabilities of soldiers. Initially education was only required of artillerymen, who needed
special engineering skills, but the mathematically-minded Napoleon encouraged further technical
knowledge within the ranks. As military theorists like Antoine-Henri Jomini codified the
principles of Napoleonic warfare, which emphasized flexible corps and sharp, direct attack, the
armies of Europe became academically imitated and uniform.
Chemical and mechanical innovations were developed, such as mercury fulminates which
allowed an all-weather ignition system - providing reliable rifles when combined with massproduced metal percussion caps. For much of the early nineteenth century arms manufacturing
proceeded at a slow pace. However, as inventors produced thousands of patents for exotic and
new arms technologies to kill the enemy better, stronger, and faster, states began restructuring
their procurement systems to manufacture new weapons with unprecedented speeds. For
example, Prussia’s effort to convert their muzzle-loading rifles to breech-loaders in 1840 would
have taken 30 years to complete at a rate of 10,000 per annum using existing production
facilities. Diktats from military advisors demanding changes in production capabilities resulted
in increases up to 22,000 per annum by 1863. 241 In the United States, mass-produced firearm
factories and metallurgy forges were built in New England in coordination with the Army
Ordnance Department and were among the first industrial operations to employ F.W. Taylor’s
scientific management techniques.242 By the 1880s this development in ships, artillery, rifles,
and shells was being accomplished by what William McNeill termed, a “Command Technology”
system, which was essentially a military-industrial-complex eighty years before Dwight
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Eisenhower coined the term. 243 McNeill described the gray public/private distinction within this
command complex:
Fast acting feedback loops thus arose whereby financial and managerial decisions
in the Admiralty meshed into financial and managerial decisions made within
what were still ostensibly private firms. Public and private policy became
irremediably intertwined…Marxist or quasi-Marxist historians since the 1950s
assert that the dominating element in this mix was the private one…This seems a
distorted vision of human motivation and behavior…Market and pecuniary
considerations were not firmly subordinated to political command before 1914;
but then, political and military decisions were not subordinated to profit
maximizing by private manufacturers either. 244
Industrialists like Alfred Krupp, William Armstrong, and Hiram Maxim made fortunes through
war profiteering; however, military officials were equally motivated to produce the most
effective weapons in order to earn staff promotions. The arms industry attracted the best
technical minds because the most advanced industrial research was being done among the
drydocks and foundries connected to warmaking.
The mutually reinforcing dynamic between private and military industry led to dramatic
technical innovation throughout the century, as can be seen in Table A.9. This remarkable
chronology demonstrates the dramatic acceleration of technical innovation that developed late in
the century, as game-changing inventions were arriving annually until World War I. Indeed, in
Kenneth Macksey’s Encyclopedia of Weapons and Military Technology, from which the table
was derived, the nineteenth century’s military innovations take up the space of 5 pages, while the
twentieth century, including both World Wars and the Cold War, only take up 2.5 pgs. All
preceding history dating back to 4,000 B.C. and the invention of wheel occupies only 4.5
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pages. 245 While the table does not indicate whether a technology had military or civilian origins,
the dual purposes of inventions like the telephone or pneumatic tires indicates the advantages
militaries derived from consumer industrial developments, as well as military “spin-off”
technology – an effect that is often associated with the Cold War nuclear and space races which
led to the internet, robotics, LED lights, etc. 246 Many products that are today taken for granted
were inspired for military purposes. Napoleon III, for example, offered a reward for a cheap
process of making steel capable of withstanding the explosive force of the new shells. 247 The
Bessemer process was the immediate answer, which has since allowed the construction of
skyscrapers, high tension cables, and other industrial creations made possible by cheap steel.
Napoleon III’s incentive strategy also led to the creation of margarine when a substitute for
butter for the armed services was called for.
At this point, Anthony Giddens distinction between “capitalism” and “industrialism” is
worth considering. In The Nation-State and Violence, Giddens wrote,
In European history, the development of capitalism antedates that of
industrialism, and by a considerable period of time. The former was also the
necessary condition for the emergence of the latter. But capitalism and
industrialism have their own distinctive features. They cannot be conceptually
collapsed into one another and empirically they can exist in some substantial
separation. 248
Giddens considered capitalism similarly to Marx and Weber in that it involves particular social,
class, and monetary relations and is engineered toward the pursuit of profit. However, according
to Giddens, industrialism is a relatively neutral organization of mechanical and technological
processes and only takes on the particular form associated with Marxian analyses as ‘industrial
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capitalist society.’ 249 In the realm of military production this distinction can be seen most
dramatically. The merging of industry, technology, and the means of waging war has been one
of the most important features of the processes of industrialization as a whole. 250 While
capitalist profits were drawn by armaments firms, the state’s interest in weapons and technology
was independently motivated.

Figure 3.6 – Military Expenditure by the Great Powersa, 1880-1914
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And yet, the technological innovation that took place during the nineteenth century could
not have occurred without the material support of states. Figure 3.6 above represents the total
military expenditures of the Great Powers during the most accelerated period of arms production.
In absolute terms, states’ investment in war grew throughout the century. Table A.10 provides
figures that reflect the relative percentages of military and civilian expenditure from 1800-1910.
One can see that midway through the century spending on non-military services began rising as a
relative percentage in most states. The introduction of social welfare programs certainly account
for some of this increase. Charles Tilly suggested that welfare and other civilian demands were a
delayed reaction to extraction by states for war purposes that had been on the rise since the
eighteenth century. The initial state functions of statemaking, warmaking, and protection, paid
for via extraction of resources and manpower from subject population led to new state
responsibilities: adjudication, distribution, and production. 251 Tilly wrote,
European states began to monitor industrial conflict and working conditions,
install and regulate national systems of education, organize aid to the poor and
disabled, build and maintain communication lines, impose tariffs for the benefit of
home industries, and the thousand other activities Europeans now take for granted
as attributes of state power. The state’s sphere expanded far beyond its military
core, and its citizens began to make claims on it for a very wide range of
protection, adjudication, production, and distribution…Direct rule and mass
national politics grew up together, and reinforced each other mightily. 252
However, Tilly’s perspective treats the civilian activities of the states as being a function of their
ultimate and primary goal: making war. This is in line with his well known quotation, “wars
made states and states made war.” 253 Indeed, as several sociologists, from Perry Anderson to
Anthony Giddens have pointed out, one of the earliest jobs of states in the modern period was to
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make war. 254 In large part, this was the only job of monarchs up until the beginning of our
period. 255 However, as Immanuel Wallerstein said,
If we compare the real power (ability to get decisions actually carried out) of
Louis XIV of France (who reigned 1661-1715), usually taken as the arch-symbol
of absolute power, with say the prime minister of Sweden in the year 2000, we
will see that the latter had more real power in Sweden in 2000 than Louis in
France in 1715. 256
It was only during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that states were able to make a
shift toward direct rule of their internal populations. If we recall our initial definition of
modernity itself, according to Mark Raeff, it “was society's conscious desire to maximize all its
resources and to use this new potential dynamically for the enlargement and improvement of its
way of life.” 257 Through the influences of liberal reformers, physiocrats and social engineers
like Saint-Simon in France and Stein and Hardenberg in Prussia, states began trying to harness
the energy of its population toward the increase of power, including both military and economic
power. 258
Michel Foucault termed this state interest, “governmentality,” which was fundamentally
new compared to the earlier Cameralist model of ideal government. Antecedent to the
administrative state of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Foucault identified
A state of government that is no longer essentially defined by its territoriality, by
the surface occupied, but by a mass: the mass of the population, with its volume,
its density, and, for sure, the territory it covers, but which is, in a way, only one of
its component. This state of government, which essentially bears on the
population and calls upon and employs economic knowledge as an instrument,
would correspond to a society controlled by apparatuses of security. 259
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Indeed, Foucault inverted Clausewitz’s famous dictum, “War is politics by other means,” into
“Politics is war by other means.” 260 In Clausewitz, Foucault saw a theory of strategy that
applied not just to war, but to any ends that are achieved via strategies of power. 261 Accessing
the natural forces of the population, such as the rational self-interest of Adam Smith’s “Invisible
Hand,” required knowledge of subject populations. For this reason, the nineteenth century was
the Golden Age of statistics, and states used their knowledge of society to control and maximize
the activities of their domestic populations toward the increase of state power.
This could also explain the decline in “Territory” as a cause of war, as states dedicated
their energies internally toward their existing populations. Prussia, for example, integrated vast
territories throughout the period through dynastic, military, and diplomatic victories. The
partitions of Poland were among the first territories requiring new means of directing the
population toward the interests of the Prussian state. 262 Similar mechanisms, often involving
compromises with local elites, were required most notably in the German Rhineland, which was
the most advanced industrial region in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 263
While this interest in domestic populations may have been initially motivated by states’ ability to
go to war, as Tilly suggested, by the mid-century the functions assumed by states were numerous
and had developed a life of their own through a increasingly autonomous bureaucracy.
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Michael Mann’s theory of the state identified several functional crystallizations within
the modern state which rose to prominence during the period of 1760-1914. Mann saw state
crystallizations as being polymorphous, in that they did not need to establish “ultimate” primacy.
So states could be “Capitalist” in addition to being “Protestant.” Furthermore, among the five
states, Austria, Prussia, Britain, France, and the United States, there were many roads to
nationhood which resulted in multiple variations in form according to which functions were
emphasized. Mann’s identification of state functions is not the same as pursuing a
“functionalist” analysis, as I have criticized Marxist and Realist perspectives for engaging in
above. Rather, Mann has pointed to specific decisions in which states identified and pursued
goals, eventually institutionalizing those that were effective and desirable in specific
configurations.
Mann’s theory of the state differed from Marxist, Realist, and Pluralist theories which
conceive of the state as a “place,” an “actor,” and again as a “place” respectively. As mentioned
above, Mann considered the proper definition of the state to be an “active place.” His definition
can be summarized in four points:
1. The state is territorially centralized. It does not wield I.E.M. (Ideological, Economic,
Military power), but must draw on these resources which are outside it. It does,
however, have binding powers over a territory.
2. The state contains two dualities. It is a place and persons and center and territory. It
is simultaneously ‘statist’ (vested in elites and institutions at the center), and it is
composed of ‘party relations’ between center and across territories.
3. State institutions are differentiated, and undertake different functions for different
interest groups. Unity or even consistency are not necessary, and do not tend to occur
because of overlapping, intersecting power networks.
4. States are in relationships with other states. 264
264
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Because states are the territorial space and population within borders as well as the actors that
occupy the elite positions, the third component of Mann’s definition allows us to look at the
various state functions in the correct light. The state develops functions, maintained by
institutions and bureaucratic civil servants, based on the needs of elites and constituents. States
may allocate priorities according to four state mechanisms: legal codes and constitutions,
budgets, party-democratic majorities, or monocratic bureaucracies. These may, indeed, satisfy
economic functions by reproducing the capitalist mode of production. 265 However, these may
also lead to geopolitical or military interests that run counter to the segmental interests of capital
– as in the case of Prussian industrialists encouraging naval production despite the increased risk
to financial capital posed by a provoked Great Britain. This head-on conflict, which many
(including Mann himself) have argued led to the outbreak of the First World War, is the result of
functional crystallizations that are systemic and limiting. Not all crystallizations are systemic in
this way, however. For example, moral-ideological crystallizations between secular, Catholic,
and Protestant religion may conflict with class crystallizations, but not systemically, and
therefore do not produce a head-on dialectic. For this reason, multiple crystallizations developed
and existed simultaneously in nineteenth century states. Identifying absolute primacy in regard
to economic modes of production may be analytically helpful for certain questions, but can also
lead to neglect of other crystallizations that were often equally important. No crystallization
existed purely without interacting with the other state functions. These interactions produced
emergent unanticipated consequences.
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Mann identified six higher-level crystallizations that most Western states came down on
in one manner or another in the period between 1760 and 1914.
1. Capitalist – States became capitalist by the end of the period, but only through
dialectical struggle between classes. States established private property rights that
allowed capital accumulation and industrialization.
2. Ideological-moral – These crystallizations concern the official religious denomination
of the state, or freedom of religion, as well as moral obligations of the state in terms
of social welfare and humanitarian assistance.
3. Militarist – Though military budgets diminished as a percentage of state expenditures,
geopolitical and domestic needs for the deployment of violence led to different
configurations of civil-military relations and military postures.
4. Representative – States varied on the issue of who was represented in the decisionmaking processes of the state, falling between the two poles of party-democracy and
autocracy.
5. National – States needed to determine who was a member of the state, in terms of
ethnic background, religious affiliation, and language. Furthermore, states
coordinated with their broader territories either as a centralized nation-state, or as a
confederal regime.
6. Patriarchal – As in the capitalist crystallization, all of the states Mann considered
ended up as patriarchies, establishing repressive gender and sexual roles that were not
substantially addressed critically until the twentieth century. 266
Mann pointed out that, if a state failed to modernize in terms of the four most important
crystallizations - capitalist, militarist, representative, and national - that state did not survive.
This Darwinian determination resembles Tilly’s conclusion regarding why the national
state became the dominant governmental form in the modern era, when other forms, such as the
ecclesiastical state, multi-ethnic empire, or city-state, were equally valid in 990 C.E. Tilly wrote,
Over the last three centuries, compacts of powerful states have increasingly
narrowed the limits within which any national struggle for power occurred…That
narrowing restricted the alternative paths of state formation. Throughout the
world, state formation converged on the more or less deliberate construction of
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national states…according to models offered, subsidized, and enforced by the
great powers. 267
Tilly saw this as the consequence of competing state strategies that employed varying
proportions of capital, coercion or both. Certain states, such as Venice and Holland were able to
use their financial resources to hire mercenary forces to defend and expand their domains. Other
states, like Brandenburg-Prussia or Poland had more coercive trajectories and drew power
through warlords and direct extraction in kind. Between these two lay the capitalist-coercive
trajectory, as exemplified by France, Britain, and Imperial Germany. These states were able to
take advantage of a monetized economy, which made extraction via taxation easy, while also
developing substantial standing militaries and navies to compete for territory and resources. 268
Ultimately the states that combined both capital and coercion became the most powerful states
and forced other states into their model of “national states.” The trajectory of these various
strategies can be seen in Figure 3.7.
In terms of state coercion, Jeremy Black outlined the three main functions of the military
in the nineteenth century: international, domestic and colonial. 269 The weaponry, organizational
systems, logistics and communications employed were similar, but in the case of domestic
conflict the fighting took place in urban environments, quite different from the traditional open
field battles of previous eras. Because military history has traditionally focused on symmetrical
warfare between nations, the period between 1815 and 1849, which primarily saw military action
of the domestic sort, has been largely ignored. 270 By the years following 1848, the technology of
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Figure 3.7 – Relative Concentration of Capital and Coercion
as Determinants of States’ Paths of Growth.

Source: Tilly 1990, p. 133

social control became refined to the point where actual violence was rarely necessary. This was
not, however, an “externalization” of conflict toward the geopolitical realm due to the increased
effectiveness of surveillance, as Giddens and Foucault have argued. 271 Rather, as Michael Mann
indicated, the symbolic use of the military persisted everywhere except Britain, whose nightwatchman state was the exceptional case social theorists based the norm off of. 272 Throughout
the century, the military was gradually supplemented by distinct police and paramilitary forces in
domestic situations. The army was only called up when the situation extended beyond the
control of these two forces. Repressive militarism proceeded along three stages – first, by
establishing a “presence,” then engaging in a “show” of force, and only rarely through actual
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violence. 273 Success in this regard was supplemented by the state’s monopolization of coercive
force through the disarming of populations, while advanced technological weaponry, like
machine guns and cannon, made resistance futile. 274
The case of Britain’s early ability to stifle domestic violence is exemplary in one way.
That the military was not needed domestically provided the opportunity to dedicate resources
overseas toward expanding the British Empire, which grew at an average annual pace of about
100,000 square miles between 1815 and 1865. 275 As other states on the continent resolved these
domestic problems later in the century this allowed them similar opportunities, which could
explain the dramatic rise in “New Imperialism” after the 1870s. 276 If we recall the three
functions of the military – domestic, international, and colonial - the third, colonial military
action, was emphasized most after the domestic crises subsided and the European balance-ofpower became bipolar along lines that would clash in 1914. In fact, we can associate the
primacy of each of these functions with three periods within the Hundred Years Peace.
1. 1815-1848 – Domestic violence / international peace.
2. 1848-1871 – Localized international violence.
3. 1871-1914 – International peace / New Imperialism
Polanyi described the first third of the hundred years’ peace, as being under the firm grip
of the Holy Alliance (Prussia, Austria, and Russia): “Its armies were roaming up and down
Europe putting down minorities and repressing majorities.” 277 This was partially true within the
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territories they were responsible for, which included the minimally militarized remnants of the
Holy Roman Empire. The army did not exist solely for repressive purposes, however, nor could a
military achieve such ends without political and legislative mechanisms in the form of local
concessions and alliances between middle classes and old regime nobles and patricians, who also
wanted order. 278 Still, Giovanni Arrighi, following Polanyi, described the Holy Alliance and the
Concert of Europe, the two primary diplomatic mechanisms to emerge from the Treaty of Vienna
in 1815, as “an instrument of British governance of the continental balance of power.” 279 While
the novelty of the post-Napoleonic international system was a commitment toward domestic
order, Britain was actually notably absent from Continental diplomatic issues and spent most of
the period consolidating its overseas empire. 280 Furthermore, other than the Metternichian
interest in domestic order, there was nothing particularly unusual about a period of peace
following a general European war. After the Seven Years War of 1756-1763, the Great Powers
were materially exhausted and dedicated themselves to maintaining the balance-of-power while
they regrouped. 281 The Partitions of Poland, in which Austria, Prussia, and Russia carved up the
decaying state of Poland to avoid war with each other provides an example of how far these
powers were willing to go to preserve the peace. To suggest that the Holy Alliance was simply
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acting according to British hegemonic interests implies that the continental powers had no
interest of their own in maintaining order and peace after the exhausting “Great War,” as the
Napoleonic Wars were called throughout the nineteenth century.
The second period, 1848-1871, actually saw quite a lot of intra-European wars. As has
been discussed above, some of these were shortened because of new technologies and because
diplomatic understandings prevented the wars from becoming general conflagrations. However,
as we have also seen, these wars involved unprecedented scales of troops and supply
mobilizations, and should not be measured necessarily according to their duration. In any case,
this period also saw several lengthy wars such as the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the U.S. Civil
War of 1861-1865, the Franco-Mexican War of 1861-67, and the intermittent wars of German
and Italian Unification. Polanyi said that during this period, which was “one of the most
confused and crowded quarter centuries of European history - peace was less safely established,
as the ebbing strength of reaction met the growing strength of industrialism.” 282 But what does
this mean? By peace being “less established” does this admit that there was war? Does this
mean peace was maintained, but it was precariously stabilized without the presence of either
reaction or finance? If one ignores the wars that did happen, as Polanyi did, the second
proposition might be tenable except for his reasoning regarding the third period.
1871 to1914 was the era that best resembled the conditions Polanyi described as the
peace between Great Powers, though it lasted forty-three years instead of one hundred.
Considering the dramatic increases in military and naval spending and troop buildup, the fact
that states resisted deploying their geopolitical power does seem to need explanation. As we
know, Polanyi suggested that transnational capital provided the mechanism through which peace
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was maintained. However, Polanyi said that “by the end of the seventies the free-trade episode
(1846-79) was at an end as the actual use of the gold standard by Germany marked the
beginnings of an era of protectionism and colonial expansion.” 283 Indeed, Eric Hobsbawm’s
breakdown of the nineteenth century’s eras mirrors this assessment. 1789-1848 was the “Age of
Revolutions.” 1875-1914 was the “Age of Empire,” and, in between, was the “Age of Capital” 1848-1875. 284 Hobsbawm characterized the post-1848 period as such:
The era of liberal triumph began with a defeated revolution and ended in a
prolonged depression…The new era which follows the age of liberal triumph was
to be very different. Economically it was to move away rapidly from unrestrained
competitive private enterprise, government abstention from interference and what
the Germans called Manchesterismus (the free trade orthodoxy of Victorian
Britain), to large industrial corporations (cartels, trusts, monopolies), to very
considerable government interference, to very different orthodoxies of policy,
though not necessarily of economic theory. 285
The economy in the Age of Empire was different from the Age of Capital in four ways.
1. The First Industrial Revolution was replaced by the Second Industrial
Revolution
2. The domestic consumer market developed.
3. The era of British industrial monopoly was replaced by rival national
industrial economies
4. Competition led to economic concentration, market control, and
manipulation. 286
In Polanyi’s reading, a powerful unified Germany upset the balance of power and The Concert of
Europe broke down leaving Britain as the leader of the peace interest. Colonial rivalry became
acute and the ability of haute finance to avert the spread of wars diminished rapidly, especially
283
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after 1904 when the Triple Alliance removed France as a power that could independently
mediate between the British and the German blocs. According to Polanyi, the peace effect of
haute finance peaked around 1890. If we follow this timeline then,
1871 – “Localized” wars between Great Powers end.
1879 – Free trade era reaches an end – Germany’s acceptance of gold standard starts the
downfall of the Concert of Europe
1890 – Haute finance peace interest peaks.
1904 – Concert of Europe is effectively over.
1914 – World War I
Other than the 1890s and perhaps the 1880s, it seems as though finance maintained the stability
of the system for a very limited period of time. As Polanyi indicated, this period was
characterized mostly by a decline in the stability of the Concert of Europe. This would be a
decline from a period in which peace “was less safely established” (1848-71), which, in turn, was
measured relative to the period in which the Holy Alliance ruled Europe with an iron fist (pre1848).
In this sense, Polanyi was really talking about two periods – what he calls The Holy
Alliance and the Concert of Europe. The “confused” middle period (1848-1871) can be
dismissed from the analysis as either a 23 year outlier, or as a transition period between the two
geopolitical configurations. The problem with this analysis is two-fold. On the one hand, the
Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe are two separate things, but not two separate times.
Actually, both were established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Secondly, Polanyi saw the
Holy Alliance breaking down due to the decline of the Catholic Church and religion as a
transnational binding force. This is problematic because religion and ideological sodality did not
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actually subside within Europe during the nineteenth century, especially not at the level of the
highest dynastic classes that handled geopolitics. 287
Polanyi’s bifurcation between the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe makes the
Concert of Europe seem like a separate secular organization that worked only in the second half
of the century, while the religious Holy Alliance was at work in the first half of the century.
Rather, in 1815, the Treaty of Vienna established two major innovations in European diplomacy
that had not existed prior to the Napoleonic Wars. One was the Congress system, in which the
winning powers (and a restored France) would meet to resolve diplomatic issues. The other was
the Holy Alliance that was devised by Czar Alexander of Russia because “the course formerly
adopted by the Powers in their mutual relations had to be fundamentally changed and that it was
urgent to replace it with an order of things based on the exalted truths of the eternal religion of
our Savior.” 288 However, Russia was Greek Orthodox, Prussia was Protestant
(Lutheran/Calvinist), and Austria was Catholic. These confessional divisions provided little
religious common ground upon which they could establish an international order. Rather, by the
time Metternich had revised the plan, preserving only lip-service to matters of faith, the three
powers were dedicated primarily to preserving the domestic status quo in Europe. Through the
Holy Alliance these three powers (and just these three since Britain refused to be involved in the
domestic issues of other states) intervened in concert to preempt liberal, democratic, or
nationalist uprisings. But this begs the question in relation to Polanyi’s analysis of the Holy
Alliance as the protector of international peace: did radical democrats on the barricades have
some interest in international war? Were these not efforts to preserve the internal survival of
regimes? The insurrectionary violence of the early century was largely unrelated to potentials
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for Great Power war, which was still left on the diplomatic table. The only relation the Holy
Alliance had to international peace was its provision of a normative bond between the rulers of
these three states. In other words, it was the common enemy of liberalism that distracted states
away from war with each other, not their success in putting down the rebellions themselves.
The diplomatic mechanism established at Vienna was much more important, the Concert
of Europe, which as Polanyi noted, lasted nearly up until the First World War. This diplomatic
system, which led to five major Congresses throughout the century,289 was initially secured by
the Quadruple Alliance between Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. While Britain conceived
of the balance-of-power in terms of how well the various nations performed the roles assigned to
them in their overall hegemonic design, the other powers did not conceive of themselves as cogs
in Britain’s wheel, but rather in terms of their own national interests, which happened to
correspond with Britain’s model. Austria and Prussia were concerned with each others’ potential
influence in the German Confederation which had replaced the Holy Roman Empire. 290 Each
was also wary of Russia’s ambitions to their east. The Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe
were stabilized due to the inability of the others to gain an upper hand. While I have argued
above that the International Relations theory of balance-of-power is not always useful in
explaining geopolitical phenomena, it is appropriate in this instance because the statesmen who
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intervention in Spain. The Congress of Berlin (1878) revolved around the “Eastern Question” and the breakup of
the declining Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, which Austria and Russia both hoped to claim for themselves; op. cit.
Kissinger 1993; op. cit. Schroeder 1994.
290
In 1806, Emperor Francis II resigned his title to become Emperor Francis I of Austria according to Napoleon’s
demands. This led to the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine, which lasted from 1806 to 1815, at which
point, the German Confederation was established and included 39 states represented in the Frankfurt Assembly; op.
cit. Blackbourn 2003.

113

generated the Concert of Europe thought, themselves, in terms of balance-of-power and
intentionally constructed an institutional framework to preserve it.
For some reason, however, Polanyi did not think the Congress system was effective. He
said,
The Concert of Europe was essentially not a system of peace but merely of
independent sovereignties protected by the mechanism of war…Take the
economic system away and the peace interest would disappear from politics.
Apart from it, there was neither sufficient cause for such an interest, nor a
possibility of safeguarding it, insofar as it existed. 291
From a Realist International Relations perspective, however, Henry Kissinger described the
Concert of Europe as a close approximation of a real government of Europe for fifty years
following 1818. 292 Polanyi’s suggestion actually implies a radically Hobbesian perspective in
which states could not have possibly wanted to preserve peace themselves. To be sure, the
mechanism by which they preserved leverage was war, but this is the case with any binding
international law, as in the United Nations today, which requires coercive enforcement. Because
of the Concert of Europe, powers did not allow Bismarck’s tinkering wars in Germany and
France, nor Russia and Austria’s simultaneous incursions into the Balkans to upset the balance.
These disputes were resolved by diplomacy, which became as rationalized and calculated as
other realms of society during the nineteenth century.
Helmuth von Moltke, the pre-eminent general of the age began thinking in terms of
“risk,” defined in terms of size, space, time and technology, for the first time just before the
Wars of German Unification, which appeared to have been calculated precisely. War was
analyzed as a systemic process in which the application of planned pressure led to predictable
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results. 293 When these military planners, monarchs, ministers, and diplomats met they could
make decisions based on strategy, and calculations of potential success. More often than not,
states did not go to war with each other because they knew they could not win. These
calculations of caution increased throughout the century as planners could execute wars in their
heads to see who would win, who would lose, and what might be the unintended consequences.
For this reason, in the late century, crises like the Fashoda Incident of 1898 between France and
Britain, and the two Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911 between France and Germany did not
lead to wars, though they did lead to diplomatic tensions and escalated production of armaments.
All of this is to suggest that, while the influence of haute finance was certainly a factor in
state’s assessments of risks, there simply does not need to be an invisible force that explains the
Hundred Years Peace. Geopolitics, diplomacy, and military risk assessment served quite
legitimately as mechanisms through which peace was preserved.
Furthermore, if we focus on explaining the forty-three year peace from 1871-1914, we
must acknowledge the vast amount of military attention dedicated toward regions outside of
Europe. While Europeans had been colonizing regions of the world since the fifteenth century,
there were two reasons that this impulse was dramatically accelerated in the late nineteenth
century. First, the technology stemming from the Industrial Revolution provided the “tools of
empire” that allowed significantly greater penetration into Asia, Africa, and the Americas. 294
Second, the resolution of domestic conflict through social control and political reform, coupled
with the stalemate situation between the Great Powers led militant interests abroad. Between
1876 and 1915 about one-quarter of the globe was distributed as colonies among a half-dozen
states, as can be seen in Figure 3.8 below. 295
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Figure 3.8 – Increase in Territory per State, 1876-1915a
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By 1900 Britain had one fifth of the world’s land surface, which rose to one quarter by 1909,
containing 400 million people out of a total world population of 1,600 million. 296 Enhanced
communications, sanitation, and disease control helped the military requirements of this
expansion, while the invention of machine guns and artillery eventually overwhelmed resistant
groups. Indeed, many colonial conflicts were often considered “war games” by military staffs in
which new technologies could be experimented with and opportunities for promotion could be
determined. 297 As seen above in Figure 3.4, these actions were the majority of conflicts Western
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powers engaged in, though they were usually grossly asymmetrical and quickly lost by states and
peoples who dared to resist. 298
Still, imperialism is not typically understood as having been stimulated by military
ambitions. Rather, the most common interpretation suggests that imperialism was primarily the
outgrowth of economic pressures. As discussed above, Lenin’s Imperialism as the Highest Stage
of Capitalism, provided a widely accepted model of capitalist imperialism in Marxian, as well as
non-Marxian circles. The problematic functionalist assumptions behind the theory have been
discussed in detail above, but it is worth outlining Lenin’s analysis again and comparing its
economic considerations against other perspectives, including Polanyi’s. Lenin’s theory of
Imperialism can be summarized in three points.
1. The capitalist economy cannot absorb its own production, or surplus,
domestically and must therefore expand in search of markets and investment
opportunities.
2. Economic competition causes European nations to compete for overseas
territories.
3. This competition overseas leads to war at home as the Europeans run out of
land left to carve up between themselves. At its limits, further expansion
comes at the expense of rival European states, which leads to violent conflict
(i.e. World War I). 299
This economistic theory of imperialism has been criticized profusely since it was written in
1917, but as Eric Hobsbawm noted,
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While the technological and logistic capabilities of the West were far superior to many states and peoples outside
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Non-Marxist analysts of imperialism have tended to argue the opposite of what
the Marxists said…They tend to deny any specific connection between the
imperialism of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries with capitalism in
general, or with the particular phase of it which…appeared to emerge in the late
nineteenth century. 300
Anti-anti-Imperialists, as Hobsbawm termed them, instead emphasize psychological, ideological,
cultural and political explanations. In critiquing the Leninist perspective, then, we should not
over-emphasize non-economic issues to the exclusion of the obvious economic issues that were
involved in imperialist expansion. 301 What is at stake at this point, then, are these questions what were the precise economic issues? And, what was their relation to imperialism as a causal
mechanism? To do this we need to break down each of the three points listed above, which are
distinct propositions.
The first issue - that capital could not contain its surplus and needed to export it abroad to
relieve the pressures of the contradictions of capitalism - was inspired by the socialist political
agenda that would have capitalists redistribute their surplus wealth to the working class at home
instead of exporting it abroad. 302 However, others, including Lenin himself, acknowledged that
the cheap colonial manufactures benefited the working class with a higher standard of living,
which was frustrating since this distracted them from their class positions. That Capital exported
investments abroad is without doubt. Figure 3.9 provides relative distributions of European
capital investments overseas among the three leading imperialist powers, Britain, France and
Germany, amounting to over $30,000,000,000 in foreign and colonial loans and investments as
of 1914. 303
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Figure 3.9 – Export of European Capital to 1914
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However, the assumed link between capital export and imperialism is analytically weak. The
two occurred simultaneously, but were not entirely commensurate. For example, between 1865
and 1914 only a quarter of total British investment went to the British Empire, whereas 45
percent went to other foreign economies. 304 Only one tenth of French investments were in
French colonies. 305 While investment overseas did, indeed, provide substantially higher returns
than domestic investments in government bonds and industrial stocks, investors still preferred
“civilized” regions like the United States, Russia, or Latin America where there was less risk of
default. In any case, returns on investments overseas peaked around 1884, when they yielded
304
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around two-thirds higher returns than domestic investments, falling two-fifths lower
thereafter. 306
The second proposition - that economic competition led to imperialist competition - is
even harder to substantiate. First of all, while protectionism did rise during this period, as will be
discussed below, this did not amount to a wholesale ban on mutual cooperation between national
capital markets. Indeed, this is evidenced by the transnational, proto-globalized economy
everyone acknowledges developed during the nineteenth century. In 1913, over 20 percent of
Germany’s imports came from the British Empire, which in turn absorbed over 18 percent of
German exports. 307 If we follow the logic that trade wars generate real wars, then Britain’s
greatest enemy should have surely been the United States which was her outstanding economic
rival. Yet, since the War of 1812 over the forced conscription of American sailors into the
British Navy, the U.S. and Britain has never been on the verge of going to war against each
other. 308 Considering Britain’s aggressive incursion into the Uruguayan and Argentine markets
in the early twentieth century, which fell within the bounds of the Roosevelt Corollary of the
Monroe Doctrine, the Anglo-US bond was all the more remarkable. Furthermore, the greatest
colonial rivalries of the era, the Anglo-Russian “Great Game” in Central Asia, and the AngloFrench “Scramble for Africa” were between eventual allies in World War I.
This leads to the third proposition, though it most requires the first two to work. The idea
- that rivalry for colonies led to European conflict within Europe itself when the peripheralization
of the world reached its limits - can be disproven on many counts. Neither the First nor the
Second World Wars originated directly from a conflict over colonies. The immediate cause of
306

op. cit. Ferguson 1999, p. 280
op. cit. Aron p. 64
308
A Langguth, Union 1812 : The Americans Who Fought the Second War of Independence, Simon & Schuster,
New York, 2006.
307

120

the First World War was the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria which triggered
war between Austria and Serbia; which triggered Russia’s mobilization; which triggered
Germany’s declaration of war against Russia and France; which led to Germany’s invasion of
Belgium; which triggered Britain’s entry into the war. All of these were stipulated consequences
of diplomatic treaties designed (imperfectly) as defensive pacts to prevent war. The colonies had
nothing to do with it. Several colonial crises such as those in Morocco between Germany and
France were resolved diplomatically without a shot fired. European powers did not feel that
colonies were worth general military engagement. To be sure, armaments were expanded for
leverage at the diplomatic table, and wars might have occurred between rival Muslim armies
trained and led by British and Russian officers in Central Asia, but these wars were always
“localized” to use Polanyi’s term.
Reflecting the teleology of functionalist analyses, Lenin’s theory of imperialism takes the
consequences of the First World War, namely that Germany and Austria were stripped of their
colonial territories, and infers that this must have been the Europeans’ motivations. Since these
were not the expressed motivations of the participants on the eve of war, who pointed instead to
a burgeoning German navy or the oppression of Slavic brethren, Lenin’s analysis requires an
orthodox Marxist connotation of false-consciousness onto the protagonists. As Raymond Aron
has pointed out, it is difficult to see how this can be proved or disproved. In fact, one can just as
easily find evidence that economic interests were propounded as false legitimation of
unprofitable territorial acquisition which could have been the ultimate goal of imperialists. As
Aron put it,
It is a fact that in each epoch conquerors have found different formulas for
masking the will to power, which appears to be one of the unchanging features of
European communities. It is certain that, once a territory has been acquired,
enterprising individuals and companies seek to exploit the protected areas. While
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this exploitation is not the primary purpose of the governments, they conceive it
as one of the advantages of conquest. More than that, at a time when thinking
everywhere is dominated by economic considerations, the so-called colonialists
can increase the popularity of their cause by using these considerations to justify
it. The public might turn away from them or rebel if they spoke of glory or
national greatness. 309
While the merits of this argument are, perhaps, unsustainable in light of the popularity of
nationalist sentiments during this period, Aron’s argument does demonstrate the ease with which
expressed motivations, whether economic or political, can be attributed as either true or false
depending on the agenda of the analyst.
Even if we reserve that the incentive of overseas investment and unexplored markets had
some impact, as they surely did, it appears that the overwhelming economic influence directing
imperialism ran in the opposite direction. That is, rather than being stimulated by the need to
export capital or find markets, territories were needed to extract resources for importation. New
industrial manufactures and consumer products in the late century required raw materials such as
rubber, petroleum, tin, coconuts, tea, coffee, and a wealth of other products that only tropical
regions could provide. 310 Furthermore, because these goods required advanced industrial
processes to be extracted, Europeans could no longer resign themselves to maintaining isolated
trading outposts on coasts where pre-industrial natives brought their harvested vegetable
products and human traffic (in the form of slaves). They needed to establish direct rule to secure
heavy capital investments in mines, plantations, docks, warehouses, factories, refineries,
railroads, river steamships, banks, etc. 311 In many cases, these capital investments had be
encouraged where they were not forthcoming by investors, as in the Italian government’s
309
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granting of discount privileges to the Bank of Rome on the precondition that they would invest in
colonial projects in Tripoli. 312 The colonial focus on raw materials turned many regions into
monocultural exporters, determined according to the worldwide division of labor. So Malaya
provided rubber and tin, Brazil coffee, Chile nitrates, Uruguay meat, Cuba sugar and cigars. 313
This dependency is in line with Immanuel Wallerstein’s identification of the core-periphery
dynamic, evident as far back as the sixteenth century, when “the trend in the core was toward
variety and specialization while the trend in the periphery was toward monoculture.” 314
Europe’s need for these resources did not, in and of itself, cause the dash to seize
territory. As the post-colonial era demonstrates, these resources can be obtained without direct
colonial rule (though, to be sure, dependency relations still persist). Rather, it was the
protectionism that rose during the late nineteenth century that necessitated access to as much
territory as possible. Neo-protectionism, promoted by new economic theories such as the
“National System” of Frederich List that emphasized high tariffs and managed economies meant
that, colonial exportation to rival economies became limited, while colonial host nations could
reserve access to their material imports. The only way a state economy could secure the
necessary range of raw materials needed for industrial production was by directly claiming the
territory within which the materials rested.
This protectionism was, in fact, what Polanyi considered the leading economic cause of
imperialism. Also, high tariffs and state interference in the economy were introduced late in the
century along with the seemingly contradictory institution of the international gold standard.
Polanyi wrote,
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The coming of the gold standard itself hastened the spreading of protectionist
institutions, which were the more welcome the more burdensome fixed exchanges
proved. From this time onward tariffs, factory laws, and an active colonial policy
were prerequisites of a stable external currency…Only when these prerequisites
were given could now the methods of market economy be safely introduced.
Where such methods were forced upon a helpless people in absence of protective
measures, as in exotic and semicolonial regions, unspeakable suffering ensued.
Herein we hold the key to the seeming paradox of imperialism – the economically
inexplicable and therefore allegedly irrational refusal of countries to trade with
one another indiscriminately, and the aiming instead at the acquisition of overseas
and exotic markets. What made countries act in this manner was simply the fear
of consequences similar to those which the powerless peoples were unable to
avert. 315
Polanyi’s insights into the effects of the introduction of the international gold standard are worth
considering, especially since contradictory protectionist mechanisms were instituted
simultaneously. 316 Polanyi indicated at least three significant consequences:
1. The traditionally separate spheres of the economic and political classes were
merged due to protectionism, so that politicians involved themselves in
economic matters, while capital became intricately entwined with political
events.
2. This incestuous union led to higher concentrations of capital and monopolies
due to protectionist cartel arrangements. Individual firms and politicians held
more power in this configuration.
3. The strains produced in the economic realm due to normal currency
fluctuations caused political upheavals and led to rigid international relations,
including alliances between military and trading blocs.
These consequences all seem to have been plausible effects of the international gold standard and
protectionism. 317 The era was certainly characterized by an increase in consolidation of firms
into large monopolistic entities that were necessary for both market protection as well as
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industrial economies of scale. 318 However, whether this was the cause or the effect of the
incestuous relationship between politicians and industrial capitalists seems more difficult to
gauge.
Polanyi’s analysis suggests that independent capitalists, who had extricated themselves
from the bonds of society, then reembedded themselves into the state through institutional
mechanisms that linked the fate of markets and states together. However, the ideal of the
disembedded capitalist existed only in economic theory. 319 Adam Smith wrote the Wealth of
Nations because trade was not free in 1776. During the course of the nineteenth century,
particularly in Britain, the theory of laissez-faire and open-markets promised, and, to an extent,
delivered greater wealth for individuals and the national state. Yet, this was allowed to occur
because the state could see benefit from releasing the energies of individuals engaging in selfinterested market behavior. If we assume Tilly’s definition of the state as a warmaking
institution, would it not be the economy that was allowed to prosper because it provided the
means through which a more advanced military could develop? In turn, the greater security
afforded by this advanced military and/or navy would have been the only way the economy was
allowed to prosper as it did.
This dynamic between capital and coercion proceeded according to a feedback loop in
which economy and military developed to each others’ benefit until reaching a fevered pitch
immediately before World War I. However, there is no reason to give primacy to the economic
in this analysis. Rather, the warmaking state and its military might be considered the agent that
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made this dialectic come about. More precisely, the state may have been the agent that allowed
this dialectic to develop.
But, there is also no need to assert the primacy of either, for they both existed together,
and neither would have existed without the other. The particular economic configuration of
nineteenth century capitalism certainly impacted the course of military developments in the
period - by stimulating industrial innovation and providing the monetized resources that allowed
effective extraction. At the same time, states’ willingness to expand their territories militarily in
pursuit of raw materials and markets, whether ahead of, or for capitalist interests, allowed
particular conditions to exist for the economic market and manufacturing sector.
Thus, as Michael Mann, Charles Tilly, Anthony Giddens and other sociologists have
argued before me, we must submit that economic activity does not solely, or primarily, provide
the constitution of modern society. We must include militaries, wars, and violence within the
historical logic of modernity.
But even this addition of military power, while significant, cannot explain the totality of
modern society; for the economic and military relations that exist do so within a broader frame of
cultural and ideological landscapes. In the case of the nineteenth century, both war and
economics were significantly impacted by, while impacting upon, the symbolic universe of
European society.
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4. Culture, Ideology, and War in the Nineteenth Century
Using Polanyi’s analysis of the Hundred Years’ Peace as a foil, I have pointed to a
number of indicators to suggest, not only that war has been an important feature of modern
European civilization, but that it cannot be reduced to solely economic variables. Though
Polanyi did effectively argue that transnational capitalism and protectionist tariff policies had a
novel effect on decisions of war and peace between 1815 and 1914, these do not prove to have
been the only variables at work. To summarize some of the findings that have led to this
conclusion:
•

The Hundred Years’ Peace was not actually peaceful. States were
involved in nearly constant preparation for and execution of war.

•

Economics as a cause of war declined. Commerce issues were less of an
issue stimulating war between European powers. More often, political
and ideological factors, like maintaining the integrity of an empire or
relieving ethnic confreres, were the interests involved with war.

•

Industrialism stimulated military development and vice-versa.
Technological innovations in weaponry and communications accelerated
throughout the century.

•

Armies, navies, and armaments levels increased in scale.

•

Wars should not be equated with duration in this period, because many
were shortened due to the influence of technology, mobilization scales,
and diplomatic concessions.

•

The three major periods (1815-1848, 1848-1871, and 1871-1914) saw
distinct developments in war, emphasizing domestic, international, and
colonial war respectively. Each of these periods contained non-economic,
as well as, economic explanations for peace. Especially important was
the Concert of Europe political system which should not be underrated.

•

During the forty-three year peace from 1871-1914, imperialism occupied
the attention of states and militaries.

•

The dialectic between capital and coercion did not allow one (capital or
coercion) to exist without the other in the modern international state
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system due to the survivability probability of states that failed to
modernize in both.
While critical attention was directed toward Polanyi’s thesis, the economically deterministic
theories - Marxist, Liberal, and Realist - have come up, implicitly or explicitly, above. Figure
3.1 above summarized the assumptions and problems within the three theories. Figure 4.1 below
summarizes the pros and cons of these approaches in relation to the Polanyi’s thesis.
Yet, as noted in Figure 3.1, all of these theories, while not focusing on ideological
factors, do allow the possibility for cultural influence. Marx, for example, suggested that class
consciousness could be consitituting. In the Liberal framework, the idea that the rational
individual is constructed by civilization demonstrates that culturation and socialization can
generate positive or negative qualities. Realists, who identify a will to power inherent in
international action, should acknowledge that these power interests are not universally held since
elites may not act according to raison d’etat. In this case, the particular personality and
psychology of elites can tell us why certain aggressive or defensive behaviors occur. Polanyi’s
position was closest to the Liberal/Marxian perspective here, since he considered modern market
society as an unnatural social arrangement that emphasizes certain characteristics. He wrote,
Nineteenth-century civilization alone was economic in a …distinctive sense, for it
chose to base itself on a motive only rarely acknowledged as valid in the history
of human societies, and certainly never before raised to the level of a justification
of action and behavior in everyday life, namely, gain. 320
Nonetheless, the economic determinism of the theories tends toward system-level causal
explanations. Even the critiques of these perspectives, such as those of Giddens, Mann, and
Tilly, as well as my own thus far, incorporate military as another structural factor in the
constitution of society. Modern society is conceived of as a particular set of institutions through
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Figure 4.1 – Merits and Weaknesses of Theories in Relation to Nineteenth Century War

Theory

Marxist

Realist

Pro

Con

Repressive force of
the state may
reproduce economic
relations or deal with
economic needs.

Cannot explain noneconomic military
compulsions.

Balance-of-Power
institutions can
establish peace.

Cannot explain war
and peace except
through systemic
forces and the rational
action of elite agents.

Nineteenth Century
Examples

Pro: Need for
resources stimulated
imperialism.
Con: World War I
was not directly
caused by economic
competition.

Pro: The Concert of
Europe had an effect
in maintaining relative
peace.
Con: Does not
account for the
internal evolution of
state societies caused
by capitalism,
industrialism, and
democracy.
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Figure 4.1 – continued

Theory

Pro

Con

Nineteenth Century
Examples

Economic integration
can lead to peace
between powers.

Does not explain war
and violence against
peripheries, or
hegemonic cycles.
Nor does it account
for military alliances
between trading blocs.

Pro: Transnational
markets established
grounds that
cautioned against war
in the late nineteenth
century.

Liberal

Con: Does not predict
imperialism, localized
wars between powers,
arms build-up, or
Great Power Wars.
i.e. all of the wars and
warmaking in the
period.

Communitarian
(Polanyi)

Balance-of-power and
International Gold
Standard worked
together to establish
peace, however
precariously.

- Cannot explain noneconomic war and
peace.
- Gives primacy to the
systemic institutional
level.
- Does not explain
why the wars that
happened happened.

Pro: Identifies a
particular relationship
between economy and
politics in the
nineteenth that led to
both sustained peace
and failure in war.
Cons: see bulleted list
above. (p. 125)
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which social action is channeled. The primary structuring of these institutions can be either
economic, or political-economic, or as a military-industrial-complex in these views. While most
of the scholars I have mentioned would not suggest that ideology is irrelevant, most seem
reluctant to incorporate culture and ideology as a causal mechanism into their structural models
and analyses. For example, though ideology is the “I.” in Michael Mann’s I.E.M.P model, and is
carefully distinguished as either “immanent morale” or as “sociospatially transcendent,” in
Mann’s epic historical study of the period immediately preceding World War I (1760-1914), he
wrote “that ideological power declined somewhat in significance during the period,” providing
justification for relative minimization of ideology compared to economic, political, and military
phenomena. 321 This decline may have been the case in terms of the Christian ecumene, but other
ideologies arose during the period, for example, the Enlightenment, Romanticism, Nationalism,
Darwinism and, indeed, every doctrine and movement that emerged during “The Advent of the
‘Isms’” as R.R. Palmer described the period between 1815 and 1848. 322 As Palmer described
them,
An ‘ism’ (excluding such words as ‘hypnotism’ or ‘favoritism’) may be defined
as the conscious espousal of a doctrine in competition with other doctrines.
Without the ‘isms’ created in the thirty-odd years after the Peace of Vienna it is
impossible to understand or even talk about the history of the world since that
event. 323
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Some of the “isms” that emerged during this period included:
1819 - Liberalism
1832 - Socialism
1835 - Conservativism
1830s - Individualism, Constitutionalism, Humanitarianism, and Monarchism
1840s - Nationalism and Communism
1850 – Capitalism
Most of these doctrines are still with us today, and though many of these ideas existed prior to
their naming, the appearance of so many ‘isms’ showed that people were making their ideas
more systematic. To a certain extent, this is an advantage to the analyst who can categorize ideas
according to the professed boundaries established between two or more opposed ideologies – for
example between Constitutionalism and Monarchism. On the other hand, this limits the ability
to distinguish ambiguity that was actually felt by individuals and groups that rarely assumed pure
ideological orthodoxy.
For the purposes of this historical project, a more useful conception comes from Lewis
Mumford’s term “idolum.” 324 Mumford defined an idolum as being similar to Walter
Lippmann’s expression, “pseudo-environment,” and wrote,
By idolum I do not mean either an idea or an idol : neither a concept nor a fetich
(sic) nor an ideology. By idolum I indicate the existence of an ideological ‘field,’
which unites and polarizes, as it were, a number of related images, symbols, ideas,
and even artifacts. Idolum is close to the German term Weltbild when taken in its
literal sense: a picture of the world, that is, the world experienced in and through a
culture, that people carry in their minds. I prefer it to the term pseudoenvironment, because as such an idolum is neither fictitious nor false: it is simply
the dominant mental environment of a particular culture, containing both
permanently verifiable experiences and temporarily acceptable illusions. 325
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There are a number of exceedingly useful elements in this term as defined above. On the one
hand, the recognition of an ideological “field,” similar to an electro-magnetic field, allows the
possibility that ideologies can be unifying and polarizing. The idolum therefore is the totality of
cultural outlooks, which is experienced as given to individual participants. 326 The idolum is
generated and transformed by the ideas and feelings of social actors, but it is also limited by the
available ideas accessible at any given time. The idolum can be conceived of as moving along a
historical time axis, similar to Hegel’s World Spirit (Weltgeist), though an idolum is not
necessarily dialectical, or wholly determining. 327
In the context of an idolum, the “isms” that align themselves against one another as
discreet ideologies are coherent and recognizable. However, within individual or group
consciousness, these ideologies cannot exist so purely. So an individual may be mostly
“Conservative,” but have some “Liberal” inclinations, while also being “Nationalist” and/or
“Capitalist” in varying degrees. Unlike economic structures and ideologies that can be
analytically conceived of as discreet entities at the macro-sociological level, individual actors
may contain several forms of consciousness that could be considered logically contradictory.
This does not mean that they are false consciousness, in the orthodox Marxist sense, since this is
the actual consciousness of actors. Rather a more complicated notion of the human self may
contain double consciousness, psychologically repressed rationalizations, or “misrecognition” of
power relations. 328 Micro-sociologists from George Herbert Mead to Erving Goffman to Harold
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Garfinkle have demonstrated the manner in which the social self is constructed through social
interaction, making a single “self” difficult to place. 329 At the same time, micro-social
interactions constitute social structure at large.
The importance of the above discussion is relevant to our study of war for two reasons.
First, identification of double, or multiple consciousness in individual actors establishes the
micro-foundations upon which the overall social theoretical examinations are based. An analysis
of large scale structures, such as the modern capital economy, or European ideologies, require
actors to enact and reproduce these structures. These actors cannot be reduced to the atomized
level of their human bodies. Below even the individual level, the workings of human
psychology complicate behavioral and structural analysis that might equate social roles with
particular interests and behaviors, as in models that highlight the rational utility maximizing
human. Second, the attention paid toward the idolum moving through time provides a general
framework through which these social actors have to interact. For example, there is no way that
the economic mode of production can stimulate war or peace without stimulating that action in
actors, who exist within the context of an idolum. Prevailing ideologies at a given moment may
further reinforce, or contradict the rational calculations of statesmen. The mechanism through
which these two levels work is best captured by Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of Habitus. 330
Habitus results from socialization experiences in which external structures are internalized,
various times. W E B Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk Bantam classic edn., Bantam Books, New York, 1989. see
C Calhoun, Critical Social Theory : Culture, History, and the Challenge of Difference, Blackwell, Cambridge,
Mass., 1995.pp. 70-97. The role of psychology, in terms of socialization and psychic repression will be dealt with
below. see S Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents Rev. edn., Hogarth Press : Institute of Psycho-analysis,
London, 1963. “Misrecognition” is an important concept in the sociology of Pierre Bourdeiu, and is similar to “false
consciousness” but involves a more active denial of economic and political interests. see D Swartz, Culture &
Power : The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997, p. 89.
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generating a “system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences,
functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions,” as Bourdieu
described it. 331 The psychic process of enculturation via familial rearing, class-based social
interaction, education, and religious upbringing impact the individual with cultural norms that
are “structuring structures.” Though at the individual level this externalization is highly
personalized, at the aggregate level, recognizable patterns can be discerned within the idolum.
As these patterns change, the reproduction of ideological structures changes as well, according to
generational processions, discursive favor, and asynchronic social rhythms. 332
With this in mind, we can return to our discussion of nineteenth century Europe to see
that there were several idolum evolutions from 1815-1914, the period of Polanyi’s Hundred
Years’ Peace. These changes were not as pivotal and segmented as Michel Foucault would
suggest in his concept of “historical a priori,” 333 since new ideologies do not always amount to a
rejection of previous beliefs, but rather contain legacies and shifting emphases of concepts and
ideas. However, cultural concepts and ideological fields do have the potential to change much
more rapidly than social structures such as the economy or national state, precisely because of
their discursive, mutable character. Thus, in the period of the nineteenth century in Europe we
can identify a number of shifting ideas and concepts that make the early period remarkably
dissimilar from the end of the period immediately before World War I. While it is more or less
impossible to identify one, single European culture during the nineteenth century, there are
distinctive trends within the overall idolum that should be considered within the context of war
331
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and peace. The purpose of this examination is to identify contexts in which the causal
considerations discussed above took place. While it might be difficult to attribute primary
importance to general ideas such as nationalism, militarism, scientism, etc., these ideologies did
impact decisions and should be discussed in terms of their influence as qualitative variables.
Just as Polanyi identified three periods of war in the nineteenth century – the Holy
Alliance (1815-1848), the confused middle period (1848-1871), and the forty-three year peace
(1871-1914), one can identify different idolums beginning with the post-Revolutionary period, in
which democracy, proto-nationalism, and free speech liberalism were among the important
issues of the day, remnants of the eighteenth century Enlightenment ideals. By mid-century,
entrepreneurial capitalism, and the beginnings of a consumer society were laying the ground for
the late century “Victorian” culture which is, today, often associated with the century as a whole.
Men in black top hats and coats, women in painful corsets holding umbrellas; these are
impressions that arise when we recall Europeans in the 1800s. However, even this culture was
not monolithic. For example, the “Victorian” attribution refers to British industrial/capitalist
society; all the while Paris was considered the pinnacle of culture throughout the century.
German-speaking cities like Berlin, Frankfurt, and Vienna witnessed the emergence of Wagner’s
operas and Romanticism, while similar centers of culture developed in New York City, St.
Petersburg, Milan, and Geneva. While each cultural capital was unique and distinct, homology
developed as these cultural centers became ever more unified due to the increase in discursive
communication that emerged during this period, which, in turn, led to similarities of concerns in
the realm of political ideas and cosmopolitan interests. The emergence of this discursive space
within entirely novel institutions like the modern research university or widely-circulated
periodicals, led not just to a communion of culture, but also to a fragmentation of political
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ideologies as competition within the market of ideas encouraged the calcification and
rigidification of perspectives. 334
Before returning to the relevance of this European culture to the study of war and society,
I request a suspension of our cultural context in the twenty-first century. There are many
perspectives that Europeans in the nineteenth century held that may seem “irrational” to us
today. For example, it was not until the mid-twentieth century that democracy, as a concept,
became a foregone political assumption that all states must nominal pay lip service to. Thus,
when the Holy Alliance policed the internal politics of Central Europe repressing democratic
uprisings, we should recall that, in many regions such as the Rhineland, the majority of the
population was counter-revolutionary and would have overwhelmingly supported the forces of
Reaction. 335 Similarly, we must remember that many scientific and philosophical ideas we take
for granted did not exist prior to the twentieth century. For example, imagine a world before the
psychology of Sigmund Freud and William James indicated that there was such a thing as the
“unconscious.” 336 In this world, one’s thoughts were one’s own; under control; capable of
discerning the objective reality of Nature in a way humans could have hardly dreamed of a
century before. In this light, the Positivism of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer are not
“irrational” or “chauvinist” but rather, immanently logical from within the nineteenth century. 337
Thus, we must not hold a twenty-first century notion of Racism in our minds as something that is
not logical - for what is offensive today was not perceived as such in 1853 when Arthur de
334
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Gobineau published his “Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races.” 338 Like phrenology (the
scientific study of skulls), the scientific study of biological difference between races became an
accepted method of grasping natural truth via scientific principles. Though, as will be discussed
below, this practice can be considered an “alibi” for ideologies (and psychologies) which
benefitted from such an interpretation, 339 here we should acknowledge that for the actors
themselves, they were not oppressing indigenous peoples across the world – they were helping
them by bringing Christian civilization. They were not suppressing democratic and socialist
movements – they were assuming paternal responsibility for the wretched of the earth. Without
engaging in extreme cultural relativism, we should recall that many similarly “offensive” and
“irrational” perspectives enjoy broad support today, are tolerated within our public sphere, and
are, therefore, constitutive elements of our present idolum. 340 This is important because, as in
any era, many individuals in the nineteenth century were not necessarily representative of the
ideologies we most identify with today. Radical Jacobin democrats, or abolitionists, or
transcendentalists were merely a percentage of the population. Rather individuals, such as the
statesmen we are interested in understanding, may have been Monarchists, racists, Social
Darwinists, militarist, or other “offensive” attributes by current standards, and would have still
338

Gobineau did have some critics, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, who could see the underlying ethnic superiority
in Gobineau’s description of the Aryan race. Like racial studies as a whole, Gobineau’s scholarship was not
unchallenged throughout the century. It was, however, tolerated, and legitimated as a scientific discourse in a way it
would not be today.
339
op. cit. Gay
340
At the time of this writing, the Tea-Party movement is dominating the American political psyche. While some
elements exhibit more racist sentiments than others, a simple example of “illogic” can be seen in the “Oath
Keepers,” a group of military and police personnel who vow to uphold the constitution should they be ordered to
violate it. While they claim to be protecting the 10th Amendment which states that powers not expressly granted by
the Federal Government remains in the states, Article 3 of the constitution gives the Supreme Court the power to
determine whether a law oversteps the powers designated by the Federal Government. In short, the Oath Keepers
are protecting the sacred constitution by giving themselves powers to interpret the constitution the Founders had no
intention of granting local law enforcement. This is just one of many examples of contradictory positions (in terms
of logic) held by the libertarian Right in the United States, while as many contradictions can be seen within the
ideologies of the Left, such as progressives who would like to keep jobs in the United States (achieved through
tariffs) while simultaneously demanding support for Third World economies who suffer from high tariffs on exports.

138

been acceptable to broad segments of their constituent populations (which were themselves often
limited to varying elite segments of the population).
An underlying assumption behind much of the literature reviewed above implies a
distinction between politics and economics. Polanyi, for example, described the countervailing
force of transnational capital in terms of the cautionary influence of ‘business’ upon the
warmaking ‘state’. While, in analytic terms, distinguishing between the economic sphere and the
political and geopolitical spheres can be helpful, from a cultural sociological perspective
attentive to the micro-foundations described above, we must determine how much a distinction
can be made, in terms of the individuals who occupied roles within those spheres. As C. Wright
Mills’ Power Elite demonstrated in the case of mid-twentieth century American society,
identifiable members of certain classes occupy roles of power that allow them to “make history.”
These elites might be the owners of large capital firms, diplomats and bureaucrats in state
service, and, in nineteenth century Europe, high ranking clergy. In order to understand their
motivations and the ideological content of their characters we must identify who occupied these
positions and what sorts of ideas typically stimulated their actions and behavior.
The nineteenth century is typically regarded as the century in which the bourgeoisie rose
to power in Western European society. In this reading, the expanding role of business replaced
the role of the church and aristocracy, making way for modern processes of rationalization and
commodification. However, in the realm of the military, this class transformation was not
evident. Though we have seen above that conscription expanded the Military Participation Ratio
within Great Power armies, 341 and the need for technical skills allowed a certain amount of
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meritocracy to enter the nepotistic military hierarchy, war was still left, by and large, to the old
regime. The vast majority of high-ranking officers were drawn from landed nobility and gentry,
especially in the General Staffs, which represented a sharp contrast to the democratizing societies
at large. For example, in the French army of 1870, 39 percent of division generals were of noble
origin, with similar proportions persistent even in democratic countries such as Great Britain and
the United States. 342 The same holds true of diplomats, as Michael Mann pointed out: “Foreign
policy remained the private domain of a small group of notables, plus special interest groups
advising the few politicians who aspired to be ‘statesmen’.” 343 Routine foreign policy was
handled by a small ruling elite, even in parliamentary countries like Britain, France, and the
United States, as, indeed, it still is today. Only in crises and wars were outside parties consulted.
In the case of diplomacy, the use-value of aristocrats in the foreign service was
rationalized according to the skills, such as foreign language, that were engendered in elite
schools. In the military, however, the expansion of technocratic meritocracy should have led to
democratization of the higher ranks of officers, though this was not the case. In the French army,
for example, 14 percent of division generals had come from the ranks in 1870, while less than 3
percent in 1901. 344 From the Napoleonic era forward, the aristocracy in Europe made the
military its home and bastion, filling elite positions in the most nepotistic manners. In turn, the
military took on a character increasingly distinct from broader society. By conscripting hundreds
of thousands of men into the ranks, the aristocratic military caste was able to enculturate a large
segment of the population loyal to the specific codes of honor and status found within military
and bottom in terms of social power (e.g. economic inequality) shrank via a middling force; S Andreski, Military
Organization and Society 2nd edn., Routledge & K. Paul, London,, 1968.
342
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establishments. 345 While consisting of perhaps no more than 5 percent of the population, the
aristocratic class was able to maintain a large and powerful influence within politics and society
through the preservation of its separate military sphere.
In certain countries, such as Prussia and Austria, the state (the Hohenzollern or Habsburg
monarchies) and the aristocracy maintained similar allegiances in relation to the military, which
was preeminent. In other nations, such as Third Republic France, the isolated caste of the
military could become a highly controversial subject, as in the Boulanger Crisis of 1889 and the
Dreyfus Affair of the 1890s and 1900s. In these cases, Michael Mann’s distinction between
military and political power is most evident. The military existed as a power-wielding entity that
was, in many ways, autonomous and could be arranged in a variety of configurations with the
political state at large. 346 Since large states could not do without militaries in this period, and
these militaries had a distinctly aristocratic character, this “militarist” character could be found in
varying degrees in most states. 347 Eventually the term “militarist” became synonymous with
“aristocratic” and, in a pejorative sense, “feudal,” though it is important to note that this negative
connotation developed largely after World War I. 348
Prussia is typically considered the most militarist state during the period. Indeed, the
state of Prussia would likely not have risen to her position within the Holy Roman Empire and

345

op. cit. Frevert
The civil-military configuration was of great importance to Frederick Engels, who had served as an artilleryman
in the Prussian Army, and was abreast of the important advances in military science. In his essay, “The Armies of
Europe” Engels analyzed every major European army, how it was organized and how it was related to political
authority. F Engels, 'The Armies of Europe', <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1855/armieseurope/index.htm>, accessed 11-29-09 2009. See also, F Engels, 'The Prussian Military Question and the German
Workers' Party.', <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1865/02/12.htm>, accessed 11-23-09 2009.
347
The possible exception to this would be the United States, whose federal military was not substantially influential
before or after the Civil War. However, the United States did engage in probably the most violent of all the military
actions of the century – the genocide of the Native Americans during the course of its westward expansion.
348
While sociologists like Spencer and Engels might have wailed against the “militarism” of nineteenth century
European society, one must also acknowledge the considerable popularity of military parades among the ‘nonintellectual’ masses. As will be discussed below, it was not necessarily unpopular to be “militarist.”
346

141

German Confederation had they not possessed an unusually large army during the seventeenth
and eighteenth century. 349 However, following the Battles of Jena and Auerstedt in 1806,
Prussia was nearly brought to her knees by Napoleon and only survived by placating and
submitting to the French emperor’s treaty terms and ongoing diplomatic requirements.
Following the war, Prussia “modernized” her army through conscription, strategic planning by
General Staffs, and the incorporation of the most advanced technological means of
destruction. 350 Prussia was the leader which others followed, especially after 1871. The
overwhelming success of Prussia in the Franco-Prussian war marked the move away from the
dominant French model of war toward the Prussian way of war, reflected in the popularity shift
away from military theorist Antoine-Henri Jomini toward Carl von Clausewitz who had inspired
Field Marshal Moltke’s strategy. The shift was further reflected in the change in fashion from
French-style uniforms to Prussian dress throughout the armies of Europe, Latin America, Japan,
and elsewhere. 351 To have a “modern” army, meant to have an army modeled on Prussia.
Though after World War I Prussia’s militarist character was criticized by Anglo-American
scholars as “feudal” and “backward,” before the war, their quintessentially modern military was
the envy of Europe and the world. 352
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The problem with this type of negative analysis of Prussian/German exceptionalism, that
suggests a uniquely “militarist” or “feudal” society in Imperial Germany, is that it disguises the
illiberal and aristocratic nature of the assumed European norm. 353 Germany’s militarist union
between monarchy, aristocracy, and military represented an alternative path to modernization
that led to fascism. 354 Like the Liberal/Marxian traditions described above, this perspective
assumes that war and the military are not component parts of modern social organization militarism is “premodern.” And yet, every major power that exists today did go through at least
one period of massive militarization - for the most part, willingly. Why aren’t these non-German
militarizations considered “backward” or “feudal”? In the case of France, Great Britain, the
United States, and even the Soviet Union, the assumption appears to be that Germany’s war guilt
in World Wars I and II necessitated the militarization of the democratic capitalist West, which
otherwise would not have occurred. Therefore, German militarism represents a scapegoat for the
entire Western world.
This perspective is based on an assumption that the bourgeois capitalist class is not
militant and war-like. War is the aspiration of the aristocracy, whose members are presumed to
be antagonistically related to the middle class. However, this assumption needs to be
substantially challenged and qualified to understand war, particularly in the nineteenth century.
As Joseph Schumpeter described English capitalist society, “the aristocratic element continued to
353
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rule the roost right to the end of the period of intact and vital capitalism.” 355 However, as noted
above, Schumpeter indicated elsewhere that this aristocratic element was “atavistic” and could
be considered the cause of militancy and imperialism. 356 It was widely assumed that the
aristocracy, who held elitist attitudes and codes of honor and valor, glorified war. For example,
Alexis de Tocqueville wrote,
Feudal honor prescribed vengeance and stigmatized pardon of injuries…It made
neither humanity nor mildness a law; but it vaunted generosity; it prized liberality
more than beneficence, it permitted one to enrich oneself by gambling, by war,
but not by work; it preferred great crimes to small gains. Cupidity appalled it less
than avarice; violence often agreed with it, whereas guile and treason always
appeared despicable to it… Feudal aristocracy was born of war and for war; it had
found its power in arms and it maintained it by arms; nothing therefore was more
necessary to it than military courage; and it was natural that it glorified that above
all the rest. All that manifested this outwardly, even at the expense of reason and
humanity, was therefore approved and often commanded by it. 357
Indeed, the history of eighteenth century Europe, which is often in practice the history of the
aristocracy, was full of conflicts over honor and unusual (from our twenty-first century
perspective) violent behavior. 358 As a function of the absolutizing monarch which demanded
that nobles serve in the central court where they could be surveyed, there was little asked of the
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nobility except to maintain constant preparation for war. 359 Since the highest authority of the
monarch rested upon the interest of territorial defense, without military action, the entire
legitimacy of the monarchy could be threatened.
The perspective of the bourgeois revolution in the late eighteenth century and early
nineteenth century stems from Karl Marx’s analysis of the dual revolution – the democratic
revolution in France and the industrial revolution in Great Britain. 360 The analysis implies that a
rising bourgeois merchant class overtook the monarchy and the aristocracy. The aristocracy and
monarchy could no longer enjoy the life of the “leisure class,” and was compelled to deliver
power to the owners of capital who represented the vanguard of progress. 361 However, this
perspective clouds the persistence of the aristocracy throughout the nineteenth century,
particularly in cultural and political terms.
Rather than Junker Prussia and Imperial Germany, widely considered the most “feudal”
of Western states, we should examine the case of the most capitalist nation: Great Britain. 362 In
terms of land ownership, with the exception of Austria, Hungary, and Romania, the British
gentry and grandees owned a greater proportion of territory in the British Isles than any other
European country in 1880 (see Table A.11). Though the House of Commons overtook the
primacy of the House of Lords over the course of the century, as late as 1860, in the lower house
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it was estimated that three-quarters of all MPs were patricians and that one-third of the
Commons was filled by no more than sixty families. 363 Furthermore, the majority of the most
significant civil service positions were held by men of patrician status. If the state is the
executive committee for the ruling class, the ruling class was the aristocracy. The Conservative
(Tory) governments under the Duke of Wellington, Robert Peel, and Benjamin Disraeli made
some political concessions to the new industrial class, most notably by repealing the Corn Laws
in 1846. However, as David Cannadine put it, “in practical terms, these did not amount to much.
Their position of dominance was so entrenched, so complete, that their generosity … in making
concessions mattered far less than it was commonplace to suppose.” 364 As late as the 1870s, the
British aristocracy was the wealthiest, the most powerful, and, certainly the most conscious class
in the country. While early in the modern era the bourgeoisie may have achieved a coup in
opening the feudal door so that they were even allowed to minimally participate in power, it is
difficult to describe the process as revolutionary.
Though the economic, political and legal structures necessary for capitalist accumulation
were established in the major European nations, we must not assume that this was because it was
in the capitalist class’s interest. Indeed, in Prussia and Germany under Bismarck, entrepreneurial
and industrial capitalism needed to be established “from above,” because the state and military
saw a need for the economic power that would enable it to compete among the Great Powers. 365
Where Schumpeter described this process as “the active symbiosis of two social strata,” the
typical reading of this relationship has the ‘ascendant’ class, the bourgeoisie, in the drivers’ seat.
Rather, as Arno J. Mayer said,
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The rising business and professional classes were in no position to challenge the
landed and public service elites for parity or first place in Europe’s ruling classes,
let alone in its governing classes. Quite apart from their numerical and economic
disadvantage … the new-fledged industrial and financial bourgeoisies as well as
the subaltern free professions lacked a coherent and firm social and cultural
footing of their own. 366
Precisely at the social and cultural level, not the economic, this issue of class primacy is essential
to understanding not only the nineteenth century idolum, but our own. Against the typical
analysis of Victorian culture which highlights the “embourgeoisement” of society, I would
suggest that we note the “feudalization” of the bourgeois middle classes, not just in Germany,
but throughout Europe as a whole. 367
Though the remarkable historical work of Eric Hobsbawm highlighted the ways in which
the hegemonic culture of the European ruling classes permeated society throughout the
nineteenth century, there seems to be no reason to assume that this was somehow “bourgeois”
culture. 368 Where did the bourgeois get this autonomous culture from? To be sure, in the British
Liberal party or the French Doctrinaires under Francois Guizot the state was pressured in the
interests of capitalism and the bourgeois class. Through John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham,
Herbert Spencer, and other (typically British) social philosophers, bourgeois class activities and
interests received important political justification and clarification. However, this political
economic theory did not define the sum of European culture then any more than it does now.
Indeed, the impetus for deploying the political economic theories of Adam Smith or David
Ricardo were necessary because the aristocratic class, the church, the peasantry, and other realms
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of society were against the valorization of material wealth as an end in itself. At the same time,
where relevant and instrumentally useful, these economic theories were used by the patrician
classes themselves, initially in gambling and agriculture, and eventually in commercial
investment itself, leading to a further consolidation of their power and influence. Even in the
most capitalist of nations, the United States, only 48 percent of millionaires from the Age of
Capital (1848-1875) came from lower or lower-middle class families, and only 8 percent of the
“industrial elite of the 1870s” came were sons of working-class fathers. 369 In Britain, at least 70
percent of the millionaires who died between 1858 and 1879 were descendants of at least one
generation of wealth, over 50 percent of which was based on land. 370 All of this is to suggest
that the “bourgeois” theories of political economy seem to have benefitted the old landed estates
more than the upstart middle class who joined their ranks in the leisure classes.
Since this was not “revolutionary” in the temporal sense in which social order was
overturned in a quick order of time, we must consider that the bourgeoisie who did rise were
assimilated into the culture of an existing “high society.” In pre-Revolutionary France, for
example, those who managed to attain substantial wealth could purchase hereditary titles –
literally joining the aristocrat class. 371 In England, where noble titles were restricted and nonproliferating (a unique arrangement in Europe), the distinction between the two separate classes,
aristocracy and bourgeois, was most evident. Yet, even here, the rising millionaires and wealthy
capitalists assumed the cultural characteristics of the noble classes, parroting the nobility in
broad terms and details from patriarchal household management to lawn landscaping on country
estates. The most obvious examples of this trend were the Nabobs, who made their fortunes
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within the British Empire overseas, typically in India. They would return from several years of
sun-baked entrepreneurship, purchase large estates, and ostentatiously spend their money in
ways that made dukes cringe. 372 It is important to not assume that this life of luxury was a
change in a positive direction, no matter how much we assume a preference for comfort and
leisure. As Lewis Mumford described it,
The ‘performance of leisure’ imposed new sacrifices. The dinner party, the ball,
the formal visit, as worked out by the aristocracy and by those who, after the
seventeenth century, aped them, gave satisfaction only to those for whom form is
more important than content. To be ‘seen,’ to be ‘recognized,’ to be ‘accepted’
were the supreme social duties, indeed the work of a whole lifetime. 373
Elsewhere Mumford similarly quipped, “By his very success in inventing labor-saving devices,
modern man has manufactured an abyss of boredom that only the privileged classes in earlier
civilizations have ever fathomed.” 374
Indeed, the manufacturing potential of modern industrialism, coupled with exotic imports
from faraway places brought the modern consumer culture into being. If one understands this
not as an alleviation of material want, but as a submission to the rituals of “conspicuous
consumption,” as Thorstein Veblen insisted went hand in hand with leisure society, one can see
the evolution of modern capitalism as the extension of the aristocratic lifestyle, however ‘gilded,’
to broader realms of society; beginning in the bourgeois merchant classes, then extending to
professional, managerial, and working classes. This democratization of aristocratic airs was not
reflected economically, that is as a distribution of wealth throughout society. As the century
372
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proceeded, the proletarian working class emerged as financial wealth consolidated into
oligarchies. Rather, the cultural distribution of old regime values through greater European
society developed such that members of the middling classes, particularly those in civil service,
military, and managerial roles identified themselves with the state. Because of this among other
reasons, nationalism became one of the most important ideological issues of the period.
Yet, despite the convincing attempts of Marxist historians like Benedict Anderson and
Eric Hobsbawm to connect nationalism to economic forces, the process cannot be understood
outside of the context of the military. 375 In the Central European regions of the Rhineland and
Prussia, for example, the incursion of the French Revolutionary armies in the territories of the
Holy Roman Empire caused people to identify themselves as “German” in distinction to the
hated, hypocritical “French.” 376 Though the German states exploited national enthusiasm when
the time came to expel the French, monarchs and nobles did not immediately recognize
nationalist ideologies as being in their best interests, as the repressive policies of the Holy
Alliance demonstrated. These national movements were distinctly autonomous from the state, as
in the Turnbewegung, or gymnast’s movement, that developed in Prussia in 1811 to train for the
coming war with the French. 377 The citizen-soldier/acrobats wore matching pajama-like clothing
and performed routines in parks in Berlin, generating popular enthusiasm for national sentiment,
physical fitness, and Enlightenment ideals of equality. 378 Hegelian philosophy became a popular
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justification for ideologies on both the Left and the Right, and imbued the state with a quasimystical ‘Spirit.’ Indeed, nationalism as a concept became a reinforcement for all political
spectrums during the period leading up 1848, as Matthew Levinger described in Enlightened
Nationalism. 379 Levinger identified at least four groups of actors who employed distinct
conceptions of the national state of Germany: liberal state reformers, aristocrats, romantics, and
revolutionaries. The co-option of the term nationalism by the aristocratic class was a particularly
interesting case. While proposed national reforms stood as potential threats to their legal
privileges and way of life, the aristocrats soon managed to use the rhetoric of nationalism to
defend their position. While some rejected the concept outright, a significant portion of the class
invoked the authority of the nation as a means of preserving the old traditions. Levinger
indentified this as having two broader consequences. First, Prussian nobles reinforced the civil
servants’ definition of the nation as a “harmonious body.” Secondly, they transformed their own
social and political identities by conceiving of the nobility as a national, rather than a provincial,
institution. 380
In the case of Germany and other nations that utilized conscription, the role of the
military in the construction of national identity cannot be underrated. As mentioned in the
previous section above, as much as 20 percent of the male population in nations had gone
through the process of trimming, programming, stripping, and leveling described by Ute Frevert
in A Nation in Barracks. 381 Army recruits were, and still are, more or less children. In the
nineteenth century, contrary to Frederick Engels’ assessment, the majority of recruits were from
the countryside, since the urban working class was mistrusted and, more importantly, was needed
379
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in the factories to produce armaments. 382 These peasants would be stationed in a distant city
where they had no familiar social identity and learned about the world for the first time in the
context of military culture. 383 Surrounded by flags, insignia like Prussian Iron Cross, military
music, marching formations and drill instructors cadenced calls, these individuals submitted and
conformed to the unit and eventually came to identify themselves with their corps, and by
extension their nation state. 384
The national state, which had only recently established monopoly over the means of
violence, was the new feature in military training. The technique of drill had existed since it was
recovered from the Classical texts of Julius Caesar, Vegetius, and Aelian in the fifteenth century
during the so-called “Military Revolution.” 385 In sixteenth century Holland, Maurice of Orange
incorporated the notion of drill. With almost scientific precision, every movement of the
musketman’s routine was observed and codified so that the entire corps could move like
clockwork. 386 The mechanization and division of labor created one of the first examples of a
functional top-down organization that communicated vertically and horizontally according to
rank and instruction. The broader relevance of this innovation was made quite clear by Lewis
Mumford:
The general indoctrination of soldierly habits of thought in the seventeenth
century was, it seems probable, a great psychological aid to the spread of machine
382
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industrialism. In terms of the barracks, the routine of the factory seemed tolerable
and natural. The spread of conscription and volunteer militia forces throughout
the Western World after the French Revolution made army and factory, so far as
their social effects went, almost interchangeable terms. And the complacent
characterizations of the First World War, namely that it was a large-scale
industrial operation, has also a meaning in reverse: modern industrialism may
equally well be termed a large-scale military operation. 387
Though Spencer and other contemporary sociologists saw their era as being ‘Industrial’ as
opposed to ‘Militaristic,’ the gap between these two forms of social organization was not as wide
as it appeared to those living during the Hundred Years’ Peace.
Indeed, this was the period during which the process Max Weber described as
‘rationalization’ developed to its full potential. The ‘iron-cage’ of administration, compelled by
the tyranny of the written rule, led to the disenchantment of the world. As Weber, himself an
unsatisfied conscript in the Prussian army, was well aware, bureaucratic administration
originated in the military and preserved many of its organizational patterns, including even an
esprit de corps. 388 However, Weber’s letter to his mother from military training demonstrated
his awareness of the mind-numbing character of modernity present within the duties of a “oneyearer” on base. He wrote, that “’even far worse’ than the physical exertions was ‘endlessly
killing time’ and ‘the repetitions of any number of purely mechanical skills, not just a thousand
times but a million times’ which ‘simply obliterated any power to think and generated a dreadful
apathy.’” 389 Weber’s depressive disposition aside, Ute Frevert compared his letter, written at the
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time of his service, to that of Friedrich Paulson who wrote about the same monotonous barrack
lifestyle, but at age 50 within a “unified, meaningful picture of his youth – a phase of
development ending with his military service year, marking the transition into an adult life.” 390
Service in the military became an essential component of the middle-class résumé. When one
considers the high employment of military men in state civil service and business management
positions one finds both the discipline required of the “Organization Man,” and the direct
identification with the state that led Michael Mann to suggest that it was this substantial civil
service/military population that were the most visceral proponents of chauvinistic nationalism not the middle class in general. 391
But nationalism, of all the ideologies in the age, is the most difficult to place within a
structural framework, for, as we have seen, it was used as legitimation for several classes and
social groups. Nationalism cannot be reduced to a single class, or be explained as the
propagation of a single source. It could be conceived of as a relatively neutral set of ideas
applied differently in different contexts - were it not so emotionally charged. 392 Though many
theorists have struggled to get a handle on such an “irrational” social phenomena, I would like to
relate nationalism to some of the themes that have been brought up thus far. In particular, there
are two trends that run in somewhat different directions, namely ‘rationalization’ and
‘feudalization’. The application of rationalized, or instrumental reason found its strangest
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bedfellow - the popular identification with the nation, military, and aristocracy – in the ideology
of ‘Scientific Racism’.
There are two conceptions of rationalization I am interested in exploring here. Both are
related to each other, but are distinct social processes. The first is the typical sociological
process of “rationalization” as outlined by Max Weber, and expanded by Jürgen Habermas, who
recalled that
Weber sees cultural rationalization in modern science and technology, in
autonomous art, and in a religiously anchored ethic guided by principles. He
designates as rationalization every expansion of empirical knowledge, of
predictive capacity, of instrumental and organizational mastery of empirical
processes. In modern science, learning processes of this type become reflective
and can be institutionalized in the scientific enterprise. 393
Weber thought the expansion of rational organization would continue indefinitely because it
represented the most efficient and powerful means of achieving goals. In the analysis of critical
theorists, such as Georg Lukács and the Frankfurt School, this process of rationality leads to
reification in which social relationships and subjective experiences are turned into “things.” 394
Whereas Weber’s conception of rationality is relatively “value-neutral” in the sense that the
rational process can be applied in the service of any number of ends, the Frankfurt School
tradition, like Michel Foucault, considered this scientific process as an instrument of power
itself. 395 This is especially the case in the human sciences, which were modeled on the natural
sciences, leading to a pattern that is, like the rest of society, dominated by industrial production
techniques. 396 Because of the necessity of an inductive method in sociology, as Durkheim

393

op. cit. Habermas 1984, vol. I, p. 159
G Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialects, Merlin Press, London, 1971.
395
op. cit. Foucault 1980
396
M Horkheimer, 'Traditional and Critical Theory', <http://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/hork.doc>2009.
394

155

correctly established, value-neutrality is impossible within social science. 397 The scientific form,
beginning with the selection of hypotheses, simply does not allow ideological bias to be
eliminated.
This is related to the second meaning of “rationalization,” which takes place at the level
of the individual personality. Just as Horkheimer and Adorno criticized positivism for
confirming that which is already the case in society, within individual consciousness the actions
and behaviors one engages in may exist prior to the justification for those actions. So, for
example, male householders were engaged in patriarchal relations with their wives and children
for hundreds of years before they were forced to justify why they did this. A habitual behavior
like this - which seems natural since, as far as one knows, it has always existed - is very unlikely
to be discarded. Much more likely, one will develop a rationalization for this behavior, which
may be entirely “irrational” - that is, contradictory or illogical on its own terms. As one searches
for justification to counter critical challenges to one’s ways of life – for example, the bourgeois
capitalist who is accused of materialism, or “mammon worship” – the rationalizing ideologies
available within the idolum can be employed where available, or developed where lacking. So,
in the case of the capitalist, the rational “scientific” theories of classical economics provided
justification for behavior they would have engaged in anyway. This rationalizing process leads
to several reinforcing trends.
1. The ideology itself is strengthened as more adherents and proponents join the
movement.
2. Individuals and groups are able to identify with like-minded actors to mobilize
greater social power and to feel better about the own actions. This is
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especially the case when an ideology can be understood as an “objective”
science.
3. Existing behaviors, institutions, and status structures may become rigid in
relation to competing ideologies.
In the light of both forms of rationalization, we should examine the nineteenth century
most significant socio-cultural trend – the overwhelming belief in scientific progress. Nineteenth
century Europe was, above all else, optimistic. Right up to World War I, Europeans had no
reason to assume that the progress they were witness to would ever stop. 398 Indeed, as Paul
Fussell has argued, our modern cynical attitude toward everything - from the state, to
technology, to other human beings - was actually generated, in large part, by the absurdity of the
First World War. 399 Instead, men like Charles Kingsley entered the Great Exhibition of 1851
and broke into tears, saying,
If these forefathers of ours could rise from their graves this day they would be
inclined to see in our hospitals, in our railroads, in the achievements of our
physical science, confirmation of that old superstition of theirs, proofs of the
kingdom of God, realizations of the gifts which Christ received for men, vaster
than any of which they had dreamed. 400
It is important to note that science and the ideology of progress are not disconnected from
religion here. Though many accounts of the age speak of the “secularization” of society during
this period, this increase in scientific rationality was rarely at the absolute expense of religious
sentiment. 401 Churches continued to be built by the thousands. Conflicts, like the German
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Kulturkampf between Prussian Pietism and “ultramontanist” Catholicism, and surges in
humanitarian missionary work throughout Africa and Asia, reflected a heightened religiosity
during the period. James Sheehan has even suggested that religion was a cornerstone of the
Enlightenment itself; while spiritual disposition was a necessary component of
Bildungsbürgertum, an untranslatable German word indicating education and civilization. 402
While intellectuals from Nietzsche to Weber spoke of the ‘Death of God’ or the ‘Disenchantment
of the World,’ this process was primarily in relation to changes in the emerging public sphere.
That is, as religious tolerance became gradually acceptable in Europe, one’s beliefs became a
matter of private, rather than public conscience. This did not, however, eliminate pietistic
feeling within the (male) individual - who still went to church, held theological opinions of
others, and demanded allegiance from his ‘private sphere’ (wife and children). Enlightened
religion combined with science in various attempts to prove or disprove the existence of God. 403
Beyond denominational Christianity, cults of Nature, spiritualism, transcendentalism, Free
Masonry, pantheism, and alternative forms of religion still provided quasi-theological visions of
the world. The ability of scientists, particularly in Physics, Geology, and Biology to identify
immutable natural laws, in fact, reinforced the notion of an intelligent designer. 404 Europeans
were, in a sense, being entirely “rational” in identifying themselves as God’s chosen people, for
they had discovered the techniques to unlock His secrets.
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This feeling of superiority increased throughout the century as technology allowed
contact with peoples throughout the world who appeared to be living in a different stage of
human social organization. While colonial Europeans had been treating indigenous races,
deemed “savages” or “primitives,” with little regard throughout the early modern era, in the
nineteenth century, this domination needed to be “rationalized.” What gave Europeans the right
to exploit and take land from other peoples? Men like Arthur Gobineau took the latest findings
in linguistics and anthropology to determine a hierarchy of ethnic groups, nations, and
communities. 405 Indeed, the tangible experience of exploration was immanently related to
racialized thinking. Without the vanguard of anthropologists, missionaries, and biologists who
travelled into the uncharted heart of Africa and Asia, the European public might not have
become so consumed with the relationship between their race and others. Missionaries, who had
been an active element in the inimitable British impulse to export millions of its citizens to the
corners of the Earth, involved themselves in such humanitarian missions as the banning of suttee
(the ceremonial immolation of widows) in India, ending the Atlantic and Arabic slave trade, and
exploring the ‘dark heart of Africa’ around Lake Victoria and the Mountains of the Moon in
advance of ‘Christian civilization.’ 406
In Lords of Human Kind, V.G. Kiernan described the manner in which racist attitudes
developed in every region of the world where the Europeans came in contact with native
peoples. 407 In some areas like the islands of the South Seas discovered by Captain Cook this led
to an idealized image of the ‘noble savage.’ Elsewhere, as in the Sudan, the “horror and human
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depravity” of the “witches’ brew of African primitivism and Muslim fanaticism” caused the
British to engage in acts of violence equivalent in ruthlessness and self-righteousness. 408 At the
battle of Omdurman (1898), the Anglo-Egyptian forces used Maxim machine guns to slaughter
up to 95% of the 52,000 dervishes with a loss of only 48 British soldiers. 409 General Kitchener
followed up the battle by desecrating the Mahdi leader’s tomb and carrying off his skull. 410 The
brutality of some Europeans - for example, those engaged in King Leopold’s notorious rubber
plantations - represented one of two trajectories of acculturation. 411 The first attitude, which
could be termed the ‘Conrad’ approach, was captured in The Heart of Darkness, in which
Europeans “went native” - adopting violent practices that were unacceptable in “civilized”
Europe, while simultaneously using the technical, instrumental skills useful for dominating the
societies they assimilated into as gods or kings. 412 More common, however, was what could be
called the ‘Kipling’ approach, in which the civilizing mission was seen as a universally
beneficial gift of a patriarchal race that was willing to sacrifice themselves for the betterment of
humanity. The white man was willing to battle against heathenness, malnutrition, and disease to
“serve their captives” needs. 413
Though some native races, such as the Zulus under Shaka, became idealized to portray
the colonials as having put up a fight, most were considered ‘child-races’. As the century went
on, race-thinking was used to scientifically justify the treatment and confiscation of property
408
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from weaker peoples. 414 In the twentieth century, this race-thinking was applied back upon
Europe itself. Indeed, in The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt argued that, in addition
to Anti-Semitism as emerged in France’s Dreyfus Affair, late nineteenth century imperialism
was a primary source of twentieth century totalitarianism. As she said,
When the European mob discovered what a ‘lovely virtue’ a white skin could be
in Africa, when the English conqueror in India became an administrator who no
longer believed in the universal validity of law, but was convinced of his own
innate capacity to rule and dominate, when the dragon-slayers turned into either
‘white men’ of ‘higher breeds’ or into bureaucrats and spies … the stage seemed
to be set for all possible horrors. Lying under anybody’s nose were many of the
elements which gathered together could create a totalitarian government on the
basis of racism. 415
Indeed, it was not just scientific racism that developed, but also the bureaucratic administration
of death that would become deployed during the purges under the Soviets and the Holocaust
under the Nazis. Though developed in Cuba in the 1890s, concentration camps were first used
substantially in war against the “white tribe” of Africa - the Dutch Afrikaners during the Boer
War of 1899-1902. 416 In the same vein, Isabel Hull convincingly linked Germany’s organization
of mass death during their colonial administration in German Southwest Africa from 1904-1907
to the administration of concentration camps during World War II. 417
Indeed, the cases of the Boer War, German Southwest Africa, and the Belgian Congo
were among the major scandals at the turn of the twentieth century that led to a breakdown in the
popular perception of pure imperial motives. 418 The rationalization, or “alibi” as Freudian
historian Peter Gay termed it, could no longer support the contradictions between the professed

414

H Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Schocken Books, New York, 2004. pp. 158-184; op. cit. Kiernan 1995;
op. cit. Gay 1984.
415
op. cit. Arendt, p. 221
416
ibid. pp. 191-207; op. cit. Black 2009 p. 195; op. cit. Ferguson 2000 pp. 272-82
417
I Hull, Absolute Destruction : Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany, Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, 2005.
418
op. cit. Hale 1971

161

values of “Civilization” and “Christianity,” and the realities of economic and military
exploitation. 419 Though popular social movements, like the Congo Reform Association rose to
shut down specific egregious cases, the notions of racial superiority continued to grow unabated
among segments of the European population. When coupled to nationalism, as in the Pan
movements (pan-Germanic, pan-Slavic, etc.), these racialized political projects began dividing
biologically identical populations from one another according to linguistic or cultural
differences. 420 As Horkheimer and Adorno’s analysis of Anti-Semitism theorized, negative
domestic social attributes could be ascribed to particular ethnicities. 421 So in Germany, enemies
of the empire (Reichsfeinde) were considered to be foreign powers as well as domestic enemies
(socialists, Leftist liberals, ethnic minorities, Catholics, etc.). The internal enemies were
identified with international conspiracies (Catholics with Austria, Poles with Slavs and Russians,
Jews with capitalism, Alsatians with France, liberals with Britain and France, etc. etc.). 422 This
reification of social conflict onto ethnic groups and nations allowed the process of “social
imperialism” to contain some of the internal disorder threatening to undermine the legitimacy of
the old regime political system during the fin de siècle and early twentieth century. The result
was an intensely chauvinistic public affect. This was, on the one hand, the expression of official
state communications reported by the media, but was also generated by the yellow media itself.
In 1899, Conan Doyle suggested that the greatest threat to the twentieth century was “an
irresponsible press,” 423 while J.A. Hobson thought that “the modern newspaper is a Roman

419

op. cit. Gay 1984, pp. 35-128
A Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires : Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 19141923, Routledge, London ; New York, 2001.
421
M Horkheimer and T Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment : Philosophical Fragments, Stanford University Press,
Stanford, Calif., 2002. pp. 137-172
422
op. cit. Mann 1993, p. 789; see also M Postone, 'Anti-Semitism and National Socialism: Notes on the German
Reaction To "Holocaust"', New German Critique, vol., issue 19, 1980, 97-115.
423
op. cit. Hale 1971, p. 3
420

162

arena, a Spanish bull-ring, and an English prize-fight rolled into one. The popularization of the
power to read has made the press the chief instrument of brutality.” 424
This jingoism, as well as scientific racism, patriarchy, demagoguery, and other
‘pathologies’ of nineteenth century European society, were reflections of psychologically
repressed violence according to Peter Gay, who said, “Every culture, every class, every century,
constructs its distinctive alibis for aggression. And each of these defensive strategems has its
history. Most are sheer replicas of time-honored rationalizations, or subtle variations on them;
only a handful ever manage to be truly innovative.” 425 Gay identified three major rationales, or
alibis, for aggressive impulses in the nineteenth century:
1. The case for competition – stemming from biological theory to economic,
political, literary, and private life.
2. The construction of the convenient Other.
3. The cult of manliness – a nineteenth century adaptation of the aristocratic
ideal of prowess.
These three expressions together constituted a distinctive “Victorian” culture, which was not
unique to Britain under Queen Victoria, but also applied to France, Germany, the United States,
and Europe in general. In order to understand this psychopathological mechanism at work, we
should return to the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud that inspired Gay’s theoretical
framework.
In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud considered the process of sublimation in the
individual ego within the context of civilization as a whole. He wrote,
Sublimation of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural
development; it is what makes it possible for higher psychical activities,
424
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scientific, artistic or ideological, to play such an important part in civilized life…it
is impossible to overlook the extent to which civilization is built up upon a
renunciation of instinct, how much it presupposes precisely the non-satisfaction
… of powerful instincts. This ‘cultural frustration’ dominates the large field of
social relationships between human beings. 426
Freud identified two contradictory instincts, Eros and Thanatos, that motivated individuals’
relationship to society. Eros, the capacity for empathic, altruistic desire for human relationships
leads individuals to identify with others and establish social bonds. The contrary drive, the death
drive, leads individuals to resent ‘civilization’ which provides so many personality
characteristics, especially the super-ego. The egoistic desire to sabotage one’s civilization
provides an inclination towards aggression, which civilization must channel and check. As Erich
Fromm suggested, this psychological explanation, when placed in a sociobiological and
historical framework, does not have to rely on an innate aggressive instinct, as Konrad Lorenz
theorized in the mid-twentieth century. 427 Rather, the real condition of existence of man qua
man, establishes a neuropsychological structure that may take the form of malignant aggression,
including sadism – the passion for power over another sentient being; and necrophilia – the
passion to destroy life and the attraction to dead and purely mechanical things. 428 Not every
individual handles these aggressive impulses in the same way. Still, at an aggregate level, these
instincts can be useful explanations for social phenomena. Not just war, but also competition
between rigid ideologies and business firms.
It is no coincidence that team sports were also institutionalized during this period in the
late nineteenth century. Again the technology of railroad provided a precondition that allowed
remote schools and teams to travel to one another to compete. This necessitated codification of
426
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rules so that teams could coordinate their incredibly varied versions of Football in order to play
together, leading to the three versions of American Football, Australian Rules (Rugby), and
Soccer. 429 The significance of sport is not most important for the athletes themselves, but rather,
as in the Roman Coliseum, makes its most vital impact on the mass of spectators. Lewis
Mumford described the effect:
Through his place in the chorus, the spectator finds his special release: usually cut
off from close physical associations by his impersonal routine, he is now at one
with a primitive undifferentiated group …The spectator feels himself contributing
by his presence to the victory of his side…for in the sports arena the spectator has
the illusion of being completely mobilized and utilized. 430
This is related to Freud’s principles of Group Psychology, which were later incorporated by
Adorno et al, in The Authoritarian Personality. 431 When one identifies with organized, artificial
masses, such as the church or the army, one transfers the libidinal dependency for the “father” to
the illusion of a supreme chief, or an authoritative idea, which is frequently negative. 432 By this
mechanism, each individual becomes bound to both the leader and the other members in the
group. While the specifics of Freud’s oedipal framework are rightfully controversial, the general
dynamic that establishes this form of mass psychology seems to be related to a number of the
processes we have been discussed thus far: sports, nationalism, racism, and war. Georg Simmel
theorized a similar process related to his in-group/out-group hypothesis by identifying a “rally
round the flag” effect that increases support for political leaders. Conflict with an out-group
increases the cohesion and political centralization of the in-group. 433
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However, not all channels of aggression are necessarily harmful. For example, in the
case of sports, we see in this period the development of the Olympic movement, intended
specifically for the establishment of world peace through athletic competition. One need not
identify with saber-rattling ideologies either, and could, instead engage with the substantial
international peace movement that was incredibly vital throughout the century, with its greatest
success in the decade immediately preceding World War I. 434 In 1899, Bertha von Suttner, an
Austrian aristocrat caused a sensation with her pacifist novel, Die Waffen Nieder, selling more
than a million copies in eight languages. She later convinced Swedish industrialist Alfred Nobel
to establish the Nobel peace prize in 1905, and enlisted Americans Theodore Roosevelt and
Andrew Carnegie, as well as Czar Nicholas II of Russia to the cause of peace. Roosevelt soon
thereafter resolved the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, while
the Czar Nicholas convened the second Hague Conference to establish armament limitations. In
1910, Andrew Carnegie established the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. These
were the culmination of a century of social peace movements, from the International Red Cross
established in1863 following the Austro-Sardinian war, to the Salvation Army, to the hundreds
of Associations dedicated to the establishment of International Law. 435
Ultimately, two contradictory ideologies were operating simultaneously within the
idolum immediately preceding World War I: the international peace movement and the jingoist
nationalist movement. These ideologies also drew from a number of laterally, dialectically, or
mimetically related trends that existed simultaneously, such as the leisure consumer culture, freemarket Liberalism, or Evangelical Christianity. How, precisely, the human individual
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internalized these varied ideologies is difficult to say from this perspective. Of course, every
individual personality was uniquely shaped at a microsociological level. Of these individuals,
the ones we should be most focused on are those at the political level at which decisions of war
and peace were made. This would certainly include the elites, who we have seen were largely
composed of old regime class members. But we must also recall Michael Mann’s definition of
the state as an “active place.” That is, these elites were also related to their populations and
territories at large, from which they drew their power. These citizens and subjects lobbied the
state for action that could be contradictory in practice or motivation. Industrialists might
encourage arms production, while pacifists might demand arms reduction. As democratization
proceeded throughout the century, these conciliations and contradictions became more
significant even as many principles, such as trade liberalism, balance-of-power, and international
law became institutionalized across time and space.
All of the military, economic, and political structural transformations outlined in the
previous section were established within a cultural context, or idolum. Even as structural
circumstances and considerations, such as accumulated surplus capital or diplomatic alliance
opportunities might compel state actors to establish particular institutions to reinforce or
countervail existing power relations, these actors did so with individual personalities shaped by
their cultural, ideological, and class milieu.

Conclusion: “Capitalism” vs. “Civilization”
The above considerations related to war, modernity, and capitalism represent only a
tentative outline of the major trends that took place across the nineteenth century (1815-1914).
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However, the goal of this essay has been directed toward challenging Polanyi’s thesis regarding
the Hundred Years’ Peace, and, by implication, economistic interpretations of war and society.
In this direction there are several points upon which we can assert that, while economic variables
were relevant and important, there is no basis upon which we can afford these economic
conditions primary explanatory importance. First, geostrategy and war itself were autonomous
pressures that continued to exert influence upon states. From the build-up of arms to the actual
short wars that did take place, the period between 1815 and 1914 did not substantially differ
from previous periods in military/diplomatic terms. While the influence of transnational
capitalism did exert important encouragement in the form of imperialism, and discouragement in
the form of a peace interest between Great Powers, no less important were the decisions by state
actors to institutionalize balance-of-power principles. The consequence of attributing economic
structural factors primary importance is that the actual development of the military in Europe
becomes clouded. Conscription, military industrial development, and the rationalization of
military theory within General Staffs were essential variables in both war and society. Without
recognizing these trends one cannot properly understand the First World War, or the twentieth
century that followed – a century that was by far the bloodiest period of human history. By
looking at the actual development of war and the military in the nineteenth century we see that
war is absolutely a component part of modernity.
By suggesting that war is somehow an atavism that has not yet been removed from
modern society, the Liberal/Marxian tradition relegates our understanding of war to “feudal,” or
“pre-modern” traditions held by the aristocratic rulers of national states. However, though the
hereditary position of old regime aristocrats has been relatively minimized during the course of
the twentieth century, this aristocratic class weakness was not present in the nineteenth century.
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By examining the ways in which the aristocracy imparted their cultural codes of honor and glory
to the rising bourgeoisie during this period we see the middle and lower classes - especially those
in civil service positions - engaged in “irrational” jingoistic nationalism. This phenomenon is
still with us today, as any newspaper headline regarding this or that “outrage” a nation or group
has committed against our nation, can provide evidence of.
Furthermore, we must also follow the development of the modern individual
consciousness in the age of industrialism and consumer capitalism. As traditional social bonds
were replaced by rationalized and commodified systems of social relations, the individual was
confronted with a void. According to Freudian conceptions of the pleasure principle and death
drive, the individual latched onto illusory groups, or ‘imagined communities’, as Benedict
Anderson would term them. Even if one does not assume the validity of psychoanalytic
conceptions of the self, there can be little doubt that the modern psyche underwent tremendous
change during the course of the nineteenth century. By the 1890s, intellectuals including Freud
himself, as well as Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, Karl Jung, Georges Sorel, and others were
beginning to see how necessary a recognition of human consciousness was in order to understand
the society they were living in. 436 Sociologists, including Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, and
Vilfredo Pareto, reacted to the distorted Enlightenment principles represented by positivism and
Marxism to insist that human sciences could not be understood according to mechanistic natural
laws. This pessimistic intellectual environment developed in the so-called fin de siècle societies
of Paris and Vienna. 437 Meanwhile, society at large experienced the belle époque, full of exotic
consumer products available at the Paris Arcades, with public museums, zoos, and libraries
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extending knowledge to the masses. 438 What wars, or threats of wars, existed were handled
through the medium of a popular press, creating a battle of words between hawks and doves one that has never ceased. Readers could invest themselves in these issues in entirely novel
ways, especially as democratic developments proceeded towards fulfillment of the promise of
the French Revolution. However, these citizens could just as easily invest their energy into
following sports, or religious and labor movements, or Harry Houdini, or technical achievements
like flight and cinema. All of this is to suggest that war, like other European institutions became
transformed into a commodity on the market of the public sphere. In this sense, we can speak of
the relationship between the capitalist economy and society as cultural practice, at the level of
the bourgeois individual, as Theodor Adorno or Michel Foucault might term it.
As Adorno outlined in Negative Dialectics, individuals have become products of the
exchange principle, or identity thinking. He wrote,
The individuals are not only character masks, agents of value in a supposedly
separate economic sphere. Even where they think they have escaped the primacy
of economics - all the way into their psychology, the maison toleree of
uncomprehended individuality - they react under the compulsion of the
universal. 439
In this sense, the individual is not, as the ideology of individualism suggests, an autonomous
utility maximizing agent, but rather a product of social content – of the societal totality, which in
the modern era has become capitalist. This dialectical perspective was taken up by Moishe
Postone in his critical Marxist analysis, Time, Labor, and Social Domination. Postone suggested
that Marx was really trying to communicate a theory of capitalism as a social totality, which was
unique in human history. Marx’s analysis is therefore exclusively applicable to modern society,
and is not, as traditional Marxists have suggested, a transhistorical theory of political economy.
438
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The modern capitalist social formation is constituted by a qualitatively homogenous social
‘substance,’ that is alienation. 440 Alienation and commodity fetishism allow a single structuring
principle to penetrate all social relations as a totality, in a way that is not the case in other social
formations. These deep structures ground everyday action and thought which reconstitute those
structures through practice. In this dialectical interaction between structure and agency, the
capitalist totality reproduces the actors that willfully regenerate that totality without knowing the
extent to which their interaction is constitutive of the society at large.
In this context, where capitalism is the social totality, we can begin to speak of the effect
of capitalism on war. Unfortunately, this project will need to be left for another occasion. I
would, however, like to make two points here regarding the dialectical framework of Adorno,
Postone, and other critical theorists. First, although Postone borrows heavily from Pierre
Bourdieu’s theories, which would include room for agents to improvise within the context of
“fields” – I find the Marxist perspective lacks a positive theory of action. 441 Instead, I find
Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration more useful, in that it allows actors, who are not
“cultural dupes,” to engage in freedom of action relative to the amount of power resources they
are able to draw from social structures. 442 This power need not be exclusively distributive (i.e.
domination), but may also include collective power that is not a part of a zero-sum game.
Structures constrain and enable.
Secondly, and more importantly, I find no reason why we should call that modern social
totality “capitalism.” Saying modern society is capitalism assumes a normative stance that
amounts to saying, ‘even if we acknowledge that base and superstructure are dialectically related
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- as Marx understood and Althusser did not - the social totality is still ultimately determined by
the economic base.’ As I hope the discussion of war in the nineteenth century has demonstrated,
there are many cases in which economic actions and structures could be deemed byproducts of
military activity. At the same time, war could be stimulated by cultural and ideological concerns
that were very isolated from economic issues. The complex totality of social issues, including
economic, military, religious, ideological, political, scientific, sexual, and other concerns, are a
necessary context through which any social phenomena needs to be understood. However,
unless one is interested in studying exclusively economic phenomena, there seems no scientific
reason to trace the core of modern society to economic issues. In many ways, this trend is itself
a reflection of a modern society which is so economically obsessed; and the Marxian argument
seems to be the greatest possible submission to the utilitarian idea that all human beings are
simply materialistic greedy creatures – homo economicus. Instead, I propose that we return to
the trend in the nineteenth and early twentieth century social analysis to engage in a discussion of
“civilization.” 443 What we have been talking about thus far concerns modern European
civilization, and the role of war within it. Provided we do not reassume the master narrative that
would associate civilization with the progress of European hegemony, the sociological use-value
of a concept of social totality could prove very effective.
These concluding remarks are clearly only indications toward further research. By
analyzing precisely what was lacking in the overly economically-determined Marxian, Liberal,
and Realist theories, while noting what was effective and useful, a picture of war in the
nineteenth century has begun to come into focus. But ultimately - like a grainy daguerreotype
taken during the Crimean War to provide some context to the interested newspaper subscriber in
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London or Barcelona - this research on war in the nineteenth century still needs further
development.
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Appendix
Table A.1 – Wars, Revolutions and the Bond Market, 1830-1914
Event

Starting
Date

1

7/27/1830

2

2/22/1848

Britain

Peak
Date

2/8/1831

3

6/2/1853 3/31/1854

4

4/19/1859 4/29/1859

France

Increasea Peak
Date

67

Russia

Increase Peak
Date

4/7/1848

505

4/7/1848

172 4/28/1848

662

4/7/1854

106 3/24/1854

175 3/31/1854

243

18 5/20/1859

50 5/27/1859

46 6/24/1859

426

6/8/1866

29 4/26/1867

298

12 4/27/1877

60 4/27/1877

59

52

6/8/1866

9

6

7/2/1870

3/31/1871

181

7

4/24/1877

8

2/4/1904
6/28/1914 7/13/1914

a

5

4/27/1877

5/10/1906
22 7/31/1914

5

7/13/1914

129
52 7/31/1914

All increases in basis points (one percent = 100 basis points)

Key:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Increase

273

6/7/1866

9

Increase Peak
Date

4/2/1831

5

5/4/1877

Austria

1830 Revolution: revolt against Charles X’s ordinances
1848 Revolution: revolt in Paris after ban on banquets
Crimean War: British fleet ordered to Dardanelles
Austro-Italian War: Austrian ultimatum to Sardinia to disarm
Austro-Prussian War: Prussian troops occupy Holstein
Franco-German War: Leopold of Hohenzollern’s acceptance of Spanish throne
Russo-Turkish War: Russia declares war on Turkey
Russo-Japanese War and 1905 Revolution: outbreak of war
Approach of First World War: assassination at Sarajevo

Source: Ferguson 1999, p. 276; orig.The Economist
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Table A.2 – Wars between “Western” Powers, 1815-1914a
War

Western Powers
Involvedb

Years

Duration
(months)

Franco-Spanish

France v. Spain

1823

7.3

Navarino Bay

1827

0.1

Russo-Turkish I

England, France,
Russia v. Turkey
Russia v. Turkey

1828-29

16.7

Russo-Turkish II

Russia v. Turkey

1877-78

8.8

Sino-French

France v. China

1884-85

11.8

Sino-Japanese

China v. Japan

1894-95

8.0

Spanish-American

USA v. Spain

1898

3.7

Russo-Japanese

Russia v. Japan

1904-05

19.3

Italo-Turkish

Italy v. Turkey

1911-12

12.7

Total

a
b

Does not include Great Power Wars listed in Table 3.2 (or Crimean War).
China, Japan, and USA are included when they entered into “Western” geopolitical orbit.

Source: Singer and Small 1972

88.4
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Table A.3 – Wars by “Western” Powers against Lesser States, 1815-1914
War

States Involved

Years

Mexican-American

USA v. Mexico

1846-48

21.1

First SchleswigHolstein
Anglo-Persian

Prussia v. Denmark

1848-49

8.1

England v. Persia

1856-57

4.6

Spanish-Moroccan I

Spain v. Morocco

1859-60

5.2

Franco-Mexican

France v. Mexico

1862-67

57.7

Second SchleswigHolstein
Spanish-Chilean

Prussia, Austria v.
Denmark
Spain v. Peru, Chile

1864

3.6

1865-66

6.5

Greco-Turkish

Turkey v. Greece

1897

3.1

Spanish-Moroccan II

Spain v. Morocco

1909-10

8.5

First Balkan

Turkey v. Serbia,
Greece, Bulgaria
Turkey, Serbia,
Greece, Romania v.
Bulgaria

1912-13

6.1

1913

1.0

Second Balkan

Total

Source: Singer and Small 1972

Duration
(months)

125.5
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Table A.4 - Wars Involving “Western” States and Non-State Actors, 1815-1914

War

States Involved

Years

British-Mahabattan
Greek
First Anglo-Burmese
Javanese
Russo-Persian
First Polish
First Syrian
First British Afghan
Second Syrian
First British-Sikh
Hungarian
Second British-Sikh
First Turco-Montenegran
Sepoy
Second Turco-Montenegran
Second Polish
Ten Years
Dutch-Achinese
Balkan
Bosnian
Second British-Afghan
British-Zulu
Franco-Indochine
Mahdist
Franco-Madagascar
Cuban
Italo-Ethiopian
First Philippine
Second Philippine
Boer

England
Turkey
England
Holland
Russia
Russia
Turkey
England
England, Turkey
England
Austria, Russia
England
Turkey
England
Turkey
Russia
Spain
Holland
Turkey
Austria
England
England
France
England
France
Spain
Italy
Spain
USA
England

1817-18
1821-28
1823-26
1825-30
1826-28
1831
1831-32
1838-42
1839-40
1845-46
1848-49
1848-49
1852-53
1857-59
1858-59
1863-64
1868-78
1873-78
1875-77
1878
1878-80
1879
1882-84
1882-85
1894-95
1895-98
1895-96
1896-98
1899-1902
1899-1902

Total

Source: Singer and Small 1972

Duration
(Months)
6.9
85.1
29.1
56.2
17.0
8.3
13.7
48.4
3.1
2.9
11.1
5.1
3.4
22.9
12.9
14.9
112.1
65.2
21.4
2.1
18.2
5.7
25.7
39.6
9.7
37.3
10.5
23.1
40.9
31.6

784.1
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Table A.5 - Wars and Issues, 1815-1914

Wars/major armed interventions

Dates

Issues for original combatants

Austria – Naples
Austria – Piedmont
France – Spain
Russia (Greece, Great Britain,
France) – Turkey

1820-21
1821
1822-23
1828-29

1.
1.
1.
1.

Belgium (France) – Holland

1830-33

2.
3.
4.
5.
1.

Turkey – Egypt

1832-33

Turkey – Egypt

1839-47

Prussia – Denmark

1848

Sardinia – Austria

1848-49

France – Roman Republic

1849

Russia (Austria) – Hungary

1849

Turkey (Great Britain, France,
Austria) – Russia

1853-56

2.
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
1.
2.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Government composition
Government composition
Government composition
National liberation/state creation (R.,
Gr., B.B., F.)
Protect religious confréres (R.)
Commerce/navigation (R., T.)
Protect ethnic confreres (R.)
Maintain integrity of empire (T.)
National liberation/state creation (B.,
F.)
Maintain integrity of state (H.)
Territory
Empire creation (E.)
Maintain integrity of empire (T.)
Dynastic claims
Territory
Empire creation (E.)
Maintain integrity of empire (T.)
Dynastic/succession claims (D.)
Territory
National unification/consolidation
Territory
National unification/consolidation
(S.)
Ideological liberation (S.)
Maintain integrity of empire (A.)
Government composition
Maintain regional dominance (F.)
National liberation/state creation
(H.)
Maintain integrity of empire (A., R.)
Protect religious confréres (R.)
National liberation/state creation
(Wallachia, Moldavia) (R.)
Balance of power (G.B., F., A.)
Maintain integrity of empire (T.,
G.B., F., A.)
Strategic territory (R.)
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Table A.5 continued

Wars/major armed interventions

Dates

Issues for original combatants

Sardinia (France) – Austria

1859

German Confederation (Prussia)
– Denmark

1863-64

Russia – Poland

1863

Austria – Prussia (Italy)

1866

1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1.
2.
1.
2.

Italy – Roman Republic

1870

France – Prussia

1870

Serbia, Montenegro – Turkey

1876-1878

Russia – Turkey

1877-1878

Bulgaria – Turkey

1885

3.
1.
2.
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1.
2.
3.

Territory (F., S.)
National liberation/state creation (S.)
Ideological liberation (S.)
Maintain integrity of empire (A.)
Dynastic/succession claims
Protect ethnic confréres (P.)
Strategic territory (D.)
Enforce treaty terms (P.)
National unification/consolidation
Territory
Ethnic unification/irredenta
National liberation/state creation (P.)
Maintain integrity of empire (R.)
Territory
National unification/consolidation
(P., I)
Maintain regional dominance (A.)
National unification/consolidation
(I.)
Regime/state survival (R.R.)
National honor (F.)
Test of strength
National unification/consolidation
(P.)
Territory
National unification/consolidation
(S., M.)
Maintain integrity of empire (T.)
Protect religious confréres (R.)
Territory
National liberation/state creation
(Wallachia, Moldavia) (R.)
Protect ethnic confréres (R.)
Commerce/navigation (R.)
Maintain integrity of empire (T.)
Ethnic unification/irredenta (B.)
National unification/consolidation
(B.)
Maintain integrity of empire (T.)
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Table A.5 continued

Wars/major armed interventions

Dates

Issues for original combatants

Serbia – Bulgaria
Turkey – Greece

1885
1897

Spain – United States

1898

1. Territory
1. Protect ethnic confreres
2. National liberation/state creation
(Crete)
1. Ideological liberation (U.S.)
2. Commerce/navigation (U.S.)
3. Maintain integrity of empire (S.)
4. National liberation/state creation
(Cuba, U.S.)
1. Maintain regional dominance
2. Commerce/navigation
3. Autonomy (C.)
1. Strategic territory (G.B.)
2. Autonomy (B.)
3. Protect nationals/commercial
interests abroad (G.B.)
1. Empire creation (R.)
2. Colonial competition
3. Strategic territory (J.)
1. Territory
2. Maintain integrity of empire (T.)
1. Territory
2. Maintain integrity of empire (T.)
1. Territory
2. National honor (A.)
3. Maintain intergrity of empire (A.)
4. Protect ethnic confréres (S.)
5. Regime/state survival (A.)

Russia, Great Britain, Germany – 1898-1900
Chinese rebels
Boer Republics – Great Britain

1899-1902

Japan – Russia

1904-1905

Italy – Turkey

1911-1912

Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece,
Serbia – Turkey
Bulgaria – Serbia, Greece
Austria-Hungary - Serbia

1912-1913

Source: Holsti 1991, pp. 140-142

1913
1914
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Table A.6 – Issues that Generated Wars, 1815-1914

Issues

a
b

Frequency

Previous
period %a
8

I.E.M.P Typeb

Maintain integrity of
state/empire
Territory
National liberation/
state creation
National unification/
consolidation
Protect ethnic confréres
Government
composition
Strategic territory
Commerce/navigation
Dynastic/succession
claims
Ideological liberation
Protect religious
confréres
Maintain regional
dominance
Empire creation
Regime/state survival
Ethnic
unification/irredenta
National crown honor
Autonomy
Balance of power
Enforce treaty terms
Test of strength
Colonial competition
Protect nationals/
commercial interests
abroad

17

% of
wars
55

13
9

42
29

67
8

P
I, P

8

26

-

I, P

5
4

16
13

14

I
P

4
4
3

13
13
10

17
36
22

M
E
P

3
3

10
10

1
11

I
I

3

10

-

E, P

3
2
2

10
6
6

11
17
-

P
P
I

2
2
1
1
1
1
1

6
6
3
3
3
3
3

3
3
8
11
-

P
P
P
E
M
E
E

Total

92

1715-1814
Ideological (I); Economic (E.); Military (M); Political (P)

Source: Holsti 1991, p. 145

P
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Table A.7 – Progress of Railway Building

Number of countries
in Europe

1845

1855

1865

1875

with railways

9

14

16

18

with over 1,000
km. railway line

3

6

10

15

with over 10,000
km. railway line

-

3

3

5

Source: Hobsbawm 1996, p. 54
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Table A.8 – Density of Railway Network, 1880
km2 (per 10,000)

Country

over 1,000

Belgium

over 750

United Kingdom

over 500

Switzerland, Germany, Netherlands

250-499

France, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Italy

100-249

Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Rumania, United
States, Cuba

50-99

Turkey, Chile, New Zealand, Trinidad,
Victoria, Java

10-49

Norway, Finland, Russia, Canada, Uruguay,
Argentina, Peru, Costa Rica, Jamaica, India,
Ceylon, Tasmania, N.S. Wales, S. Australia,
Cape Colony, Algeria, Egypt, Tunis

Source: Hobsbawm 1996, p. 310
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Table A.9 – Wars, New Technology and Weapons, 1800-1914

Year

War

1800
1805
1809
1813
1820
1821
1822
1827
1831

French revolutionary

1833
1834
1837
1839-42

1849
1850
1850-64
1851
1852

Chemical-electric primary cell
Percussion cap
Bottled food
Steam-powered armored warship
Electromagnetic rotation
Natural-gas well
Photographic plate
Water-turbine engine
Steam-turbine engine;
Electromagnetic induction
Plastics
Electric motor;
Computer
Screw-propelled boat;
Practical telegraph system

First Afghan
First Opium
Fuel cell;
Canned food

1839
1845-9
1845
1846

Technology/Weapon

Anglo-Sikh
Pneumatic tire
Nitrocellulose;
Rodman gun barrel;
Anesthetics;
Arc light, Carbon;
Bombs from unmanned balloons
Morse code with telegraph ‘sounding key’
Taiping Rebellion
All-steel artillery piece
Repeater rifle;
Man-carrying, non-rigid airship

1854-7
1854
1855

Crimean

1856-60
1856
1857-58
1858

Second Opium

Periscope
Cowen’s armored fighting vehicle;
Refrigeration;
Rodman powder
Bessemer steel
Indian Mutiny
Heliograph; Aerial Photography
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Table A.9 – continued

Year

War

1859

Austro-Piedmont

1860
1861-5
1861-7
1864
1865
1866
1870-71
1870
1873

American Civil
Franco-Mexican
Danish-Prussian
Austro-Prussian
Austro-Italian
Franco-Prussian

1874
1875
1876

1877-8
1878-80
1879

Russo-Turkish
Second Afghan

1880-81
1881
1882
1883-5
1884

First Boer

1885

1886
1888
1889

Technology/Weapon
La Gloire armored ship;
Breech-loading artillery;
Hand-rotated machine-gun;
First successful oil well;
Lead-acid storage battery
Magazine rifle
Turreted ironclad warship
Pasteurized food
Antiseptics
Locomotive torpedo
Anti-aircraft gun
Xylonite (Celluloid)
Spar torpedo-boat;
Practical typewriter
Barbed wire
Ballistite smokeless powder;
Cordite
Telephone;
Four-stroke gas engine;
Locomotive torpedo-boat

Electric-light bulb;
Dynamo
Searchlight
Armored Steel
Sino-French
Destroyer;
Steam-turbine dynamo
Four-wheel motor carriage;
Smokeless powder;
Semi-automatic machine-gun
Electrically powered submarine
Portable roll-film camera;
Pneumatic tyre
Cine-camera;
Radio waves;

204

Table A.9 – continued

Year
1890
1892
1894-5
1895

War

Electromechanical computer
Detected radio signal
Sino-Japanese

1897

1898
1899-1901
1899
1900-1901
1900

Spanish-American
Second Boer

Radio transmission and reception;
Gyroscope
Steam-turbine-engine ship;
French 75mm field gun;
Cathode-ray-tube oscilloscope
Wire recorder (forerunner of tape recorder)
Armored car
Plastic explosive (later RDX)

Boxer Rebellion

1901
1902
1903
1904-5
1905

Technology/Weapon

Russo-Japanese

1906
1908
1909
1910

1911-50
1911-12

Chinese revolutionary
Italo-Turkish

1912-13

Balkan

Source: Macksey 1993, pp. xv-xix

Gas-electric submarine;
Rigid airship
Transatlantic radio link
Thermionic diode valve;
TNT
Powered, heavier-than-air flying machine
Radio-direction-finding (DF)
Dreadnought battleship;
Scott naval fire-control system
Radio crystal detector
Voice radio
Duralumin;
Bakelite
Aerial bombing;
Armed aircraft;
Nuclear theory;
Shipborne aircraft
Seaplane;
Airborne torpedo
Aircraft catapult
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Table A.10 – Centrala State Expenditures in Current Prices, 1800-1910
Prussia-Germany

Austria
Year

Absolute
(millions
of florins)

1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910

216
160
138
165
269
367
332
432
560
803
1,451

% of
GNP

%
%
Military Civilianb
57
35
33
33
47
51
24
19
19
17
16

9
9
11
11
11
12
13
15
17

15
33
35
35
34
39
46
45
39
47
60

Absolute
(millions
of marks)
201
219
204
252
323
1,380
519
1,044
1,494
2,673

France

% of
GNP

%
%
Military Civilian

19
17
12
9
8
15
4
5
5
6

38
34
35
37
36
40
82
78
59
52

45
50
53
48
49
22
15
25
35
40

Great Britain

Year

Absolute
(millions
of francs)

% of
GNP

%
Military

%
Civilian

Absolute
(millions
of pounds)

% of
GNP

%
Military

%
Civilian

1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910

726
934
907
1,095
1,363
1,473
2,084
2,482
3,141
3,154
3,557
3,878

9
10
7
7
8
9
9
10
13
14
12
11

64
75
25
30
34
35
39
26
30
34
38
37

24
9
48
47
49
29
17
32
39
32
36
40

51.0
81.5
57.5
53.7
53.4
55.5
69.6
67.1
81.5
90.6
143.7
156.9

19
27
20
16
12
10
11
7
8
7
9

31
59
29
28
26
27
25
32
53
36
48
40

5
11
17
18
19
22
34
28
35
37
36
47

a

Mann also provides figures for All government expenditures (i.e. beyond central state expenditures). Adding these
slightly increases % allocated to civilian expenditures)
b
Civilian + Military + Interest = 100 %

Source: Mann 1993, pp. 363, 366, 373
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Table A.11 – Land of the British Isles Held in Estates of 1,000+ Acres, 1880

Country

Number of Owners

Total acres owned

% of total land area
owned

4,736

12,825,643

56.1

672

1,490,915

60.78

Ireland

3,745

15,802,737

78.4

Scotland

1,758

17,584,828

92.82

10,911

47,704,123

66.14

177,000,000
-

14.0
20.0
40.0
52.0

England

Wales

Total (UK)

Total (Russia)
Total (France)
Total (Prussia)
Total (Spain)

Source: Cannadine 1990, pp. 9, 19
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